REYNALDO G. LAURIAGA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (1ST DIVISION), ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., HAYS SHIP LTD., AND/OR RHOMMEL P. PAMINTUAN, RESPONDENTS.
DIAMANTE, J.:
“7.1 THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S MEDICAL CONDITION WHICH LED TO HIS TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY IS NOT WORK-RELATED. IT EVEN REFUSED TO CONSIDER HIS WORK AND NATURE OF HIS WORKING CONDITION TO HAVE AGGRAVATED PETITIONER’S MEDICAL CONDITION.
7.2. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN OMITTING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES.”
The records and pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
Complainant-seafarer (herein petitioner) Reynaldo G. Lauriaga entered into a Contract of Employment[4] with respondent company Ace Navigation Company (local agency and herein private respondent), for and in behalf of its principal Hays Ships, Limited as its Third Engineer for the latter’s vessel MV “KOMMANDOR JACK” and was given a nine-month contract.
Prior to his embarkation, petitioner underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit for sea duty.[5] The Government of the United Kingdom also issued a Seafarer Medical Certificate stating that petitioner is fit to work with no restrictions.[6]
Fifteen (15) days after petitioner’s embarkation or on October 12, 2012, petitioner was brought to Polyclinique Hotel Dieu Abidjan in Abidjan, Ivory Coast for high fever accompanied by coughing with yellowish sputum and numbness of his two lower extremities. The initial diagnosis was that petitioner has polyradicular nevritis.[7] As petitioner had difficulty in breathing and was vomiting, he was placed in the Intensive Care Unit where he stayed for almost a month or until his discharge on November 10, 2012. The Medical Report upon petitioner’s discharge showed that he is suffering from “[a]reflexic tetraparesia with respiratory and swallowing troubles evoking polyradiculonevritis Guillain Barre Type.”[8]
A day after his discharge from Polyclinique Hotel Dieu Abidjan or on November 11, 2012, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines, accompanied by an African doctor as he could barely walk.[9]
On even date, he was seen by the company-designated physician, Dr. Natalio G. Alegre. Dr. Alegre’s initial assessment was that petitioner has Guillain Barre Syndrome. Petitioner was then referred to a specialist for specialized medical care.
On November 12, 2012, petitioner was confined at St. Luke’s Hospital for continuing treatment and evaluation. He was released after ten (10) days but was required to undergo rehabilitation.[10] Petitioner regularly observed his scheduled medical check-up with Dr. Alegre,[11] as well as his occupational and physical therapies.[12]
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2012, Dr. Alegre prepared a Progress Report[13] addressed to Mr. Rodolfo F. Pamintuan, Chairman/President of Ace Navigation Co., Inc., stating, inter alia, that while petitioner has been diagnosed with Guillain-Barre Syndrome, the same is not secondary to accident or trauma nor is listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A,[14] thus deemed not work-related.
Despite the treatment and therapy that petitioner has been receiving, his body remains weak and is unable to walk and move about without the assistance of other people. Thus, on March 15, 2013, he went to the clinic of Dr. Alegre, wherein he was attended by a certain Dr. Mary Anne Santos, who made a notation on the Acknowledgment Receipt[15] referring petitioner to Dr. Alegre for final disposition and disability rating.
Petitioner claimed that Dr. Alegre refused to give him a permanent disability rating when he went to see the latter for such purpose prompting him to consult a physician of his choice, a certain Dr. May S. Donato-Tan (Dr. Tan). After examining petitioner, Dr. Tan’s impression were the following: HPN Stage II; Polyradiculo Sensory Deficit/Polyradicular Neuritis; To consider Guillain Barre Syndrome; and To consider Parkinson White Syndrome. Thereafter, she issued a Medical Certificate[16] declaring petitioner to be permanently disabled as a seaman “for he will not be able to perform his job effectively, efficiently and productively.”[17]
Armed with the Medical Certificate issued by the physician of his choice, petitioner filed a complaint on the same day, for permanent total disability benefits, refund of medical expenses and transportation, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.[18]
Herein private respondent Ace Navigation Co., Inc. did not deny that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons. It claimed that petitioner was provided the medical attention he needed and was timely paid of his sickness allowance. However, private respondent argued that petitioner is not entitled to compensation and disability benefits for the reason that the company-designated physician and the attending specialist declared that the latter’s condition is not work-related. Private respondent ratiocinated that to be entitled to the benefits he is claiming, it is not enough for petitioner to establish that his illness or injury rendered him permanently or partially disabled. It must also be shown that there is a causal connection between his illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted for.
After due consideration, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on rendered a Decision dated November 28, 2013, declaring that since petitioner suffered his illness during the term of his contract and his illness is disputably presumed to be work-related, there was sufficient legal basis for the grant of disability benefit. He thus ruled:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering ACE NAVIGATION CO. INC./HAYES SHIP LTD. and/or RHOMMEL P. PAMINTUAN to pay complainant the amount of One Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Two Hundred Five U.S. Dollars [US$124,205.00], representing full disability benefits and sickness wages of US$1,230.00 plus ten [10%] percent thereof as and for attorney’s fees, and the amount of P50,000.00 as medical reimbursement.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”[19]
Private respondents elevated the case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), First Division, Quezon City, seeking for the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The NLRC found merit in private respondent’s appeal ratiocinating that while it is true that it is provided in the POEA SEC that illnesses not listed under Section 32 (A) are disputably presumed to be work-related, this presumption comes with the burden on the part of the complainant to prove that his working conditions caused, or at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease. The NLRC was of the view that herein petitioner was clearly unable to discharge the said burden of presenting substantial evidence to show that his working conditions caused or increased his risk of contracting GBS. The NLRC disposed of the case as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated November 28, 2013 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one issued DISMISSING the complaint.
SO ORDERED.”[20]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] of the aforesaid Decision, to which motion, private respondents filed their Comment/Opposition.[22]
Finding that the motion filed by petitioner raised no new matters of substance which would warrant reconsideration of the Decision of the Commission, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution[23] dated July 9, 2014.
Hence, the present recourse, on the thesis that the assailed Decision and Resolution were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, on the grounds enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
In the meantime, on September 5, 2014, this Court issued a minute Resolution[24] requiring private respondents to file a Comment (not a motion to dismiss) to petitioner’s Petitioner for Certiorari. This Court also directed petitioner to file his Reply within five (5) days from receipt of the Comment, if he so desires. Moreover, the parties were directed to inform the Court if there is any pending case before the other Divisions of this Court involving the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law to ensure strict observance of Section 3, Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals [In Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana, etc., A.M. No. CA-13-51-J, July 2, 2013], within ten (10) days from notice.
On September 25, 2014, petitioner filed a Petitioner’s Manifestation of No Other Pending Case.[25]
On September 26, 2014, private respondents filed their Compliance/Manifestation[26] to this Court’s September 5, 2014 Resolution.
On October 13, 2014, private respondents filed their Comment[27] to the petition for certiorari while a Reply was filed by the petitioner on January 28, 2015.[28]
With the filing of the aforesaid pleadings by the parties, the instant petition is now deemed submitted for decision.
As with all other kinds of worker, the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs at the time he is hired. But unlike that of others, deemed written in the seafarer’s contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[29] The issue of whether petitioner Lauriaga can legally demand and claim disability benefits from herein private respondent company for an illness that became apparent during his contract of employment with the shipping company, is governed by the provisions of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels; hence, it is said standard terms and conditions which are relevant and need to be construed in the case at bench. Petitioner boarded the ship on September 26, 2012, thus, it is the 2010 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels that is considered appended in his contract of employment and is controlling for purposes of resolving the issue at hand.
A cursory reading of the applicable contractual provisions and a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by both the petitioner and private respondents, lends strong credence to the contentions and arguments presented by private respondents.
The POEA-SEC, as provided under Governing Board Resolution No. 09 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, both series of 2010, which contains the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing The Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, governs the employment contract between petitioner and private respondents. Section 20-A of the POEA-SEC enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee who suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment contract, viz:
Section 20
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
x x x x
Prescinding from the foregoing, two elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable. First, the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, it must be the result of a work-related injury or a work-related illness, which are defined as “injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment” and as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.”[30]
Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA SEC reads:
“Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.”
Further, under Section 20 A (3) of the 2010 POEA SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seafarer’s disability, thus:
“SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
Xxx 2. Xxx. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in the amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.
Xxx
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The Third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
Xxx.”
Thus, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120-day initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.[31]
In the case at bar, there is no quibble that petitioner reported to the company-designated physician for treatment immediately upon arriving in the Philippines. Problems arose, however, when petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from Guillain Barre syndrome but the company-designated physician declared the same as non-work-related. Thus, while he was given the medical attention he needed and was paid his sickness allowance, Dr. Alegre refused to give petitioner a permanent disability rating.
Guillain Barre Syndrome (GBS) as defined in Wikipedia is an acute polyneuropathy, a disorder affecting the peripheral nervous system. Ascending paralysis, weakness beginning in the feet and hands and migrating towards the trunk, is the most typical symptom, and some subtypes cause change in sensation or pain, as well as dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system. The disease is usually triggered by an infection. It can cause life-threatening complications, in particular if the respiratory muscles are affected or if the autonomic nervous system is involved. During the acute phase, about a quarter require admission to intensive care admission for mechanical ventilation.
GBS is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA SEC. Nonetheless, Section 20-A (4) thereof provides that “[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.” The burden is, therefore, placed upon petitioner to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. Petitioner, however, failed to do this. While it is noted that petitioner’s physician of choice also considered his condition to be GBS, there was no categorical declaration of his physician of choice that, indeed, his illness is work-related. There is no substantiation that the progression of his ailment was brought about by his duties as Third Engineer. He merely based his conclusion that his work may have contributed one way or another to his illness on research materials.
We note that based on the Medical Report issued by Polyclinique Hotel Dieu Abidjan, petitioner already had fever for thirteen (13) days at the time of admission on October 12, 2012. Taking into consideration that petitioner boarded the vessel on September 26, 2012, it can be gainsaid that he contracted fever on his third day of work and did not seek medical attention until after ten (10) days of being feverish. It inspires disbelief that petitioner easily contracted infection on his third day at work because of the nature of his job as Third Engineer which triggered the GBS. More so that the exact cause of GBS is unknown.[32] The fact that petitioner passed the company’s pre-employment medical examination (PEME) is of no moment. The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, had ruled that the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is “fit to work” at sea or “fit for sea service”, it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the “fit to work” declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.[33]
As to petitioner’s contention that he was assessed by his attending physicians to be permanently disabled and was referred to Dr. Alegre for final disposition and disability grading, the same only shows that, indeed, petitioner is suffering from a disability. But going back to the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, such disability must have a causal relation to the work of petitioner to be compensable.
Reason and logic likewise dictate that more weight should be given to the pronouncement of the doctor who provided medical attention to petitioner that the latter’s work history has no bearing to his medical condition as GBS “xxx is a disorder whereby the body’s immune system – which attacks only foreign material and invading organism – for no apparent reason attacks and damages the nerves protective covering (myelin sheath) leading to interference with the signaling process of the nerve thus causing weakness, numbness and paralysis”[34] over petitioner’s claim that his workload as Third Engineer which at times required him to carry heavy steel and valves contributed to his acquiring the GBS.
Otherwise stated, the evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how petitioner contracted or developed GBS and how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, We cannot just presume that petitioner’s job caused his illness or aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had. As held in the case of Jimenez vs. Court of Appeals,[35] awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing.
While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Contract, We cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, We have no choice but to deny the claim, lest We cause injustice to the employer.[36] The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers – the commitment of the judiciary to the cause of labor does not prevent it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.[37]
Considering the absence of any duly proven work-relatedness, this Court sees no point in considering the other imputed legal error that could have only been triggered by a finding of work-relatedness.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the assailed Decision dated May 12, 2014 and Resolution dated July 9, 2014 in NLRC NCR Case No. OFW (M) 03-04230-13/NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 01-000053-14, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Dimaampao, J.B., Chairperson and Manahan, C.S., J.J., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 28-37.
[2] Id. at 39-40.
[3] Id. at 3-26.
[4] Id. at 62.
[5] Vide Medical Examination Record; Id. at 65.
[6] Id. at 66.
[7] Vide Medical Report; Id. at 68.
[8] Id. at 67.
[9] Vide NLRC Decision dated May 12, 2014; Id. at 30.
[10] Vide Discharge Summary; Id. at 69.
[11] Vide Letter addressed to the Chairman/President of respondent company; Id. at 73.
[12] Vide Certification issued by the Chief Physical Therapist of Fatima University Medical Center; Id. at 71-72.
[13] Id. at 100.
[14] Referring to POEA Standard Employment Contract.
[15] Rollo, p. 74.
[16] Id. at 75-76.
[17] Id. at 76.
[18] Id. at 46.
[19] Id. at 202.
[20] Id. at 36.
[21] Id. at 233-241.
[22] Id. at 243-249.
[23] Id. at 39.
[24] Id. at 251.
[25] Id. at 252-254.
[26] Id. at 260-263.
[27] Id. at 264-274.
[28] Id. at 283-290.
[29] Masangcay vs. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Ventnor Navigation, Inc., G.R. No. 172800, October 17, 2008.
[30] Ibidem.
[31] Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. vs. NLRC and Rommel B. Cedol, G.R. No. 186180, March 22, 2010.
[32] http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/guillain-barre-syndrome/basics/definition/con-20025832.
[33] Vide note 30.
[34] Rollo, p. 31.
[35] G.R. 144449, March 23, 2006.
[36] The Estate of Posedio Ortega, Represented by his wife, Maria C. Ortega vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 175005, April 30, 2008.
[37] Agabon and Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004.