PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO, AND SALVADOR V. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, AS JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY…

This
case is before Us on appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Branch II), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing
appellants’ petition for certiorari and mandamus to review four orders
of the municipal court of Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No.
5039 entitled “Sancho R. Jacinto et al., vs. Pilar T. del Rosario et
al.,” That case was one of forcible entry under Rule 72, involving two
parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo
C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners under
transfer certificate of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. These lands had been acquired by them
through purchase from the previous registered owner, J. M. Tuazon &
Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now
petitioners-appellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by
purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier and
alleged that they were and had been in actual physical possession
thereof even before the purchase from J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by
appellees. Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed
by appellees submitted their answer thereto dated October 2, 1958,
including a “third-party complaint” against the plaintiffs themselves
as well as against J. M. Tuazon & Co. Inc., from both of whom they
prayed for an award of damages.

In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was
filed, herein appellants commenced a suit for “reconveyance and/or recovery” of the same properties against
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No.
5230), and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in
the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after the termination of the
case in the Court of First Instance.

On
October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party
complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the
motion to suspend proceedings. In both instances appellants moved to
reconsider and were turned down in two other seperate orders, dated
October 24 and November 27, 1958 respectively. These are the four
orders subject of appellants’ petition for certiorari and mandamus,
which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and now on
appeal
before us.

The third-party complaint was improperly brought
against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, since they were

themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to
whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as
J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegations
against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed
to give priority to occupants of lands involved therein
(including those now in dispute) in the matter of their
purchases and that the ejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We
fail, to see how such agreement, to which appellees were
strangers, could have anything to do with their right of
action to recover the material possession of the lands in
question. The prayer in the third-party complaint that J. M.
Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should
be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters
extraneous to the issue of possession may not unnecessarily
clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in
the present instance there was no abuse of discretion in
the order of denial complained of.

With respect to the other order—that denying appellant’s motion to
suspend proceedings—it is enough to point out, first, that the action
for “reconveyance and/or recovery” in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them
when the forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously
intended to delay the proceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue
involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial
to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The very
petition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the
subject of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the
fact that it is only one of the numerous actions previously resorted to
by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civil
action No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed
by Judge Andres Reyes for lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in
Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by Judge Nicasio Yatco on
July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No.
5500, Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R.
Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of these actions were instituted after
the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought to suspend
the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole
pursued by appellants.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.