EDGARDO D. ALVIAR, ELMER P. SALVADOR, AMANTE A. PRING AND ZINNIA S. LESTANO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHIL. POSTAL SAVINGS BANK, INC., RESPONDENTS.
REYES, JR., J., J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds the Motion for Reconsideration of respondents-appellants meritorious. The decision of the labor arbiter a quo and this Commission dated April 19, 2004, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered, finding retrenchment of complainants valid.” (Rollo, p. 22).
The case arose out of two separate complaints filed by petitioners. Petitioners Edgardo D. Alviar (Alviar, for brevity) and Elmer P. Salvador (Salvador, for brevity) filed a complaint (docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 30-10-00294-99) claiming that Alviar was hired as a Credit Investigation Specialist by respondent Phil. Postal Savings Bank, Inc. (PPSBI) while Salvador was hired as Credit Investigator.
Petitioners Amante A. Pring (Pring, for brevity) and Zinnia S. Lestano (Lestano, for brevity) alleged in their complaint (docketed as NLRC Case No. 30-10-00591-99) that Pring occupied the position of Manager at the time of his termination while Lestano was an Account Officer II at the time of the termination.
Both of the above-mentioned complaints uniformly alleged that on April 27, 1999 the Board of PPSBI passed Board Resolution No. 99-14 approving the bank reorganization. It was also alleged that on October 4, 1999 petitioners were each given a notice of termination effective November 4, 1999. They also alleged that prior to their termination, Alviar and Salvador, pursuant to the expanded guidelines issued, took and passed their examination for the new positions they were applying for.
As a result of their separation from service, petitioners filed the above-mentioned complaints assailing the validity of the reorganization of the bank. They claimed that there was no valid retrenchment because the bank was not suffering from any financial losses.
PPSBI, on its part, asserted that the reorganization was valid because it was done in order to avoid further losses. It claimed that under the reorganization, departments with related or overlapping functions were merged and as a result of which 36 positions were abolished. It was claimed that petitioners’ positions were among those abolished. PPSBI maintained that retrenched employees were given the opportunity to apply for positions under the new company set-up. PPSBI further asserted that Pring and Lestano did not even apply for any new position (See: Rollo, p. 412).
After submission of the parties’ respective pleadings, the Labor Arbiter on June 30, 2000 rendered a Decision (Rollo, pp. 56-73) in favor of petitioners. The Labor Arbiter found that PPSBI failed to show evidence that it sustained substantial losses to justify the retrenchment. It was also held that the financial statement for one year submitted by PPSBI was not sufficient to justify the retrenchment. It was further held that PPSBI failed to show that it adopted a reasonable criteria to guide it in the retrenchment. The Labor Arbiter also agreed with petitioners that what happened was merely a change in the nomenclature of positions. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Philippine Postal Savings Bank Inc. guilty of illegal dismissal and it is hereby ordered to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them full backwages reckoned from the time they were dismissed up to their actual or payroll reinstatement which as of this date is in the total amount of P528,100.57. Additionally, respondent is ordered to pay complainants attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 10% of whatever they may receive by virtue of this decision.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 72-73)
On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision on April 19, 2004 (Rollo, pp. 147-156) affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter holding that:
“After a careful examination of the financial statements and the reports of the PDIC on appellants financial assets and liabilities we, however, are not convinced that retrenchment is necessary and likely to prevent losses on appellants business operation. The reports of the PDIC on the examinations conducted on May 24, 1996, August 11, 1998 and September 16, 1998 glaringly show that appellants operation losses were primarily due to inability of appellant to harness its resources towards a more profitable ventures; appellants engagement in hazardous lending practices, high compensation and fringe benefits of its employees and officers, an increase in the consumption loan transaction; appellants failed to update its loan ledgers, thus, the past due accounts were still on current status. Under such given circumstances we believe that retrenchment is not a solution to the worsening liquidity of appellants but a sound business management of appellants’ officials, i.e. to adopt measures to put in proper order the negative findings pf the PDIC.” (Rollo, pp. 155-156)
PPSBI then filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 157-165) asserting that in the case of Tanjuan vs. PPSB, Inc., the NLRC (3rd Division) held that the PPSBI retrenchment was valid. PPSB further asserted that said NLRC decision had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court (See: Rollo, pp. 159-160).
On September 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered its questioned Decision which reversed its prior decision (dated April 19, 2004) and ruled that the retrenchment was valid. Relevant portion of the September 30, 2004 Decision reads:
“Respondents-appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation, this time calling the attention of this Commission to a similar case rendered by another division (3rd Division) of this Commission, entitled ‘Prudencio L. Tanjuan vs. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc., et., al.,’ NLRC NCR Case No. 30-11-00567-99 (C.A. No. 026604-00). In the said case, the decision of the labor arbiter a quo which incidentally is the same labor arbiter who handled and resolved this instant case, was reversed by the Third Division of this Commission, stating that the retrenchment was valid, hence, there was no illegal dismissal. In the aforecited case, the Third Division, gave due course to the presentation of the pieces of evidence of respondents to prove their alleged losses and the need for reorganization,first time on appeal. The said decision of the Third Division, reached the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which affirmed the findings and decision of the Third Division of this Commission.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, this Commission deemed it wise to study the circumstances of both cases and concludes now that both cases were similar and arose out exactly from the retrenchment undertaken by respondent-appellant Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc., et. al., The same pieces of evidence were also presented to this Commission to prove respondents-appellants losses and the need for them to reorganize and effect retrenchment. As earlier emphasized in its decision dated April 19, 2004, this Commission did not consider the pieces of evidence submitted for the first time on appeal by respondents-appellants for the simple reason that they failed to justify its reason for the delay in its submission.
Perusal however of the records, will show that on page 17 rollo (respondent’s position paper), respondents stated, and to quote: ‘The first requisite regarding losses has long been a ‘favorite’ item in the various exceptions and findings of the BSP, PDIC and COA in their examination reports.’ For reasons of confidentiality and due to the nature of respondent’s business, respondents reserves the right to hold on in the meantime and present to the Honorable Commission later relevant documents on the matter if and when respondent is required to do so (underscoring for emphasis). Having failed to take note of this reservation of respondents-appellants when it disregarded the submission of the relevant documents for the first time on appeal, it is but proper to rectify such error for which reason the motion for reconsideration as allowed in our NLRC Rules of Procedure is hereby granted.” (Rollo, pp. 20-22)
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated November 2, 2004 (Rollo, pp. 198-203) was denied and they are now before this Court on a petition for certiorari alleging that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION RESULTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER ISABEL P. ORTIGUERRA DATED JUNE 30, 2000 AND ITS OWN DECISION DATED APRIL 19, 2004
AND
WHEN IT ISSUED TWO (2) CONTRADICTING AND INCONSISTENT RESOLUTION AND DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 26, 2004 AND JANUARY 31, 2005, RESPECTIVELY. (Rollo, p. 10)
There is no merit to the present petition.
As clearly pointed out in the questioned Decision dated September 30, 2004, the NLRC reversed its prior Decision based on the Decision of the Supreme Court affirming the NLRC ruling that the retrenchment pursuant to the same reorganization to be valid, to wit:
“Respondents-appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation, this time calling the attention of this Commission to a similar case rendered by another division (3rd Division) of this Commission, entitled ‘Prudencio L. Tanjuan vs. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc., et., al.,’ NLRC NCR Case No. 30-11-00567-99 (C.A. No. 026604-00). In the said case, the decision of the labor arbiter a quo which incidentally is the same labor arbiter who handled and resolved this instant case, was reversed by the Third Division of this Commission, stating that the retrenchment was valid, hence, there was no illegal dismissal. In the aforecited case, the Third Division gave due course to the presentation of the pieces of evidence of respondents to prove their alleged losses and the need for reorganization, first time on appeal. The said decision of the Third Division, reached the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which affirmed the findings and decision of the Third Division of this Commission.” (Rollo, pp. 20-21)
The NLRC, without expressly stating, was obviously applying the principle of stare decisis in its above-quoted decision. This principle was applied in the case of Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., (281 SCRA 534 [1997]) where the Supreme Court held that where the second case arose out of the same incident as the case already decided, even if the parties in the second case are different and the trials conducted separately, the second case should be decided in consonance with the first case, to wit:
“Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there can only be one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other.
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere” (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. In Woulfe v. Associuated Realties Corporation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill, it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: ‘Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.’ Thus, in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of ‘stare decisis et non quieta movere.’” (281 SCRA at 542-543) (Emphasis Supplied)
Applying the foregoing to the present case, although the complainants (petitioners herein) are different, respondent is the same bank and the retrenchment arose out of the same reorganization. The Court, therefore, finds that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its prior Decision considering that the September 30, 2004 Decision was rendered pursuant to the principle of stare decisis.
Petitioners also argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it issued two conflicting Resolutions dated November 26, 2004 and January 31, 2005.
For clarity, the said Resolutions are hereby quoted:
November 26, 2004 Resolution Reads:
“This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents of our Decision dated April 19, 2004.
After a careful consideration of the arguments and discussions raised, we find no compelling justification or valid reason to modify, alter, much less reverse the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 225)
January 31, 2005 Resolution Reads:
“This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by complainants of our Decision dated September 30, 2004.
After a careful consideration of the arguments and discussions raised, we find no compelling justification or valid reason to modify, alter, much less reverse the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 24)
Petitioners argued that in the above-quoted Resolution dated November 26, 2004, it was implied that the first Decision dated April 19, 2004 had become final and executory to wit:
“An unbiased mind and an unprejudicial person would thus easily discern therefrom that there lies the error committed by the Public Respondent NLRC, which amounted to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the Resolution dated November 26, 2004 and Resolution dated January 31, 2005 both dismissing the respective Motion for Reconsideration of the parties. In any case, the Resolution dated November 26, 2004 being issued first and private respondent having taken no action, the Decision dated April 19, 2004 becomes final and executory and therefore an Entry of Judgment must necessarily be issued. (Rollo, p. 14)
The Court is not persuaded. The above-quoted November 26, 2004 Resolution is clearly erroneously issued because respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration had already been acted upon in the September 30, 2004 Decision. The Court therefore agrees with PPSBI when it argued that:
“On the last argument, petitioners raised the two conflicting resolutions made by the NLRC: the resolution dated November 26, 2004 and the resolution dated January 31, 2005. The conflict was made but it is not without explanation. Petitioners even admitted that the NLRC insisted that the decision dated November 26, 2004 is a typographical error, which was rectified when it issued the latter resolution that is dated January 31, 2005. Correctly, it is supported by the fact that respondent Postal Bank never filed any motion for reconsideration right after the favorable decision made by the NLRC on September 30, 2004. Hence, the resolution dated November 26, 2004 is without any basis at all and it is thus consistent with the explanation given that the said resolution is a typographical error and that the resolution dated January 31, 2005 prevails based on the motion for reconsideration dated November 2, 2004 filed by the petitioners.” (Rollo, p. 270)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, (Chairman) and Lanzanas, JJ., concur.