LUTONG BAHAY FOOD COURT AND MRS. LONIFLOR IMPERIAL, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND ANTONIO M. NOBLEZA, RESPONDENTS.
CARANDANG, J.:
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner Lutong Bahay Food Court (LBFC) is a single proprietorship owned by and operating under the management of co-petitioner Loniflor Imperial (Imperial). Sometime in February 1999, Imperial’s husband Mario engaged the services of private respondent Antonio Merabuino Nobleza (Nobleza) to work as cook in one of the fast food outlets owned by the Imperials, which is located at Ever Gotesco Mall in Caloocan City. Sometime in May 2001, after the eatery at Ever Gotesco Mall has closed down and ceased operations, Imperial absorbed and continued Nobleza’s employment as cook, this time at LBFC’s fast food outlet located at North Mall in Caloocan City. In the evening of February 4, 2002, Imperial’s daughter Catherine directed the counter girl of LBFC to prepare a double order of sizzling mixed seafoods for her. Accordingly, the counter girl took the order to the kitchen and handed the same to Nobleza for cooking and preparation. As soon as it was prepared, the food was delivered to Catherine, who forthwith brought it home to be savored at the family’s dinner. After about an hour, a fuming Imperial called-up LBFC at North Mall to complain about the food, which according to her was bland. After having been informed that Nobleza was the one who cooked the food, Imperial reprimanded Nobleza regarding the sloppy preparation of the viand of mixed seafoods which was supposedly tasteless and cooked “way below standard”. Imperial then told Nobleza that if he cannot effectively perform his job, or if he is already unhappy with his work, he must leave LBFC and look for another employment. In response, Nobleza told Imperial that he shall just try to find another job. Starting on February 5, 2002, Nobleza did not report for work anymore.
On March 16, 2002, Nobleza instituted a Complaint before the NCR-North Sector Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for Illegal Dismissal, payment of emoluments and Damages against LBFC and Imperial (Rollo pp. 39-40). On January 6, 2004, after the parties shall have submitted their respective Position Papers, other pleadings and documentary evidence in support of their claims and defenses, NCR Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria promulgated a Decision pronouncing that Nobleza was unlawfully terminated from work, thereby disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents guilty of illegal dismissal. Respondents are therefore, ordered jointly and severally liable:
1. To pay complainant, the amount of P184,076.66 representing his backwages, computed only up to the promulgation of this decision;
2. To pay complainant, the amount of P36,400.00, representing his separation pay;
3. Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo pp. 94-101)
In disagreement with the judgment of the Labor Arbiter, LBFC and Imperial interposed an appeal before the NLRC through a Memorandum on Appeal on April 12, 2004. The records disclose, though, that the counsel for LBFC and Imperial received an official copy of the Labor Arbiter’s January 6, 2004 Decision on March 24, 2004, and therefore it is evident that the appeal was filed 9 days after the 10-day reglementary period for the perfection thereof has expired. On May 14, 2004, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal on ground of failure on the part of LBFC and Imperial to submit an indemnity agreement, which is an essential requirement for perfection of appeals pursuant to Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure (Rollo pp. 30-31).
LBFC and Imperial thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 2, 2004, where they tried to establish that an indemnity agreement was actually prepared and executed through the Philippine British Assurance Company, Incorporated, but they inadvertently omitted to attach a copy thereof when they submitted their Memorandum on Appeal on April 12, 2004 (Record pp. 200-203). On September 30, 2004, the NLRC issued the first assailed Resolution. Noting that an indemnity agreement was indeed executed but it was left out due to mere excusable inadvertence and honest mistake, the NLRC accepted its belated filing. Nevertheless, the NLRC still stood firm in dismissing the appeal, this time on ground of non-perfection thereof within the 10-day reglementary period allowed under Article 223 of the Labor Code (Rollo pp. 27-29).
LBFC and Imperial then lodged a Motion for Reconsideration on October 28, 2004 (Record pp. 215-221). The NLRC denied said Motion in the second assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005 (Rollo pp. 23-26).
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with petitioners raising the following issues:
I.Whether or not the Honorable Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess and/or lack of jurisdiction in holding that respondent herein was illegally dismissed and did not abandon his job.
II.Whether or not the Honorable Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess and/or lack of jurisdiction in finding that respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay.
IIIWhether or not the Honorable Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess and/or lack of jurisdiction in finding that respondent started working with petitioners from November 1996 instead of April 1999.
IVWhether or not the Honorable Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess and/or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Petition for Certiorari is impressed with merit.
Anent the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal, it is doctrinal that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on mere technicality, and for this reason, it has been the consistent attitude of this Court to frown upon dismissal of appeals purely on technical or formal grounds. Perforce, We have always adopted the policy of relaxing the rules of procedure so as to encourage hearings and resolutions of appeals on the merits (Nerves vs. Civil Service Commission, 276 SCRA 610; Vda. de Dela Rosa vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444). In the case at bench, petitioners do not dispute that their appeal was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period prescribed under the Labor Code for the perfection of appeals from judgments rendered by Labor Arbiters. Nevertheless, We hold that petitioners have provided for a sufficient and convincing explanation to show that the lapse was a result of excusable inadvertence, that is, in view of lack of guidance of counsel, petitioners mistakenly reckoned the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period by counting the same on the basis of working days, instead of calendar days, as what Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplates. Such being the case, in view of the justification for the belated filing of the appeal, which We hold as meritorious, We are inclined to adopt a relaxed and liberal interpretation of the rules on perfection of appeals so as to lift and vacate the order of dismissal of the appeal interposed by petitioners from the January 6, 2004 Decision of the Labor Arbiter (Lapid vs. Laurea, 391 SCRA 277; New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, Incorporated vs. NLRC, 328 SCRA 404). In this case, the High Court gave due course to an appeal from the judgment of the Labor Arbiter though it was filed several months after the reglementary period has expired. Ergo, to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, We find the propriety of giving due course to the appeal of petitioners, and review the ruling of the Labor Arbiter vis-à-vis the facts of the case in line with Our power to pass upon and review questions of facts even in a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 65. Under the circumstances, in as much as the entire records of the case are already elevated before Us, We no longer find the necessity of remanding the case to the NLRC, but instead, We shall proceed to delve upon the records and examine for Ourselves the factual backdrop of the case so as to determine whether Nobleza’s termination from work is legitimate or otherwise unlawful (R&E Transport, Incorporated vs. Latag, 422 SCRA 698; Agabon vs. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573).
Per the records, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Nobleza is not a good cook. For purposes of his work at LBFC, Nobleza is inefficient and has a difficulty of following instructions, more specifically in preparing the food according to the recipe of LBFC. Too, Nobleza’s crewmates at LBFC have observed that the customers of LBFC disliked Nobleza’s cooking, and have, most often than not, leave the food prepared by Nobleza unfinished. As a matter of fact, Nobleza has been repeatedly reprimanded by Imperial and her husband Mario by reason of the sloppy manner by which he used to prepare the food that he was ordered to cook. LBFC’s threshold of patience was exhausted when Nobleza failed to properly prepare the food ordered by the owners of the very same entity that employed him. Certainly, if Nobleza cannot correctly cook the food for his own employer, then there is no doubt that his inefficiency and unfitness as cook is likewise true with respect to the other customers of LBFC. All these things summed up, suffice it to say, are strong indications that Nobleza is unfit to work as cook for the food outfit that engaged his services. Verily, the position of cook is the “heart and soul” upon which Imperial’s business is dependent, such that if the cook is not good in his work, LBFC would certainly suffer material prejudice for want of eating patrons.
An employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment of workers who are unfit and inefficient in the performance of their functions, and whose continuance in the service of the employer is patently inimical and prejudicial to the growth and material interest of the employer. As an unbending rule, the law, in protecting the rights of workers authorizes neither the oppression nor the self-destruction of the employer (Bondoc vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 288). In the instant case, the law implies a stipulation or undertaking by Nobleza in entering into the contract of employment as cook that he is competent to perform the work undertaken, and that he possessed of the requisite skill and knowledge to enable him to discharge his tasks. Thus, in as much as Nobleza has turned out to be unqualified to do the work which he undertakes to perform, and is incompetent, unskillful or inefficient, and has been executing his work in a sloppy and negligent manner in spite of constant reminders and reprimands from his employer, then LBFC may lawfully discharge Nobleza from his post as cook. Be that as it may, while there may have been a just ground to severe the employment of Nobleza, Imperial failed to respect Nobleza’s right to due process of law when she hastily discharged the latter without complying with the legally required “two written notice rule”. Evidently, Nobleza was terminated without having been afforded the opportunity to explain his side. In this regard, it is a rule that where the dismissal of an employee is, in fact, for a proven just and valid cause, but the employee is not accorded due process, the dismissal shall be upheld but a sanction must be imposed upon the employer, such that the latter shall be held liable to pay an indemnity for failure to give formal notice and to conduct an investigation required by law before eventually discharging the employee from his position (Pono vs. NLRC, 275 SCRA 611; Agabon vs. NLRC, supra).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is granted, and accordingly the herein assailed Resolutions of the NLRC, Third Division, dated September 30, 2004 and April 11, 2005 are hereby annulled and set aside. It appearing that Nobleza was terminated from work on the basis of a just cause, the January 6, 2004 Decision of the NCR Labor Arbiter is reversed and vacated, and Nobleza’s Complaint for Illegal Dismissal is dismissed. In view, however, of the haste that attended the dismissal, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay Nobleza the sum of Php10,000.00 by way of indemnity so as to somehow compensate the latter for the violation of his right to due process in line with the ruling of the High Court in the case of Agabon vs. NLRC.
SO ORDERED.
Dacudao, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.