MARTHA FERANIL AND PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH III, CITY COURT OF DAVAO CITY AND SPOUSES ALFONSO CAR…

This is a petition for review on certiorari treated as special civil
action (Resolution dated December 17, 1976, p. 117, Rollo), filed by Martha Feranil and Primitivo
Villegas who were the plaintiffs in an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 2727-C of
the City Court of Davao City), filed on October 3, 1975, with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was granted on October 4,
1975.

In their answer filed on October 4, 1975, to the complaint in the
aforementioned case, defendants therein, now the herein private respondents,
Alfonso Cardenas and Lolita Cardenas, alleged as one of their affirmative
defenses the following:

“21.  That the complaint states no cause of
action in that:

‘a.   The plaintiffs have admitted in par. 5 of the
Complaint that “plaintiff Martha Feranil is the prior and legal
possessor” and that defendants “occupied more and hence herein
plaintiff demanded that the rental be increased instead of original agreement
of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), should be Eighty Pesos (P80.00) to which defendants
agreed).

“In synthesis, these allegations are admissions of plaintiffs
that defendants have juridical title to the possession of the land in dispute
as lessees and are not therefore illegally possessing the same;

“b.  Insofar as Primitivo Villegas is suing as
party-plaintiff, there is no allegation in the Complaint that he was in the
actual and/or physical possession of the land which was disturbed by
defendants; therefore, said plaintiff has not shown any interest in the nature
of the action for forcible entry;

“2.  That Primitivo Villegas has no capacity to sue as attorney-in-fact
of plaintiff Feranil there being no factual allegations in the complaint that
he is suing as much and that he has been specifically authorized to institute and prosecute the present
action;” (pp. 40-41, Rollo).

Incorporated in the
Answer is a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on
October 4, 1975.

In a preliminary hearing
held on the aforequoted affirmative defenses, as well as the motion to dissolve
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the City Court ruled as follows:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court hereby resolves defendants’
motions in this manner:

(a)  Plaintiff Primitivo Villegas is ordered
dropped from the complaint in his capacity as co-plaintiff;

(b)  Denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff
Feranil’s motion;

(c)  Modifying the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by this Court October 4, 1975, to the effect that the same is
granted to plaintiff Feranil only;

(d)  Ordering either plaintiff Feranil or Primitivo
Villegas to remove whatever improvements that they introduced on the premises
in question after the issuance of said writ within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.” (p. 48, Rollo).

In another order dated
November 8, 1975 issued upon consideration of defendants’ supplementary motion
relative to the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction, the City
Court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued on October 4, 1975
“for lack of the requisite bond required of plaintiff Feranil, without
prejudice on her part to pursuing appropriate legal remedies under the Rules of
Court.” (p. 56, Rollo).

From the aforementioned orders, petitioners brought a peti­tion
for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Davao (Branch II). The Court dismissed the petition sustaining the
orders of the City Court in an order dated March 31, 1976. (pp. 63-64, Rollo). From said order of dismissal, petitioners
filed with this Court on August 27, 1976, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

In its Resolution dated September 20, 1976, this Court re­quired
the respondents to comment on the petition, which they did by filing their
comment on October 28, 1976, (pp. 88-108, Rollo) after which, this Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and considered the
case submitted for decision. (Resolution dated December 17, 1976, p. 117, Rollo).

The questions for resolution are those as reflected in the
assignment of errors set forth in the petition, as follows:

“A.  THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UP­HOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT DROPPING
PETITIONER PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS FROM THE COMPLAINT;

“B.  THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DIS­MISSING THE
PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT REQUIRING
EITHER PETITIONER MARTHA FERANIL OR PRIMITIVO VILLEGAS TO REMOVE WHATEVER
IMPROVEMENTS INTRODUCED IN THE PREMISES AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT BUT
BEFORE TRIAL ON THE MAIN ACTION;

“C.  THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION AND IN CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE STAND OF THE CITY COURT DISSOLVING
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE BOND DESPITE
EXISTENCE THEREOF.” (pp. 28-29, Rollo).

1.  In dropping Villegas from
the complaint, the City Court said that “Primitivo Villegas, as
co-plaintiff, has no valid cause of action of forcible entry against the herein
defendants for lack of material averments that he had prior and physical
possession of the premises in question x x x.” (p. 2, Annex “A”,
Petition). Respondent judge expressed
agreement with the above ruling in his order dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed against the City Court. (p. 6,
Annex “C”, Petition, p. 62, Rollo).

It is evident that both the City Court and the respondent court
focused and riveted their attention to the allegation of the complaint that
“plaintiff Martha Feranil is the prior and legal possessor”
(par. 2, Complaint, Annex to Comment, p. 109, Rollo) over the lot in
question. They entirely lost sight of,
and clearly over­looked, the fact that the complaint also alleges that on
September 20, 1975, three days before the act of dispossession imputed to the
defendants, Feranil and Villegas entered into a contract of lease for the
construction of a fruit stand an area of 25 square meters fronting Rizal
Street. (par. 6, Complaint, Annex 1,
Comment, p. 110, Rollo), and that since September 23, 1975, defendants have
remained and continue to remain, in the illegal possession of the premises. (par. 12, Id). These allegations, together with that of paragraph 13, of the
Complaint “that the continuance of the defendants in unlawfully and
forcedly (sic) entering the aforementioned property'”, and that
“their un­lawful acts of the defendants have unjustly prejudiced the plain­tiffs
over the reasonable expected earning of the premises x x x”, (par. 15,
Id), make out also a case of unlawful detainer, which is the proper cause of
action of Primitivo Villegas, who, by virtue of the lease contract, is entitled
to the possession of the lot upon which to construct a fruit stand.

The allegation in the complaint “that the plaintiffs
informed the defendants that what they are occupying is the premises covered by
a contract and had advised them to vacate from the premises, but these
notwithstanding the defendants refused and ignored, and still continue to
refuse and ignore the removal of the hollow blocks and empty boxes in the
premises” (par. 16, Id) fulfils also the requirement of demand to vacate
from both plaintiffs Feranil and Villegas.

It is, likewise, evident that the respondent court, as well as
the City Court, was controlled in its appreciation of what cause or causes of
action are actually contained in the complaint, by the caption thereof –
“Forcible Entry, Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction”. This is plain error, for the real cause of
action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but
what the allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe. (People vs. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664; Que
Po Lay vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 104 Phil. 853; People vs. Agito,
103 Phil. 526; People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 656; People vs. Abesamis, 93 Phil.
712; People vs. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252; People vs. Defensor, 86 Phil. 591;
People vs. Magdowa, 73 Phil. 512; People vs. Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427; Arteche
vs. Rosales, et al., 67 Phil. 48; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418; U.S. vs. Lim
San, 17 Phil. 273). The designation or
caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint
themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. Consequently, We hold that the complaint
alleges facts constitutive of a sufficient and valid cause of action in favor
of petitioner Primitivo Villegas.

2. On the issue relative to the dissolution of the preliminary mandatory injunction, it should
follow from the foregoing observation, that the dissolution of the said writ on the ground that after
Primitivo Villegas, who alone is a signatory of the requisite bond has been
dropped, the bond has lost its legal efficacy, is without factual or legal
basis. With Villegas reinstated as a
proper party with sufficient cause of action, the bond signed by him as
principal is perfectly valid and effective to support the preliminary mandatory
injunction which accordingly, should be restored with full force and effect.

3. The last remaining issue is whether the order of the City Court
requiring either petitioner Martha Feranil or Primitivo Villegas to remove
whatever improvements introduced in the premises after the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction but before trial of the main action is
proper.

The effect of the preliminary mandatory injunction is to restore
the plaintiffs to the possession of the lot in question after the defendants
have allegedly forcibly entered it. The
possession once restored, entitles them to the full enjoyment thereof, in the
same manner and to same extent as they had before the possession had been
disturbed by the defendants. The
recognition of such right as was in existence in favor of the plaintiffs, or at
least in favor of Feranil, to the exercise of which the aforementioned
injunction restored them, is perfectly in accordance with the acknowledged
legal effect of an injunction, which naturally varies, depending on whether the
injunction is prohibitory or mandatory. It should be obvious that with a mandatory injunction, unlike a
prohibitory one, the party in whose favor it is issued is placed in the same
situation he was before the commission of the illegal act complained of, as if
said act has never been committed. In a
prohibitory injunction, the specific act sought to be enjoined has not yet been
performed, and is one alleged to be illegal, by the pleader. It is enjoined because it would cause
irreparable injury if allowed to be committed to the prejudice of the party
asking for the issuance of the injunction. The situation before the issuance of the prohibitory injunction is thus
preserved in status quo. The status
quo to be restored in the case of a mandatory injunction is the situation
in which the pleader is before the act already committed and complained
of. In the present case, the status quo
is plaintiff Feranil being in actual possession of her own lot, free to exercise
rights of ownership and possession.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated March
31, 1976, dismissing the petition for certiorari of the herein petitioner is
hereby reversed. Accordingly, it is
hereby ordered: (1) that Primitivo
Villegas be as he is hereby reinstated as plaintiff in the complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 2727-C of the City Court of Davao (Branch II); (2) that
preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved by the City Court be as it is hereby
restored in full force and effect; and (3) the order for the removal of whatever
improvements have been introduced in the premises after the issuance of the man­datory
injunction be, as it is hereby declared without effect. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J.,
concurring in the result.