PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CENTER, REPRESENTED BY VICTORIA BERCILLES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GREGORY WILLIAM OLSEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CRUZ, J.:
“That on or about and for the period June 13 – 19, 1997 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, GREGORY WILLIAM OLSEN, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the consent of the Philippine International Convention Center, represented in this case by Ms. Victoria Berciles (sic), take, steal and carry away the following Philippine International Convention Center properties, viz: one (1) unit JVC HR J7 PMS video recorder/player; one (1) unit Pioneer CLDS 330 Laser Disc player with S.N. QA2611647; one (1) unit C Audio RA4001 Power Amplifier S.N. R.A. 501023; one (1) unit Denon 77OR Dual Cassete tape deck S.N. 5082402693; one (1) unit Tascam CD 401 MK II CD Player S.N. 0320273962; one portable equipment consisting of: 1 unit Denon 730 R Recording Cassette deck S.N. 4070400306; 1 unit Denon 77OR Dual Cassette tape deck S.N. 5127600418; 1 unit Tascam CD 410 Mk II Cd player S.N. 0320246; Navitar Slide to Video converter; University Sound Power Amplifier Model A150; two (2) units Motorola handheld radios with charger and one (1) unit printer, all of which is valued at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) more or less to the damage and prejudice of its owners.”
As appellee entered a not-guilty plea, trial ensued. Appellant intervened in the case through a private prosecutor.
Because of appellee’s non-appearance at a scheduled trial after posting bail for his provisional liberty, the lower court proceeded with the trial in absentia (order dated February 18, 1998).
The prosecution presented the testimonies of: (i) Alvin Miranda (or “Alvin”) and Raymond Garcia (or “Raymond”), to prove that appellee took the missing equipment from appellant’s sound control room; (ii) Victoria Bercilles, who testified on the quantity and value of the missing equipment; (iii) Agnes Pineda, bank officer from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (or “BSP”), to show that, as part of appellant’s rehabilitation, BSP paid the latter’s contractor, Electro Systems Industries Corporation (or “contractor”), for the value of the missing equipment; and (iv) Atty. Julius Caesar Llamas, to prove that appellee was afforded constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
On June 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting appellee of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby acquits, on reasonable doubt, ACCUSED GREGORY WILLIAM OLSEN of the crime of THEFT as charged in the information of June 23, 1997.
The cash bond which he posted for his provisional liberty under O.R. No. 7670127 in the amount of P20,000.00 dated August 21, 1997 is hereby ordered to be released to the named payor.
SO ORDERED.”
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on the civil aspect of the case. In an order dated March 15, 2000, however, the lower court denied the motion on the ground that the testimonies of appellant’s witnesses, particularly on the taking of the missing equipment, “did not prove or substantially show that the accused was responsible.”
Unfazed, appellant interposed the instant appeal ascribing error to the lower court –
“IN NOT FINDING (APPELLEE) CIVILLY LIABLE FOR UNLAWFULLY TAKING THE SOUND AND ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OWNED BY (APPELLANT).”
Appellant contends that the trial court, in resolving the issue concerning appellee’s civil liability, applied the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases; and that the taking of the missing equipment by appellee, the amount of damage sustained by appellant and the ownership of the missing equipment were established by preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, appellee maintains that he is not civilly liable because the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
It is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation of the civil case connected therewith where (i) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (ii) the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil; or (iii) the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted (Sadio vs. RTC of Antique, Br. 10, 201 SCRA 744). The first exception is obtaining in the case at bench.
The lower court acquitted appellee on reasonable doubt, which is one that a reasonable man might entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence (F. B. Moreno, Philippine Law Black Dictionary, 3rd edition, p. 791). The basis of appellee’s acquittal was discussed by the lower court in the assailed decision, to wit:
“The two (2) key witnesses for the prosecution – Mr. Alvin Miranda and Raymond Garcia, who work as audio- visual technician and sub-contractor respectively, and who happened to be working then at the Plenary Hall of the PICC in the late afternoon of June 19, 1997, which they later changed to June 18, 1997, testified that they saw the accused entering the Sound Control Room at the third floor through the window. But neither Mr. Miranda nor Mr. Garcia actually saw the accused removed or took any audio-visual and electronic equipment from the Sound Control Room.
x x x
Verily, the testimonies of the two (2) key witnesses of the prosecution on the alleged ‘taking’ by the accused of the equipment from the Sound Control Room which were purportedly missing were hollowed and cast serious doubt to their credibility. Moreover, the equipment allegedly lost or rather taken by the accused were bulky and most of it were rack mounted as may be gleaned from (Exhibit ‘D’) the Electro Systems Report on the nomenclature and description of the missing sound/visual equipment. Assuming that the accused removed each component from the racks on which they were mounted before placing them inside the black bag and rice sack adverted to by witness Raymond Garcia, at least he would have needed the use of some kind of tools to swiftly disassemble them from the racks. x x x.x x x
Thus, doubts pervades (sic) as to how the accused was able to place his entire loot in a rice sack and in a bag. Or did he probably left (sic) the bag and the rice sack outside and swiftly carried (sic) or brought (sic) out unnoticed piece by piece or in bulk the component and equipment from the Sound Control Room to a concealed nook somewhere in the PICC premises? How could the accused possibly have done that – to easily dismantle or disassemble from the racks the components and equipment if it was already dark as it was already about 7:30 p.m., according to witness Garcia, when he allegedly entered the Sound Control Room assuming that the said room was not illuminated? The mind of the court cannot rest easy on these questions.”
The trial court’s doubt on the guilt of appellee, which prompted it to absolve him from criminal liability, did not automatically extinguish his civil liability. This is so because “(i)n case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party” (Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Appellee was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the offense, i.e., unlawful taking. But nowhere in the assailed decision is there a declaration that the asportation did not happen.
Curiously, appellee admitted in his sworn statement dated June 21, 1997 (Exh. “G”) that it was he who took the “stolen equipments”, although he wanted to “return” the same. The sworn statement pertinently reads:
“05. Question: Are you aware that you have been implicated to a theft case, that the management of PICC, CCP Complex is accusing you of stealing some Electronic Sound System equipments (sic) from the plenary hall of PICC?
Answer: Yes, Sir.
06. Question: What can you say about this?
Answer: I admit their accusations all I wanted is to get – it back to them.
07. Question: What do you mean ‘I admit their accusations’?
Answer: That I am the one responsible in stealing the said electronic sound systems equipment.
08. Question: And what do you mean by ‘I wanted is to get-it back to them’.
Answer: I wanted to return the stolen equipments.
x x x
19. Question: How did you enter the premises of the Plenary Hall?Answer: I just came in on the main entrance, enetred (sic) the Control room thru the window and put the equipments inside the sack.
20. Question: I have no more further questions you have anything to say?
Answer: I wish I could return the equipments, cause (sic) I feel sorry for what I have done.”
While the lower court declared the abovementioned sworn statement inadmissible in evidence as a confession of guilt on the part of appellee, nonetheless, it may be considered as admission of the act complained of. The distinction between confession and admission was explained in People vs. Lorenzo (240 SCRA 624), thus:
“Wharton defines confession as follows: ‘A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.’”
Be that as it may, the court’s determination of civil liability cannot be based on mere allegations. This is clear in the case of Lagon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. (349 SCRA 363), where the Supreme Court held that “(a) court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend upon competent proof that they have indeed been suffered by the injured party and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable as to the actual amount thereof.”
While there are supposedly nine (9) missing equipment, as described in the contractor’s letter to appellant dated August 7, 1997 (Exh. “D”), it is not clear whether all those items were taken by appellee. As stated by the lower court:
“As culled from the Report of the Electro Systems, (Exhibit ‘D’) most of the nine (9) missing equipment were actually rack-mounted, in other words; the racks on which they were mounted were also missing as listed. It is of common knowledge that a rack for a full-size stereo component cannot fit into a rice sack and the components/equipment allegedly missing are neither midi nor mini size components at all.
The above-cited inferences cannot altogether be discounted. In fact, Ms. Victoria Berciles, the administrative manager of PICC, testified that; viz:
On Cross-Examination
Atty. Manansala:
‘Q: As manager, have you seen personally these equipment?Ms. Berciles:
A: Yes, I saw these when they were at the audio/visual room.Q: Listed here are nine (9) equipment. Is it possible that a single person can carry it all at the same time or at one time?
A: I am not sure. Maybe the way he brings them out. I am not sure at one time.’ (TSN; Dec. 8, 1997; p. 45)”
Noteworthy is the case of People vs. De Chavez (9 SCRA 780) where the Supreme Court held:
“The trial judge in not having included civil liability in the decision, stated that it cannot exercise discretion alone in determining the liability upon the mere allegations, the same being evidentiary. Considering, however, the fact that the trial court’s attention was drawn to the existence of a lapsus in the decision, in the motion for reconsideration filed by the complaint, within the reglementary period, and taking into account the petition to supply what had been omitted, the trial judge could have set the motion for reconsideration for hearing, in order to receive evidence, as to the value of the properties admittedly stolen by the accused, or to the return of the goods, if it was still feasible. In an identical case, where the lower court had failed to provide for the corresponding civil liability, this Court ordered the said case remanded to the court of origin, for the purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused (Peo. v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, citing U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil. 600).”
Appellee’s admission on the taking of the “stolen equipments” (sic) is ambiguous; it is not clear whether he took all or merely some of the missing equipment. Consequently, there is a need for a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of further evidence on the particulars of the audio and visual equipment belonging to appellant which were taken by appellee, as well as the value thereof.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated June 8, 1999 and order dated March 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 111) are VACATED and SET ASIDE insofar as defendant-appellee was not adjudged civilly liable to plaintiff-appellant for the value of the latter’s audio and visual equipment which were asported by him. Let this case be REMANDED to that court for reception of evidence on the specification, quantity and value of the aforesaid equipment, with the right on the part of defendant-appellee to present countervailing evidence, and for other proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Roxas[*] and Bato, Jr., JJ., concur.
[*] Vice Justice Arturo D. Brion, now Secretary of Labor and Employment