DOROTHY B. TERRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, RESPONDENT.

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981,
complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the
Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint.^[1]
Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court’s
Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that
he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence.^[2]
On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent’s success in evading
service of the complaint and the Court’s Resolution and thereupon resolved to
“suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until
after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him” in
the instant case.^[3]

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a
Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation
that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla
sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage,
Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly
told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child
she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that
believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab
initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan.^[4]

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the
child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of
respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason’s Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy
further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH
registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme
necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to
be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent
Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical
and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent’s Motion to Set Aside or Lift the
Suspension Order and instead referred, by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986,
the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommend­ation.^[5]

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the
Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared
and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so
appear.^[6]
The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August
1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once
again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for
2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once
more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor
accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence
and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December
1986. Respondent Terre did not file his
memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its “Report and Recommendation” to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:

“Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and
testified substantially as follows: she
and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school
classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then
married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent
was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they
[complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued
their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with
more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab
initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her
mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16);
in their marriage license, despite her [complainant’s] objection, he
[respondent] wrote ‘single’ as her status explaining that since her marriage
was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare
it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of
the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent]
disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was
unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that
respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City
Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23)
which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City
as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case
was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative
case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed,
which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when
respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having
gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
28-29).”^[7]

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre
and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge
Priscila Mijares. There is further no
dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married
Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior marriage
with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of
respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that
he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan
Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic
facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense
is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that
her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab
initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each
other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.^[8]
Even if we were to assume, arguendo
merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to
hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply
flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to
Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with
some assistance from respondent’s parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan
Terre, by his actions, “eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to
remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the
purpose and responsibility of his gender” because marriage is a basic social institution.^[9]

In Pomperada v. Jochico,^[10] the
Court, in rejecting a petition
to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

“It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick
played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent’s
moral values. Respondent had made a
mockery of marriage, a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216,
Civil Code).”^[11]

In Bolivar v. Simbol,^[12] the
Court found the respondent there guilty of “grossly immoral conduct”
because he made “a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing
her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling
before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from complainant x x x.” The Court held such acts “indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar.”^[13]

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan
Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in
abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported
him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his
own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his
first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted
“grossly immoral conduct” under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent
Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of
admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan
Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on
the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant’s
Office. A copy of this resolution shall
also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be
circularized to all the courts of the land.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Resolution, 16 June 1992. Rollo,
p. 6.

^[2]
Three (3) attempts were made by registered mail: the first two (2), at respondent’s address at Abelardo Street,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, and the third, at respondent’s employment
address at Commission on Audit, Cadiz City. Another attempt was made at respondent’s address at Bliss Project Daga,
Cadiz City, through the assistance of the P.C. Command at Bacolod City; and another
at Lumbunao Calinog Sugar Mill, Iloilo (Court’s Resolution dated 24 April 1985,
Rollo, p. 47).

^[3]
Resolution, 24 April 1985. Rollo, p. 52.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 53.

^[5]
Id., p. 70.

^[6]
In his Answer with Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order, respondent
Jordan Terre stated his address as “c/o 4th Floor, PAIC Building, 105
Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila.” Court papers sent to him at that
address were, however, returned unserved with the notation “not known at given address” (Rollo,
p. 63). It thus appears that Jordan
Terre once more submerged to evade service of legal papers on him.

^[7]
Rollo, p.73.

^[8]
Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970); Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 37 SCRA 316 (1971); Wiegel v. Hon.
Alicia Sempio-Diy, etc, et al, 143 SCRA 499 (1986). This rule has been cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the
Family Code (Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987).

^[9]
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, 19
November 1991.

^[10]
133 SCRA 309 (1984)

^[11]
133 SCRA at 316. See also Cordova v.
Cordova, 179 SCRA 680 (1989) and Laguitan
v. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837 (1989)

^[12]
16 SCRA 623 (1966).

^[13]
16 SCRA at 630.