COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. F. FERNANDEZ, J. RODRIGUEZ, A. CANIZARES, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN GARCIA TEBA…

Commissioner of Immigration versus Garcia

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Commissioner of Immigration against the Justices of the Court of Appeals and against Juan Garcia, who had brought a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Teban Caoili. The Commissioner asks the Supreme Court to restrain the Court of Appeals from enforcing its order releasing Teban Caoili on bail pending appeal, and from taking further cognizance of the habeas corpus case. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over habeas corpus appeals and the corrective reach of certiorari, and because it insists that even purely administrative proceedings of the Bureau of Immigration must respect the cardinal primary right to a hearing.

Procedural History

Teban Caoili was arrested in March 1964 by virtue of a Warrant of Exclusion. Juan Garcia, a relative, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. The trial court denied the motion for provisional release and, on a stipulation of facts, dismissed the petition, holding that the Board of Commissioners acted within the law and that the detention was valid and legal. Caoili appealed to the Court of Appeals on both questions of law and of fact, and moved for release on bail. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and ordered his release upon bond. The Solicitor General then filed with the Supreme Court this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction because the issues were purely legal, and that, in any event, the Justices acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering release on bail. The Supreme Court gave due course and issued the injunctive writ, and after oral argument dismissed the petition by minute resolution, reserving a fuller opinion, which it then rendered.

Facts

In June 1961, Teban Caoili and his three brothers arrived from Hongkong, each holding a certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong. They came to join their father, Antonio Caoili, whom they claimed to be a Filipino citizen. The Bureau of Immigration's Board of Special Inquiry admitted them as Filipino citizens by birth. In July 1961, the old Board of Commissioners, by majority vote, affirmed that decision, with only Commissioner Galang voting for exclusion. Teban Caoili was then issued an identification certificate, and he exercised the rights of citizenship: he registered as a voter, was issued a Philippine passport, paid residence taxes, filed income tax returns, was employed with a company on Rizal Avenue in Manila, and became a member of the Social Security System.

In June 1962, a new Board of Commissioners, constituted after a change of administration, reviewed the case on its own motion and unanimously voted to exclude Teban Caoili and his brothers as aliens not properly documented, ordering them returned to the port whence they came. On the same date, the Commissioner issued a Warrant of Exclusion. Teban Caoili was not notified of, and was not present at, that review. The Commissioner later explained that notice was intended but that Caoili could not be found. An investigation by the Office of the Secretary of Justice recommended that no case be filed, since the brothers appeared to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino father.

More than a year after the warrant issued, in March 1964, Teban Caoili was arrested by virtue of the Warrant of Exclusion and detained at Camp Crame. Juan Garcia then filed the petition for habeas corpus, alleging that Caoili was a Filipino citizen and that the Commissioner had no authority over him.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the decision denying the petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner contending that the issues were purely legal.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in ordering the release of Teban Caoili on bail pending appeal.
• Whether or not the new Board of Commissioners could validly review on its own motion, and reverse, a decision already affirmed by its predecessor Board.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27(b) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, governs the review of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, and provides:

The decision of any of the two members of the board shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision.

This provision is the hinge of the case: the new Board invoked it to justify its motu proprio review, and the Court measures the Board's action against its terms.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction. The notice of appeal plainly averred that questions of law and of fact would be raised, and the appellee had no right to limit the issues on appeal, not being the one making the appeal. The Court found that questions of fact were genuinely involved: the propriety and regularity of the reversing order of the new Board was a factual issue, as was the claim that Caoili's absence was due to his elusiveness. The Court noted that the old Board had already affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry in July 1961, a fact not even disclosed in the petition, and that what the new Board reviewed was virtually the decision of the old Board, not that of the Board of Special Inquiry. The law, the Court said, does not authorize the new board to review that of its predecessor board, but only that of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion. The Justices, considering all the facts, were of the opinion that release on bail was proper. Even granting that they made an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, their actuations could not be the subject of certiorari or prohibition. The appeal was one from a decision denying habeas corpus, presented by a person who had already been a Filipino citizen, not an ordinary alien applying for admission. The Court left the applicability of the Cloribel case to the respondent court.

On the third issue, the Court stressed that while the proceedings were administrative in nature, that circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. It quoted its own doctrine from Ang Tibay versus the Court of Industrial Relations, that there are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings, the first of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The Court found unusual hurry: the review, the decision, and the Warrant of Exclusion all took place on the same date. It warned that an arbitrary, abusive, and indiscriminate exercise of the right to review, even if granted by law, would obliterate the right of an individual to due process and deal a destructive blow to the rule of law.

Doctrine

A new Board of Commissioners of Immigration may not, under Section 27(b) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, review on its own motion the decision of its predecessor Board; the law authorizes review only of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, and only within one year from their promulgation. Administrative proceedings, though not judicial, must respect the cardinal primary rights, foremost the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's own case and submit evidence. The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over a habeas corpus appeal where questions of fact are raised, and an error of fact or law in ordering release on bail is not correctible by certiorari absent grave abuse of discretion.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the preliminary injunction earlier issued was dissolved, without costs; the Commissioner lost, and the release of Teban Caoili on bail stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a new Board cannot review the decision of its predecessor Board, only that of the Board of Special Inquiry. Examiners use this case to test the limits of motu proprio review under the Immigration Act and the application of the cardinal primary rights to administrative proceedings.