BENJAMIN JARANILLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH II, AND ANTONIO ARTAJO, RESP…

Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order
of the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 10654 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, dated September 30, 1976, denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
the complaint and declaring the petitioner in default, as well as the order
dated October 4, 1976, denying the motion for the reconsideration of said
order.

The petitioner, Benjamin Jaranilla, Jr., is the defend­ant in
said Civil Case No. 10654 of the Court of First In­stance of Iloilo,
entitled: “Antonio Artajo,
plaintiff, versus Benjamin Jaranilla, Jr., defendant”, an action
for the re­scission of a contract of sale of a motor vehicle and damages.^[1]
The said petitioner, assisted by his counsel, Atty. Manuel A. Pama, filed his
answer to the complaint,^[2]
and the case was set for a pre-trial conference on September 9, 1976.^[3]
At the scheduled pre-trial conference, the parties appeared and the petitioner
asked the court to give him sufficient time to pay his obligation to the plaintiff. The court granted the motion and deferred
the hearing to Septem­ber 30, 1976 in order to give the petitioner enough time
to raise the amount with which to pay the plaintiff.^[4]

Meanwhile, Atty. Constantino S. Dignadice, Jr., en­tered his
appearance as counsel for the petitioner, in collaboration with Atty. Pama.^[5]
However, on September 16, 1976, Atty. Dignadice, Jr., independently of Atty.
Pama, filed un Urgent Motion to Discharge Writ of Attach­ment, previously
issued,^[6]
and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint,^[7]
setting the hearing of both motions on Septem­ber 20, 1976. On the date set for hearing, counsel for the
plaintiff manifested his intention to file an opposition to the petitioner’s
motions and the respondent court granted him 10 days within which to do so.^[8]

On September 30, 1976, the case was called for hear­ing, as
scheduled. Atty. Manuel A. Pama,
counsel for the petitioner, appeared, but without the defendant Jaranilla, Jr.
Atty. Pama asked for, and was granted leave to retire as counsel for the
petitioner in view of the actuations of his client and Atty. Dignadice, Jr.^[9]
counsel for the plaintiff then manifested that he was no longer filing a
written opposition to the two motions filed by Atty. Dignadice, Jr. and instead
argued his case orally. He also asked
the court to declare the defendant in default for non-appearance at a pre-trial
conference. As a result, the respondent
court issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
complaint. He also declared the absent
peti­tioner Jaranilla, Jr. in default and directed the plaintiff to present his
evidence in the afternoon of that day.^[10]

Upon learning of the order of default and the denial of his
motions, or on October 1, 1976, the petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of September 30, 1976 and the consequent lifting
of the order of default, claiming that he and his counsel were misinformed of
the date set for the pre-trial conference in that they believed that the
pre-trial conference was on September 29, 1976, and not on September 30, 1976,
so that he and his counsel were present in court on September 29, 1976; that
the plain­tiff, contrary to the Rules, had filed an opposition to his motions
to dismiss the complaint and to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment
without furnishing him a copy of the same; and that he has a very good and
valid defense, as can be seen from his motion to dismiss.^[11]
The respondent court, however, denied this motion on October 4, 1976, for the
reasons that (1) the petitioner and his counsel were duly notified of the
pre-trial of the case on September 30, 1976; (2) petitioner’s excuse for
failing to appear at the pre-trial is untenable; and (3) the motion for
reconsideration does not meet the requirements of the law in that the affidavit
of merit attached to the motion does not contain a clear statement of the facts
which would constitute a good and valid defense, and that it is not under oath,
as required.^[12]
Whereupon, the petitioner initiated the instant recourse.

The petitioner claims that there was a denial of due process of
law when the respondent court declared him in default and at the same time
denied his motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner contends that the private re­spondent had filed an
opposition to his motion to dismiss the complaint and motion to discharge writ
of preliminary attachment without furnishing him with a copy of the said
opposition, and that being the case, the “respondent Judge should have
noted such fact of failure to serve a copy of the opposition to petitioner or
counsel and then require such service or compliance and as said opposition was
filed on the same day when the case was allegedly set for pre-trial conference,
a resetting of the latter incident is very logical and responsive to the due
process of law.^[13]

We find no merit in the contention. The record does not show that the plaintiff had filed a written
opposition to the petitioner’s motions so that there was nothing to furnish the
petitioner. What transpired in the
court below is that when the case was called for hearing on September 30, 1976,
counsel for the plaintiff, upon noting the absence of the petitioner and
finding a distinct advantage in his favor, manifested to the court that he was
no longer filing a writ­ten opposition to the petitioner’s motions, after
which, he moved that the petitioner be declared in default for non-appearance
at a pre-trial conference, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules
of Court, and finding merit in the motion, the respondent court declared the
petitioner in default and denied petitioner’s motions to dismiss the complaint
and to discharge writ of attachment.

Besides, the reason advanced by the petitioner for his failure to
appear at the hearing of September 30, 1976, viz; that he and his
counsel were misinformed of the date, is untenable since the petitioner and his
counsel were duly notified thereof, as shown by the signature of the petitioner
on the notice of hearing,^[14]
and the presence of his coun­sel on September 30, 1976.

Moreover, in his Motion for Reconsideration, filed the next day,
the petitioner stated that he and his counsel went to court on September 29,
1976, to attend the hearing of the case, on the belief that the hearing was set
for that day. This being the case, the
petitioner and his counsel would have easily found from the records that the
hearing was set for September 30, 1976.

We find, however, that the respondent court incorrectly declared
the petitioner in default for non-appearance at a pre-trial conference. It appears that at the pre-trial conference
held on September 9, 1976, the defendant had admitted his obligation to the
plaintiff and asked for suffi­cient time within which to pay the plaintiff, so
that there was no more necessity for calling a second pre-trial con­ference. What the respondent court should have done
was to enter judgment pursuant to Section 3, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of
Court. But, since a decision has
already been rendered in this case on October 21, 1976.^[15]
We find it no longer necessary to set aside the orders com­plained of and
return the records of the case to the court below for the rendition of a
judgment in accordance with said Section 3, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 14.

^[2]
Id., p. 19.

^[3]
Id., pp. 38, 63.

^[4]
Id., pp. 75, 42, 63.

^[5]
Id., p. 25.

^[6]
Id., p. 26.

^[7]
Id., p. 33.

^[8]
Id., p. 63.

^[9]
Id., p. 64.

^[10]
Id., p. 38.

^[11]
Id., p. 39.

^[12]
Id., p. 42.

^[13]
Id., pp. 8-9.

^[14]
Id., p. 38.

^[15]
Id., p. 76.