COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. F. FERNANDEZ, J. RODRIGUEZ, A. CANIZARES, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN GARCIA TEBA…

PAREDES, J.:

On June 7, 1961, Teban Caoili and his three (3) brothers, Vicente, Santos and
Felipe, arrived from Hongkong on board a CPA plane. All of them were provided
with certificate of registration and identity, issued by the Philippine
Consulate General at Hongkong. They came to join their father, Antonio Caoili,
whom they claim to be a Filipino citizen. Their application for admission as
Philippine citizens were docketed as IC No. 61-1881-C to 61-1884-C, and were
considered by the Bureau of Immigration Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. On June
23, 1961, the said Board of Special Inquiry rendered a decision admitting them
as Filipino citizens, by birth. Under date of July 7, 1961, the then Board of
Commissioners composed of Commissioner Galang and Deputy Commissioners de la
Rosa and Talabis, affirmed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, with
Commissioners de la Rosa and Talabis voting for the admission of the Caoilis,
while, Commissioner Galang voted for their Exclusion. According to existing
rules of procedure in the Bureau, a majority vote was sufficient to sustain or
reverse a ruling or decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. After the Board of
Commissioners affirmed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, Teban
Caoili was issued Identification Certificate No. 15648 on July 10, 1961, worded
as follows –

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that TEBAN CAOILI x x male, x x 28 years old, x x single
whose picture and finger print are affixed hereto and partially covered by the
seal of this Office who was born in Amoy, Fukien, China on 4 November 1932, ex
CPA plane on 7 June 1961, was ADMITTED as citizen of the Philippines as per
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY DATED 23 JUNE 1961, DULY AFFIRMED BY
THE MAJORITY MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, I.C. No. 1881-C.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

Thereafter, Teban Caoili exercised the rights and prerogatives appurtenant to
Philippine citizenship; he registered as a voter, was issued a Philippine
Passport, paid his residence taxes (A & B), filed his corresponding Income
Tax Returns, he was employed with the AVESCO, with offices at downtown Manila,
and became a member of the Social Security System.

On June 23, 1962, however, a new Board of Commissioners which replaced the
old Board, due to the change of Administration, allegedly reviewed motu
proprio, pursuant to the provision of Sec. 27(b) of the Immigration Act of
1940, as amended, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, notwithstanding
the fact that the same had been already affirmed by the old Board. By a
unanimous decision, the new Board of Commissioners, composed of Mesrrs.
Martiniano P. Vivo, Marcial O. Raflola and Virgilio N. Gaston, voted to exclude
Teban Caoili and his three brothers, as aliens not properly documented, for
admission in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29(a) (17) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and ordered them returned to the port
whence they came or to the country of which they were nationals. On the same
date, the Commissioner (respondent herein issued a Warrant of Exclusion, the
pertinent portions of which read –

“AND WHEREAS, the said Decision of the Board of Commissioners ordering the
deportation of TEBAN CAOILI, VICENTE CAOILI, SANTOS CAOILI and FELIPE CAOILI is
final and now executory;

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the undersigned by law, you
are hereby commanded to carry out the exclusion of the above named alien son the
first available transportation to the port whence they came or to the port of
the country of which they are nationals.”

After the issuance of the above Warrant of Exclusion, the Office of the
Secretary of Justice conducted an investigation regarding the status of Teban
Caoili and his brothers, and on January 25, 1963, the investigator rendered a
report, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced below –

“FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 21 January 1963 this office received an information which states that
TEBAN CAOILI, SANTOS CAOILI and JOSE CAOILI are not Filipino citizens. They came
to the Philippines from Hongkong last 1961 for the first time and that the trio
could not even speak a single word of any of our dialect. The father of the trio
is one ANTONIO CAOILI resident of 139 Mayon, Q.C.

FINDINGS:

On 24 Jan. 1963, Agent Nacu interviewed ANTONIO CAOILI, ANTONIO CAOILI stated
that he is a Filipino born at Urdaneta, Pangasinan the son of MARIA CAOILI,
Filipina the common-law wife of SOTE, Chinese. That in 1931 he went to China and
married ONG SUI TY, Chinese now deceased. And that TEBAN CAOILI, SANTOS CAOILI
and JOSE CAOILI are their sons all born in Chinkiang, Fukien, China. ANTONIO
CAOILI returned to the Philippines in 1937 leaving his family In Chinkiang,
Fukien, China. In 1961 ANTONIO CAOILI was able to bring TEBAN CAOILI, SANTOS
CAOILI and JOSE CAOILI to the Philippines from Hongkong. TEBAN CAOILI, SANTOS
CAOILI and JOSE CAOILI were all declared Filipino citizens and they were issued
with corresponding Identification of Registry.

RECOMMENDATION:

Considering the statement given by ANTONIO CAOILI as the truth, then this
Office recommends that no case should be filed against TEBAN CAOILI, SANTOS
CAOILI and JOSE CAOILI for they are the legitimate sons of a Filipino father, x
x x.

More than one (1) year after the issuance of the Warrant of Exclusion and the
report of the Investigator of the Department of Justice, or on March 10, 1964,
noon time, Teban Caoil was arrested, by virtue of the Warrant of Exclusion, by
Capt. Delfin Macalinao and two CIS agents. Teban Caoili was detained at the CIS,
PC compound, Camp Crame.

Under date of March 13, 1964, Juan Garcia, a relative of Teban Caoili,
presented with the CFI of Quezon City, a petition Habeas Corpus, alleging:

“10. That TEBAN CAOILI is not being detained by virtue of any process,
judgment or order of any court of record and his continued detention upon orders
of the respondent HON. MARTINIANO VIVO, is illegal, unjustified and an abuse of
authority for the reason that TEBAN CAOILI is a citizen of the Philippines and
the respondent HON. MARTINIANO VIVO, as Commissioner of Immigration, has no
right, power or authority over him, he not being an alien or foreigner who falls
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Commissioner of
Immigration.”

In the Return presented by the Solicitor General on March 13, 1964, the
Commissioner of Immigration admitted the jurisdictional facts, but claimed no
knowledge of information suf-ficient to form a belief as to the truth of par. 10
of the petition. On March 14, 1964, counsel for Teban Caoili moved for his
provisional release, on an offer of a cash bond of P500.00. An opposition to the
release was registered by the Solicitor General, based upon the case of Republic
vs. Cloribel, L-20458, promulgated on Oct. 31, 1963. A reply to the opposition
was also presented by the counsel of Teban Caoili, calling the attention of the
Court to the non-applicability of the same to the case. On March 24, 1964, the
lower court issued an Order denying the motion for provisional release and
rendered judgment based on “stipulation of facts”, which already appear in this
discussion as part of our findings of fact. In its decision, the lower court
said –

“The decision of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting Teban Caoili as a
Filipino citizen by birth is dated 23 June 1961 (Annex A Petition). The decision
of the Board of Commissioners reversing the decision of the Board of
Commissioners reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry is dated23
June 1962. Therefore, the review and consequent reversal made by the Board of
Commissioners took place within one (1) year from the date of the promulgation
of the Board of Special Inquiry. Sec. 27(b),C.A. No. 613, as amended by R.A. No.
503, provides, among other things:

‘* * The decision of any of the two members of the board shall prevail and
shall be final unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review
by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of said decision. * * * ” (Italics, supplied.)

Viewed on the basis of the foregoing provision of law it is easily
discernible that the Board of Commissioners in making the decision reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and in issuing the Warrant of Exclusion
as a consequence, was acting within the purview of the law. Needless to say,
therefore, the detention of TEBAN CAOILI which is admittedly made by virtue of
the warrant of exclusion and the decision referred to, is valid and legal.

Regarding the second issue raised, the respondent Commissioner Vivo was
frank enough to admit that when the Board of Commissioners conducted a review of
the proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry, TEBAN CAOILI was not
notified nor present. However, he explained that it was the intention of
the Board to notify him but he was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts
cannot be ascertained. Petitioner did not bother to rebut this testimony of Mr.
Vivo. Besides, the records show that while the warrant was issued 23 June 1962,
the detainee Teban Gaoili was arrested only on March 10, 1964. Petitioner cannot
bewail the fact that he was not notified of the proceedings had before the Board
of Special Inquiry.

In recapitulation, the Court believes that the Board of Commissioners and
consequently the respondent Commissioner of Immigration did not exceed his
authority nor act in excess of jurisdiction when they issued the decision dated
23 June 1962 and warrant of exclusion of the same date, respectively. On the
same vein the detention of Teban Caoili by the other respondents is, therefore,
legal and valid.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner in
behalf of Teban Caoili in this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.”

The above decision and the order denying the motion to bail were appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA.G.R. NO.33826-R) on both questions of law and facts.
Upon perfection of the appeal, counsel presented on April 1, 1964, with the said
Court and “Urgent Motion for Release on Detained Person, Teban Caoili, Under
Bail”, alleging, inter alia–

“7. That the case of TEBAN CAOILI for HABEAS CORPUS is an extraordinary
remedy availed of by a citizen of the Philippines who has been unduly deprived
of his liberty thru the abuse and misuse of power of respondent-appellee,
Hon.Martiniano Vivo who, without giving said TEBAN CAOILI ANY BENEFIT OF HEARING
FOR THE CANCELLATION OF HIS CITIZENSHIP papers, issued on June 23,1962 an
alleged Decision of Exclusion, purportedly reversing all of the previous
findings of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and that
of the Board of Commissioners of same Office, as mentioned herein above.”

The Solicitor General opposed, invoking the Cloribel case (supra), cited by
the Court below, and arguing that the proceedings before the Board of
Commissioners, being purely administrative in nature, the right to notice and
hearing are not essential to due process. On April 7, 1964, the Court or Appeals
ordered the release of Teban Caoili upon bond.

Claiming that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal, because the issues involved are purely legal, and that even assuming the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal, the respondent Associate
Justices of said Court acted with great abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, in ordering the release on bail of Teban Caoili, pending the
appeal the Solicitor General presented the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction, asking, that respondents herein, be
restrained.

“* * from enforcing or implementing the resolution dated April 7, 1964, and
the ‘Order of Release Upon Bond’, dated April 8, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 33826-R of
the Court of Appeals entitled Juan Garcia, petitioner-appellant vs.
Hon. Martiniano Vivo, etc., et al., respondents-appellees,” and from otherwise
taking cognizance of or in any manner assuming jurisdiction or further
proceedings ,over said case, until further orders from the Supreme Court;”

The petition was given due course and the preliminary injunctive writ prayed
for was issued. Respondents were required to answer. After the oral argument, or
on May 15, 1964, this court issued a minute resolution, dismissing the petition,
without prejudice of writing a more extensive opinion.

We find that the respondent Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the appeal interposed by Juan Garcia and Teban Caoili in the
habeas corpus case, and consequently said court had the power and
authority to issue the order of release on Bond. The notice of appeal plainly
averred that questions of law and facts will be raised. The appellee was bereft
of right to limit the issues on appeal, not being the one making the appeal. A
cursory reading of the pleading revealed that questions of facts are involved
which are for he Court of appeals to resolve. The propriety and/or regularity of
the reversing order of the new Board of Commissioners, is a factual issue. It is
not denied that on July 7. 1961, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
had already been affirmed by the old Board of Commissioners, a fact which was
not even disclosed or mentioned in the present petition. The present Board of
Commissioners, however, maintain that the law gives it the prerogative to review
motu proprio the decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. With the
affirmance of the decision of said Board of Special Inquiry by the old Board of
Commissioners, virtually it is not the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
that the new Board reviewed motu proprio on June 23, 1962, but that of
the old Board of Commissioners. The law does not authorize the new board to
review that of its predecessor board, but only that of the Board of Special
Inquiry. At any event, the view, if authorized, should be made in accordance
with the processes established by law, with a view to protecting the rights of
individuals.

Whether the claim of petitioner Commissioner of Immigration that failure to
notify Teban Caoili of the hearing and bring him to the jurisdiction of the new
Board Commissioners was due to his elusiveness, is another question of fact. It
was admitted that no notice of the exclusion proceedings was given to Teban
Caoili because he allegedly went into hiding and his whereabouts were unknown to
the Commissioner. In the face of the disclosure that Teban Caoili had been all
along working in the Avenue Electrical Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No. 653
Rizal Avenue, Manila, until his arrest, and the documentary evidence showing
that he has been issued a Philippine Passport; had regularly paid his Residence
Tax Certificates (A & B), and filed Income Tax Returns, a finding of fact is
necessary whether the Commissioner really had intended to notify Teban Caoili of
the exclusion proceedings of Board had conducted in his absence. While it may be
true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature, such a
circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of administrative character,
the first of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635). The right of Teban Caoili to
Philippine citizenship had already been passed upon by a Board of equally and
duly constituted Commissioners. Petitioner at least could have notified Teban
Caoili or exerted efforts to cause his presence, by or through the
instrumentalities and agencies that the Government has at its command. Except
mere bare statements there is nothing which would indicate that even the
ordinary effort was employed within two years, to locate him. There was unusual
hurry in the disposition of the case by the new Board of Commissioners. The
review took place on June 23, 1962, a decision was rendered and a Warrant of
Exclusion was issued on the same date. Since the proceedings affected Caoili’s
status and liberty, notice should have been given. And in the light of the
actuations of the new Board of Commissioners, there is now a necessity of
determining whether the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry and tb3old
Board of Commissioners are correct or not. This calls for examination of the
evidence, and, the law on the matter.

Obviously, therefore, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal and to issue the Order complained of. Considering all the
facts before them, respondents Associate Justices were of the opinion that
release on bail was proper. This is not abuse, much less grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. Even if We grant for purposes of argument,
that respondents made an erroneous conclusion of fact of law, still their
actuations cannot be the subject of certiorari or prohibition. The appeal was
one on a decision denying a petition for Habeas Corpus, presented by a person
who had been already a Filipino citizen, not an ordinary person who is an
alien applying for admission for Philippine citizenship. This being the
case, We leave the resolution of the applicability of the Cloribel case (supra),
in the case at bar, to the respondent court.

The actuation of the new Board of Commissioners in reviewing a decision
already passed upon by its predecessor Board, may breed chaos in the Bureau of
Immigration. If sanctioned, without any legal and plausible grounds, it may lead
to an insecurity of status already established by a previous Board. If by a
whimsical stroke of fate, two or three Boards of Commissioners are constituted
within the span of one year, and each wanted to exercise the right to review
already deliberated and decided cases, where will persons similarly situated, as
Teban Caoili be? Let us ponder. An arbitrary, abusive and indiscriminate
exercise of the right to review, even if granted by law, will obliterate the
right of an individual to due process a destructive blow to the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, as Me have decreed in our resolution of May 15, 1964, the petition
is hereby DISMISSED, for being without merit. The writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued is hereby dissolved. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.