YOLANDA DIPUTADO-BAGUIO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE FELIPE T. TORRES, MTC, BRANCH II, DUMAGUETE CITY, RESPONDENT.

Yolanda Diputado-Baguio, Second Assistant City Prosecutor in Dumaguete
City, charges respondent Felipe T. Torres, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the
Municipal Trial Court in the same City, with: (a) dishonesty and violation of the 1987 Constitution; (b) gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and complete disregard of
Supreme Court decisions; and (c) misconduct, and prays for the latter’s
immediate dismissal from the Judiciary.

Complainant contends that respondent deliberately stated in his
Monthly Report of Cases submitted to this Court from January 1989 to September
1990 that there are no cases submitted for his decision when in truth, a number
of criminal cases previously tried by him had been submitted for his decision
which up to the present have remained undecided. Several cases were cited by complainant in support of this
charge. According to her, respondent
deliberately falsified his Monthly Report of Cases to enable him to regularly
collect his monthly salary and to evade the task of deciding cases within
ninety (90) days from the date of submission thereof, which is in violation of
Sec. 15 (1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Complainant also argues that some of
the said cases are even covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure which should
thus have been decided by respondent within fifteen (15) days from the
termination of the trial pursuant to Sec. 17 thereof; and that respondent
required the parties therein to submit their memoranda on the merits, which is
prohibited under Sec. 15 of the said rule.

As Asst. City Prosecutor in Dumaguete City, complainant was
assigned to handle some of the cases before respondent judge. One of such cases is Crim. Case No. C-23
wherein respondent, pursuant to Secs. 9 and 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, apparently issued an order quashing the information for
Grave Slander by Deed filed by the Fiscal and made a finding that the crime
committed by the accused therein was Slight Physical Injuries. Complainant claims that respondent displayed
ignorance of the law for conducting his own preliminary examination of the case
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, disregarding the prosecutor’s
certification that he has conducted a preliminary investigation of the case and
found the existence of a probable cause. Complainant adds that the official to determine what offense to file is
the Fiscal, who, in this case, filed the complaint for Grave Slander by
Deed. The other criminal cases, such as
Crim. Cases No. C-34-S, C-23, B-106-S and C-66-S, which are all covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, were dismissed by respondent judge on the ground of
prescription. Complainant claims that
since the complaint was initially filed with the Fiscal’s office, such filing
interrupts the period of prescription for the offense pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
110 of the Amended Rules on Criminal Procedure. The dismissals, complainant avers, are therefore erroneous.

Respondent judge denied the allegations of the complainant and
argues that it is his Clerk of Court who files his Monthly Report of Cases and
that any error that may have been committed by said Clerk of Court was not done
intentionally and with bad faith; that the questioned orders are in accordance
with law and jurisprudence; and that his use of the questioned statements was
merely to express his opinion “in a manner most convincing and easily
understood by his readers” and was intended to “liven his order or
pleading”.

In a Resolution dated August 21, 1991, this Court referred the
case to Executive Judge Enrique Garovillo of the RTC of Dumaguete City for
investigation, report, and recommendation. The Executive Judge submitted his Report and Recommendation dated
February 12, 1992.

As correctly found by Executive Judge Garovillo, there was really
a delay in the disposition of certain cases submitted for respondent’s
decision. The following cases were
apparently not decided within the 90-day period mandated by the
Constitution: (a) Crim. Case No.
9770-S, decided after one (1) year and one (1) month; (b) Crim. Case No.
10051-S, decided after one (1) year and three (3) months; (c) Crim. Case No.
9210, decided after one (1) year and eight (8) months; and (d) Crim. Cases Nos.
B-131-5, 9523 and 7614 (which were submitted for decision on November 19, 20
and 15, 1990 respectively but were not as yet decided on February 28, 1991 and
February 25, 1991). Crim. Cases Nos.
8693, 8750, 8842, 9414-S, 9412-S, 9404-S, 9770-S and 10151-S were also decided
beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. The delay, however, may be attributed in part to the following factors: congestion of the docket of respondent’s
court, lack of necessary personnel, respondent’s detail in other courts, and
his illnesses. Thus, we may consider
the presence of the aforesaid circumstances to mitigate respondent’s liability.

The charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority and disregard of Supreme Court decisions are unmeritorious. Complainant claims that respondent displayed
ignorance of the law in disposing of Crim. Cases Nos. C-23, C-34-S, B-106, and
C-66-S. In this regard, it must be
noted that on July 25, 1990, this Court, in People vs. Inting, et al., G.R. No.
88919, July 25, 1990, ruled that “the determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge”; that the “preliminary inquiry made by a
Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. xx
The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.” It cannot, therefore, be said that
respondent has ignored the law because the above-quoted ruling has, in effect,
cured the defect in respondent’s rulings. Also, respondent has been proven right in three (3) cases (Crim. Cases
Nos. C-23, B-106 and C-6-S) when the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals sustained his dismissal orders. With such an affirmation by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, respondent cannot easily be branded as ignorant of the law.

As for the other questioned orders of the respondent, We hold
that since there was no evidence to convince Us that the error was attributable
to a willful and deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice, respondent’s questioned rulings may not be the subject
of an administrative action against him.

Thus, this Court has ruled:

“A judge is not administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision rendered provided he acts in good faith and
without malice. The proper remedy of
the aggrieved party is not an administrative charge against the judge but an
appeal or petition for review of his decision where a judge’s good faith has not been put in issue, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his official duties must be conceded to
him.” (Martin vs. Judge, AM No.
MTJ-90-495, Aug. 12, 1991)

As for the last charge, Executive Judge Garovillo opined that
some of respondent’s statements in his orders and pleadings “have gone
beyond what is necessary as they are clearly sarcastic and too
personal.” We agree with the
finding that respondent’s arguments could have been better expressed in clear
and simple language limited to the issue being disputed instead of by insulting
remarks. While it is true that the
pleadings of complainant are bluntly critical of respondent’s actuations, the
latter, being a dispenser of
justice, should have exercised some restraint and acted with sobriety in his
reaction to complainant’s criticisms.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is fined in the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for delaying the decision in Crim. Cases
Nos. 9770-S, 10051-S and 9210, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of heavy docket, illness and additional assignment in other
municipal circuit courts of the province; and is reprimanded for his
unnecessary use of insulting and sarcastic remarks in certain orders in Crim.
Case No. C-23 of his court and in his answer to the petition in Special Civil Action No. 9737 of the RTC. The respondent is warned that more drastic
penalties will be imposed in case of repetition of the same or similar
offenses. Let this decision be spread
on his record.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.