PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CENTER, REPRESENTED BY VICTORIA BERCILLES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GREGORY WILLIAM OLSEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Philippine International Convention Center versus Olsen

The Case

This is the case of Philippine International Convention Center versus Olsen. The Philippine International Convention Center, through its representative Victoria Bercilles, sued Gregory William Olsen, an Australian citizen, for the crime of theft, alleging that he took nine audio and visual equipment units from its sound control room. The trial court acquitted Olsen on reasonable doubt but said nothing about his civil liability. The Convention Center appealed on that civil aspect alone. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's cleanest statement of a rule every criminal lawyer must hold: an acquittal on reasonable doubt does not automatically extinguish the civil liability of the accused, and the trial court has a duty to make a finding on that civil liability.

Procedural History

Olsen was indicted for theft before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111. He pleaded not guilty, and trial followed, with the Convention Center intervening through a private prosecutor. After Olsen failed to appear at a scheduled trial despite having posted bail, the lower court proceeded with the trial in absentia. On June 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting Olsen on reasonable doubt and ordering the release of his cash bond.

The Convention Center moved for reconsideration of the civil aspect. In an order dated March 15, 2000, the trial court denied the motion, holding that the testimonies of the Convention Center's witnesses did not prove or substantially show that the accused was responsible. The Convention Center then appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning as error the trial court's failure to find Olsen civilly liable for unlawfully taking its sound and electric equipment.

Facts

The Convention Center accused Olsen of taking nine audio and visual equipment units from its sound control room sometime between June 13 and June 19, 1997, equipment valued at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos, more or less. The information charged him with theft, and he pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the prosecution's two key witnesses, Alvin Miranda and Raymond Garcia, testified that they saw Olsen enter the sound control room through the window. But neither of them actually saw Olsen remove or take any equipment from the room. The trial court found their testimonies hollow and doubted their credibility, noting that the equipment was bulky and mostly rack mounted, and that Olsen could not plausibly have disassembled it and carried it off in a black bag and a rice sack, especially in the dark. On reasonable doubt, the court acquitted him.

What the trial court did not address was Olsen's sworn statement dated June 21, 1997, in which he admitted that he was the one responsible for stealing the electronic sound system equipment and said he wanted to return it. The trial court had declared that statement inadmissible as a confession of guilt, but the Supreme Court saw it differently, as an admission of the act complained of.

Issues

• Whether or not an acquittal based on reasonable doubt bars the continuation of the civil case connected with the criminal action.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not finding Olsen civilly liable for the equipment taken from the Convention Center.
• Whether or not the case should be remanded to the trial court for reception of further evidence on the specification, quantity, and value of the equipment taken.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

This is the provision the Court applies: it imposes on the trial court the duty to rule on civil liability even when it acquits, and it is the textual anchor of the entire ruling.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the continuation of the civil case connected with it where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, where the decision declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil, or where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. The first exception was present: the lower court acquitted Olsen on reasonable doubt, which the Court described as a doubt that a reasonable man might entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court's doubt on guilt did not automatically extinguish civil liability. Olsen was acquitted only because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the offense, unlawful taking. Nowhere in the decision was there a declaration that the asportation did not happen. The Court quoted Section 2 of Rule 120, set out above, and stressed that the trial court should have made a finding on civil liability. It also distinguished confession from admission, quoting People versus Lorenzo: a confession is an acknowledgment in express terms of guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement of facts pertinent to the issue tending, with other facts, to prove guilt. Olsen's sworn statement, though inadmissible as a confession, was competent as an admission of the act complained of.

On the third issue, the Court held that civil liability cannot rest on mere allegations. Quoting Lagon versus Hooven Comalco Industries, it ruled that a court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend on competent proof that damage was suffered and on the best evidence obtainable as to its actual amount. Olsen's admission was ambiguous: it was unclear whether he took all or merely some of the missing equipment. Following People versus De Chavez, the Court held that a remand was necessary for the reception of further evidence on the particulars and value of the equipment taken, with Olsen entitled to present countervailing evidence.

Doctrine

An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish the civil liability of the accused. Under Section 2 of Rule 120, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment of acquittal shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. The civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case in three situations: when the acquittal rests on reasonable doubt, when the decision declares the liability to be civil only, and when the civil liability is not derived from the criminal act charged.

An extrajudicial statement inadmissible as a confession may still be received as an admission of the act, which is something less than a confession and insufficient by itself to convict. Finally, civil liability must be proved, not assumed: the fact of damage and its amount must rest on competent proof, never on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the appeal, vacated and set aside the trial court's decision and order insofar as Olsen was not adjudged civilly liable, and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for reception of evidence on the specification, quantity, and value of the equipment taken, with Olsen given the right to present countervailing evidence.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an acquittal on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability, and the trial court must make a finding on that civil liability. Examiners use this case to test the exceptions to the rule that an acquittal bars the civil action, and the distinction between a confession and an admission.