CIRIACO L. MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical
expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner,
Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of
the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had
originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A.
Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against petitioner, father of the
above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:

“Plaintiff-appellant Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda
and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of
defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and
Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’, which figures prominently in this
case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy
bank. On February 22, 1966, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
quarrelled over a ‘pitogo’. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on
the right cheek with a piece of razor.

* * * * * * *

“The
facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started
the aggression. Undeniably, the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto Mercado
but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to
Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to
Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran
away to get a basket ball with which they could play. Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to
Augusto. He thought it was the ‘pitogo’ of Benedicto P. Lim, so that
when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr.
told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.’s
remark and he aggressively pushed the latter. The fight started then.
After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr. and the latter was
clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto’s anger, Augusto
seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the
right check with a piece of razor.

“Although the doctor who
treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for
plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to the amount of fees he
collected from plaintiffs-appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr.
The child was not even hospitalized for the wound. We believe that the
sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred
by plaintiffs-appellants.

* * * * * * *

“The
damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of
plaintiffs-appellant’s complaint come under the class of moral damages.
The evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by
reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of
damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that
the sum of P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.

“As
second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00
covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered due to their son’s
being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The facts
of record do not warrant the granting of moral damages to
plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. ‘In law mental
anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as
arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished
from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of
sympathy or sorrow for another’s suffering or which arises from a
contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to
the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering
caused by his or her sympathy for the other’s suffering. Nor can a
parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical
injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child
placed in peril by the negligence of another.’ (15 Am. Jur. 597).
Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney’s fees, it not
appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their claim
for damages.”

In the first, second and
third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since
the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a
Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father,
petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held
responsible instead of the father. This precise question was brought
before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:

“We
find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above” quoted,
‘teachers, or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody’, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil
Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)”

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which
petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying
should be made liable, is as follows:

“Art. 2180. * * *

“Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.”

It would
seem that the clause “so long as they remain in their custody,”
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at
bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back
to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim
of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.

We next come to the
claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are
excessive. We note that the wound caused to respondent was inflicted in
the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a grade
school. The Court of Appeals fixed the medical expenses incurred in
treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound
did not even require hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty
of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing’s face pronounced to have
caused a deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs.
Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner’s
counsel argues that if death call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the
incised wound could not cause mental pain and suffering to the tune of
P2,000.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court
pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered moral damages “by reason
of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado.” While moral damages
included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded
boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below
does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or
occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the
case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a
criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.

It
does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever
presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it
does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted
the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is
possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado
responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume
that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it
imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate
that Augusto’s resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned
by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere
with the attempt of Mercado to get “his pitogo from Renato.” This is,
according to the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was
incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed Mercado. It
is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused
to Quisumbing was Quisumbing’s own fault or negligence for having
interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another
boy. (Art, 2179, Civil Code.)

After considering all the
facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant
of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of
moral damages is not justified.

For the foregoing
considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petitioner is declared exempt or free from the payment of moral
damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses, however, is hereby
affirmed. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the result.

Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., took no part.