GENARO SENEN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAXIMA A. DE PICHAY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Maxima A. de Pichay, defendant,” the defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals from an adverse decision of the Court of First Instance. By
virtue of a resolution dated April 17, 1958 of the Court of Appeals,
the case was certified to this Court because one of the issues involved
in the appeal is the jurisdiction of the said Court of First Instance
to try the case.

In Civil Case No. 27818 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Genaro Senen, plaintiff, vs.

The record discloses the following facts:
In special proceedings No. Q-86, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Branch III), sitting at Quezon City, appointed the defendant Maxima A.
de Pichay, guardian over the person. and properties of the minors
Genaro, Rufina, Perfecto and Simplicio, all surnamed Senen. But said
guardianship proceedings were dismissed by said court on March 16,
1955, by reason of abandonment (p. 8, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Brief for
Defendant-Appellant). On September 30, 1955, Genaro Senen, one of the
wards, brought the present action against the guardian, Maxima A. de
Pichay, for a full accounting of the amounts she had received for the
wards, alleging the appointment of defendant as guardian of his
brothers and sister and himself, and that defendant had received for
the wards the sum of P900.45, as arrears in pay of their deceased
father, Pfc. Carlos Senen, and P10.00 a month “as pension for each of
the wards since June 26, 1950 until they reach 18 years of age; that
defendant withheld the pensions due plaintiff and his brothers and
sister and appropriated the same to her own use, so that the children
had rely upon other people for support; that his brothers Roberto,
Perfecto and Simplicio, are still minors; that by reason of the
malevolent acts of the defendant, the plaintiff and his brothers and
sister suffered damages. Plaintiff prays that the court order defendant
to render full accounting of the money of her wards and indemnify them
for their rightful share in the estate of their deceased father, revoke
the letters of guardianship issued to defendant in special proceedings
No. Q-86 and appoint plaintiff in her place, and award plaintiff and
his brothers and sister actual damages of P3,310.45, moral damages of
P5,000 and attorney’s fees of P1,000.

Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the claim of
petitioner or plaintiff has been released by the dismissal of the
guardianship proceedings, Case No. Q-86, and on the further ground that
the venue is improperly laid. An opposition thereto was filed and the
court denied the motion; so defendant filed her answer, denying having
appropriated the amounts she had received as guardian, or committing a
breach of her trust, with a counterclaim for P220.00. The court below,
after trial, rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
amount of P2,859, which represents the pension of the wards and the
backpay of their father, the sum of P1,000 as moral damages, and a
similar amount as attorney’s fees. In the same decision, the court
appointed plaintiff guardian of the persons and properties of his minor
brothers. This is the decision sought to be reviewed on appeal.

One question of law was raised in this appeal, thus: Had the court below jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action?

Defendant-appellant claims that the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, which appointed defendant as guardian, still retains exclusive
jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings and no other court can
validly interfere with its continuing jurisdiction. This argument
cannot be sustained. The jurisdiction of a court in a guardianship
proceeding and all incidents thereof exists as long as the case is
pending in that court. But when the case is terminated, by dismissal or
otherwise, the court ceases to exercise the power and authority to try
said case or any incidental matters thereof.

“After
final judgment or decree has been rendered and the parties dismissed,
in general, the jurisdiction of the court is exhausted * * *.” (21
C.J.S. 147.)

“After termination, by dismissal or otherwise,
of litigation in one court * * * any exclusive jurisdiction or freedom
from interference it may have possessed is at an end; and another court
may deal with the property or subject matter which, by the former suit,
was not withdrawn forever from subsequent litigation.” (Id., p. 816.)

A petition for accounting, etc., which is an incident of a guardianship
proceeding, should be filed in the court where the guardianship
proceedings are pending. But once the guardianship proceeding is
terminated, said petition can no longer be filed in the same case, but
must be filed as a separate case, in the same court, or in any other
court of competent jurisdiction.

“The
general rule that the authority of the court first acquiring
jurisdiction must prevail is subject to the exception that where the
proceeding in the court first acquiring jurisdiction is terminated,
abandoned, or void, then another court of concurrent jurisdiction may
take jurisdiction of the same subject matter.” (14 Am. Jur. 445.)

“An
action for accounting may be brought in a court of law whenever the
guardianship for any reason terminates without any prior settlement in
the court.” (39 C.J.S. 253.)

The court below, therefore, validly acquired jurisdiction over the present case.

The other issues involved are factual. To speedily administer justice in this case, we have resolved them.

The parties agree that defendant had received P757.94 as backpay of the
deceased father of plaintiff and his brothers and sister (five in all),
and the sum of P2,450 as monthly pensions of the latter while minors
under the age of 18. For convenience we have taken as basis the
“inventory and accounting,” dated April 10, 1956, signed under oath by
defendant and presented in court as Exhibit “1”. Also for convenience
we have grouped the different items into three, namely, (1) judicial
and administrative expenses, (2) expenses for burial of the deceased
mother of plaintiffs and debts of said mother for the support and
maintenance of the minors, and (3) the amounts spent by
defendant-guardian for the maintenance and support and education of the
minors, including plain- tiff herein.

The judicial expenses
include P80 paid to Atty. Marino Alagar for preparing papers for the
claim for compensation, P50 expenses in securing affidavits and
supporting papers for the claim and P69 judicial expenses incurred in
the guardianship proceedings, or a total of P199.00. These expenses are
not disputed and the claim of defendant, therefore, should be, as it
hereby is, approved, the same to be charged against the monthly
pensions of the minors.

The sum of P200 appears to have been
loaned to the mother of the minors in the year 1943 in cash and in
rice, corn and tobacco for the mother and her children (See Exh.
“1-A”). Another amount of P130 was paid by defendant to Eligia A.
Aquino (Exh. “1-B”) who had advanced said sum for the burial expenses
of the mother of the minors. The amount spent by the deceased mother of
minors for the support of the latter and the burial expenses of the
mother of minors are legally chargeable against the earnings of the
husband, which in the present case is his backpay. The defendant should
be credited with said payments totalling P350 against the backpay of
the minors’ father of P757.94, so that of said backpay defendant should
pay to plaintiffs the sum of P407.94.

As to defendant’s
claim for expenses for the support of plaintiff and his brothers and
sister, the record discloses that except for plaintiff, the testimonies
of the witnesses were taken before the clerk of court. We have,
therefore, taken the trouble to read all the testimonies that we may
better determine who is to be believed, plaintiff and his witnesses or
defendant and hers.

There is no question, however, that in
the year 1949, defendant took into her house four of the minors,
namely, Genaro, Roberto, Rufina and Rogelio and in May, 1950 she also
took Simplicio with her. This was necessary for she had to bring them
before the court of the guardianship proceedings and to get their
pension from the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Defendant is married
to a sergeant in the Army, with whom she had some ten children. That
the minors lived for some time in her home is corroborated by Severino
Tangan, who lived next door to them and Anastacio Eduarte, also a
soldier and brother-in-law of defendant. This is also corroborated by
the school record of the three minors, Simplicio, Rufina and Rogelio
(Exh. “3”). The issue is, how long did each of them live with defendant
and was supported by her and what should be the amount to be charged by
her against them for such stay.

On the question of the
length of time that each of the minor wards stayed with their guardian,
we have found the following: Genaro Senen testified that he stayed with
the defendant, her aunt, for only three months in 1955. But he admits
that upon the death of his father in 1950, defendant called him for the
purpose of collecting the money awarded his father by the Judge
Advocate General’s Office. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that
Genaro, Rufina and Roberto were taken by her since 1949 when she
applied for the guardianship proceedings, and that Genaro stayed with
her until he was employed in the Bureau of Census from 1953 to 1955. In
this respect her testimony is corroborated by those of Anastacio
Eduarte, a soldier and Severino Tangan, who lived beside the house of
Mrs. Pichay. Rufina declared that she stayed with defendant since 1950
when defendant went to get her from an uncle, but thereafter went away
and returned to her in 1952 till she got married in October, 1953; that
of the five children only four of them stayed with defendant, namely,
Genaro, Rogelio, Roberto and herself and were brought to the Judge
Advocate General’s Office, but that they went away later to their
grandfather in the provinces. But her testimony is contradicted by that
of defendant and her witnesses, and by Exhibit “3”, which shows that
she, Rogelio and Simplicio were enrolled in 1949-1950, 1950-1951 and
1950-1951, respectively, which shows that she was lying. Rogelio Senen,
16, denied having lived with defendant, although he admits that
defendant gave P40 to the aunt with whom he was living. Simplicio,
Senen, 14, also testified, denying ever having lived with defendant.
Since these boys testified in 1955, it is possible that they did not
tell the truth or had forgotten where they had lived some five or six
years before. The witnesses for defendant, however, asserted that they
were living with defendant and their enrollment in school from
1950-1951 seems to support the claim of defendant and the testimonies
of her two witnesses. Besides, one witness presented by plaintiff who
appears to be credible, Juan Asistin, lived in the provinces and came
to Quezon City to the house of defendant only once, and he could not
tell with whom the minors were actually living.

After
considering all the testimonies, we are led to the conclusion that
those of defendant and her witnesses preponderate against the denials
of plaintiff and his minor brothers. The appraisal by the lower court
of their credibility is not to be given much weight as only plaintiff
and an employee of the Judge Advocate General’s Office testified in his
presence, all the testimonies of the others having been taken before
the clerk of court as commissioner. We believe, as Rufina Senen had
admitted, that the minors must have stayed with plaintiff for from one
and a half years to two years, or at least eighteen months each.

As to the amount to which defendant is entitled, her claim of P30 per
month is not justified. The pension each minor under 18 years is
supposed to receive is P10. She should not be allowed an amount beyond
this as what was legally authorized to be spent for each child is only
P10 a month. For 18 months she was, authorized to spend for each of the
five minors only P180, or a total amount of P900. Since she actually
received for their pensions P2,450, the amount of P1,550 remains due
from her.

As to moral damages, we do not consider the act of
defendant so malicious as to make her liable for moral damages. She
certainly must have, in some way, taken advantage of the sums she had
received, but the fact that she enrolled the minors in school and tried
to keep them in her home, although the pensions were very limited and
she herself had ten children of her own, should be sufficient reason
for exempting her from moral damages.

As to attorney’s fees,
the Court believes that in view of the poverty of the minors, their
lawyer should be entitled only to ten per centum of the
recovery, the same to be charged against the defendant. As the sums
awarded are P407.94 and P1,500 or a total of P1,907,94, plaintiff’s
attorney should be paid P200 as attorney’s fees.

Wherefore,
the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff for himself and as
guardian of his minor brothers the sum of P1,907.94, to pay
plaintiff’s, attorney the sum of P200 as fees, plus the costs. The
order of the court appointing plaintiff guardian of his minor brothers
is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., took no part.