G.R. Nos. L-39367-69. February 28, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REMIGIO CONCHADA Y ASTRERA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FERNANDO, J.:
The law – and understandably so – looks with repugnance at the
crime of rape, but never is the comÂmission of such an offense attended with
such infamy as when the victim is a girl of tender years. The prediÂcament, therefore, in which
appellant Remigio Conchada
y Astrera found himself was far from enviable. He was accused of the crime of raping the
complainant, then only eight years of age, in three separate complaints.[1]
After trial, he was duly convicted, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua in each one of the above cases. Precisely because the sympathy of the Court
is with the complainant, whose traumatic experience could have repercussions
lasting in its effects, there is all the more reason for a strict and close
scrutiny of the evidence to ascertain whether or not his guilt had been shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Of that, we are
convinced. The most rigorous appraisal
of the evidence on record would not justify a reversal. We affirm.
As to L-39367, the brief for appellant summarized the evidence
for the prosecution in this wise. It was
sometime in the morning of January, 1974, that the accused Remigio
Conchada, who was on the ground floor of the Luzonian Building, Lucena City,
asked complainant Eden Lingcoran to go to the
library, located at the fourth floor of the same building.[2]
The pretext, according to her, was that she would be given a newspaper for her
father.[3]
Another girl, one Marilyn Albaciete, was with her.[4]
Upon reaching the library, she was immediately taken to a place near the
bookshelves where her panties were taken off.[5]
Then appellant took off his pants and inserted his male organ into her private
parts.[6]
To make up for her lack of height, she was made to stand on a pile of
newspapers, the Balita, about a foot thick,
folded one on top of the other.[7]
In that position, she was made to spread her legs about 1-1/2 feet apart.[8]
The result, according to her, was that her private parts became wet; after
which, appellant moved his body back and forth against her.[9]
He wiped the wet parts of her thighs and legs; then gave her the newspaper, the
Bulletin, which she brought to her father.[10]
Complainant went downstairs where “Marilyn” was waiting for me
because the bag I have was in the possession of Marilyn.”[11] Eden
did not tell her parents that she was dragged by Conchada
to the library, nor what was done to her on that occasion.[12]
The brief for appellant summarizing the evidence of the
prosecution in L-39368 admitted the existence of testimony to the effect that on
the afternoon of February 14, 1974, during the celebration of the University
week of the Luzonian Colleges, Romeo Conchada, a son of appellant, informed Eden, who was one of
the contestants in the spelling contest, that they would practice for the event. When they arrived at the library, appellant
brought Eden behind the
bookshelves. She was abused anew
sexually by appellant, who, after removing his trousers as well as her panties,
succeeded in putting his male organ into her private parts. Complainant was again made to stand on a
one-foot thick pile of Balita newspapers.[13]
The testimony came from the complainant.
As to the third case against appellant, L-39369, his brief took
due note of what had been testified to, namely, that on March 4, 1974, Eden Lingcoran, Marilyn Albaciete, and
Romeo Conchada were sent by their teacher, one Ruperto Orinday, to the library
of the Luzonian University, ostensibly for the
purpose of being taught spelling by appellant, who was the librarian. They did so twice, the first time at about 10:30 and then at about 11:00 o’clock.
Moreover, it was appellant who made the request, as shown by this
letter: “March 4, 1974 Mr. Orinday,
Ipakidala mo riyan
sa tatlong paparito, anak ni Pareng Joe at anak ni Insang
Ador, iyong ‘spelling
notebook’ mo. I’ll compare it to my
selected words. I’ll wait until 11:00 A.M.
Pareng Remy.”[14]
The three students complied with the order.
First, they read magazines, and later they were taught spelling by
appellant, who once again took complainant behind the bookshelves and repeated
the act of inserting his male organ inside her private parts. “After the intercourse, [appellant]
wiped Eden’s thighs and legs with a
piece of rag.”[15]
When appellant was putting on his trousers, Elizabeth Lingcoran,
mother of Eden, arrived at the
library. That particular act, she
witnessed. She was stunned, but she did
not say anything. She just took
complainant home, who, soon after, with tears in her eyes, told her of the
sordid acts perpetrated on her person.
What the brief for appellant failed to mention was that such narration
came not only from complainant[16]
but also from her mother, Elizabeth Lingcoran.[17]
It was also corroÂborated in part by her classmate, Marilyn Albaciete.[18]
Outside of the testimonial evidence of record, the lower court
judge, Delia P. Medina, who wrote an exhaustive and carefully written decision
of sixty-five pages, relied on the findings of Dr. Lucita
D. Goyma, the resident physician who examined the
complainant. This is her
certification: “This is to certify
that [Eden Lingcoran], age 8 years, female, student
and a resident of Lucena
City had been examined in this
hospital on the above date.
[Findings]: Body – no signs of
external injury. Vulva – reddish all
around. Hymen – open, 1-1/2 cm. in
diameter, rounded, small laceration at 5 and 6
o’clock positions. Vagina
admits one finger. Vaginal smear for
presence of spermatozoa – none seen.” [19]
To repeat, in view of the seriousness of the accusation and the
severity of the penalty imposed, this Court took particular pains in the study
of the records of the case. As set forth
at the outset, nothing was elicited that would justify a reversal of the
conviction.
1.
The first fifty-seven pages of the
appealed decision set forth the testimonies of both the prosecution and the
defense. Thereafter, Judge Medina
explained why she arrived at a finding of guilt. Insofar as the testimony of the comÂplainant
was concerned, this is what was stated in her decision: “The Court finds it quite difficult to
disregard the direct, spontaneous, candid and consistent testimony of Eden Lingcoran, the 8-year-old offended party. It is highly extra-ordinary, if not
improbable, for a girl of her age to concoct and fabricate or retain in her
memory a concoction and fabrication of such a sordid event, which happened not
only once but three times, without omitting a single material circumstance,
such as the embrace and kisses of the accused, the pile of newspapers, the
pain, the wetting of her thighs and legs, the wiping of said wetness by the
accused, and above all, the act of the accused in inserting his penis into her
private parts, the child being able to relate well and quite naturally at that,
despite the rigid cross-examination, each and every detail of the incidents, including
the sending out of accused’s child to buy ‘pansit‘, which apparently was the modus employed by
the accused to discard a witness while he consummated his lustful desire. Not to be overlooked is the unswayed and unpretentious declaÂrations of 9-year-old
Marilyn Albaciete who corroborated Eden’s
testimony on some of the incidents that happened in the library on March 4, 1974.”[20]
The testimony of complainant’s mother was appraised thus: “The Court finds it equally difficult to
ignore the testimony of Eden’s mother, Elizabeth Lingcoran,
since it is certainly against the human nature and the ordinary course of
things for a mother to sacrifice the honor, dignity and the bright future of
her daughter, who is so young, so lovely and intelligent, by exposing her to
the shame and public scandal of this trial * * *. It is unbelievable that to give vent to an
alleged grudge against the accused, which certainly has not been satisfactorily
established, Elizabeth would resort to a measure that would necessarily cover
her own daughter with the infamous stigma of having been the victim of rape
that would cause both of them a lifeÂlong grief and embarrassment. There is no proof in the records that
Elizabeth Lingcoran and her husband are so
degenerated and wicked that they would sacrifice the future happiness of their
own daughter to satisfy a personal urge for a petty vengeance * * *.”[21]
The appealed decision likewise took into consideration the testimony of Dr. Goyma, who was grilled in an intensive cross-examination,
but whose findings survived the test of the most searching questions: “Likewise, quite significant are the
findings and observations made by the doctor, an expert, who examined Eden
and who corroborated the child’s testimony in material points. The opening and laceration of Eden’s
hymen, the doctor declared, was abnormal for a girl of Eden’s
age. The reddening of her vulva ‘all
around’ added even more in making the doctor observe that such abnormal opening
and laceration could have been caused by an attempt to have sexual intercourse
with the child or by a male organ coming in contact with the vagina of Eden,
notwithstanding the absence of spermatozoa.”[22]
2.
The first two assigned errors,
namely, that the lower court erred in believing the testimony of Eden Lingcoran, and in not rejecting such testimony, may be
discussed jointly. There is pertinence
to this excerpt from People v. Angcap:[23]
“Appellant would raise a question of credibility in the second error
assigned. He would charge the trial
court of ‘giving more weight and credence to the testimony of the complaining
witness than to that of the appellant.’ He should realize that his plea for
reversal does rest on a weak and infirm foundation. There is need to stress anew that the Court
has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial
judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly proved is
entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded
circumÂstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different
finding. So it was announced by Justice
Moreland in 1910 in the first case of consequence enunciating such a doctrine. As he pointed out, in the event of a conflict
in the testimony of the witnesses, ‘the peculiar province of the trial court is
to resolve the question of credibility, and, unless there is something in the
record impeaching by fair interpretation the resolution of the trial court in
relation to that question, this court will assume that he acted fairly, justly,
and legally in the exercise of that function.’ So it has been since then. In a case reported in the latest volume of
the Philippine Reports, Justice Paredes, speaking for
this Court, succinctly stated ‘that with respect to the credibility of
witnesses, the trial court’s findings and conclusions, command great respect
and weight.’ Its more usual formulation was also set forth by Justice Malcolm
in these words: ‘After everything is
said and done, we come back, as we invariably do in cases of this nature, to a
recognition of the rule that the Supreme Court will not interÂfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstances of
weight and influence, which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted.’ The three-page discussion in the brief for appellant
could hardly make a dent in the appraisal made by the trial court of the competent
and credible evidence of record. There
could be no other conclusion then except to declare as bereft of merit this
second assignment of error.”[24]
Since Angcap, there had been other decisions in
prosecutions for rape, where such a doctrine was reiterated.[25]
3.
Appellant assigns as the third error the
finding of the lower court that rape was committed. In the light of the testimony of the evidence
for the prosecution, given credence by the trial court, it would necessarily
follow that the proof offered sufficed for a judgment of conviction. The brief for appellant did not even discuss
the evidence for the defense. The lower
court did so. Thus: “On the other hand, the defense relies
mainly on denial, the accused declaring that on February 14 and March 4, there
were many persons inside the library; that Exhibit D, which is his sworn
statement that he did not rape Eden Lingcoran but
only toyed with her private parts using merely his fingers, on March 4, 1974,
was signed by him without reading it intelligibly, although he admits that he
was not threatened by the police officer who interrogated him on March 4 and
neither was he threatened by Fiscal Romeo Dato,
before whom he executed Exhibit D, to sign the same. Accused further claims that he was not even
furÂnished with a copy of Exhibit D, but on cross-examination admitted that he
did not ask for a copy. Accused contends
that the charges against him are ill-motivated (sic) by revenge because
the accused did not lend money to Eden’s
parents when they were borrowing from him.”[26]
When the respective testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense are
compared, especially the certification of Dr. Goyma,
the allegation that the lower court erred in finding that rape was committed on
the three occasions charged in the complaint is shown to be bereft of any
persuasive force. That is to run counter
to the authoritative doctrines. In
People v. Oscar,[27]
this Court, through Justice Ostrand, relying on the
American decisions, was quite emphatic in its holding that any penetration by
the entry of the labia or lips of the female organ even without rupture of the
hymen suffices to warrant conviction. So
it was held likewise in the following cases:
People v. Selfaison,[28]
People v. Amores,[29]
and People v. Ignacio.[30]
1.
Nor can there be any weight
accorded to the observation made in the brief that complainant apparently
failed to manifest any resistance to the sexual abuse committed on her
person. Thus in People v. De la Cruz,[31]
this Court, through Justice Aquino, stated: “Appellant’s attempt to discredit
complainant’s story by observing that she had ‘made no outcry’ during the
commission of the crime or immediately thereafter does not deserve serious
consideration. In the rape of a girl
below twelve years of age force or intimidation need not be present.”[32]
Again, through the same ponente, there is this
holding in the subseÂquent case of People v. Gonzales:[33]
“The crime committed by Gonzales is simple rape or rape without the
attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. Its basic
element is the carnal knowledge of a girl below twelve years of age.”[34]
2.
That is all that needs to be said
except perhaps to reiterate that in providing for the statutory crime of rape,
where the victim is a young girl of tender years, consent on her part is not a
defense. The law is a reflection of the
deep concern of the state for the well-being of the child. In at least two cases, People v. Baylon[35]
and People v. Cawili,[36]
it was noted that the obligation of the state embraced in the concept of parens patria justifies such an approach in
its penal laws.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated August 8, 1974 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 753, 754 and 755 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I, now respectively L-39367, L-39368 and
L-39369, sentencing the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each one of them, is hereby
affirmed. Costs against appellant.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
[1]
L-39367, L-39368 and L-39369.
[2] T.s.n., Session of May
17, 1974, 178.
[3] Ibid,
177.
[4] Ibid,
Session of April 29, 1974,
83.
[5] Ibid,
180.
[6] Ibid,
181.
[7] Ibid,
186; 188.
[8] Ibid,
187.
[9] Ibid,
183.
[10] Ibid,
191.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid,
195.
[13] Ibid,
88.
[14]
Exhibit 2.
[15]
Brief for Appellant, 7.
[16] T.s.n., Session of April
29, 1974, 67-81.
[17] Ibid,
13-26; 45-63.
[18] T.s.n., Session of July
9, 1974, 3-15; 18-27.
[19]
Exhibit C.
[20]
Decision of the lower court, 57-58.
[21] Ibid,
58-59.
[22] Ibid,
59.
[23]
L-28748, February 29, 1972,
43 SCRA 437.
[24] Ibid,
443-445. The citation from Justice
Moreland is found in United States v. Pico, 15 Phil. 549, 551; from
Justice Paredes in People v. Cristobal, 110 Phil. 741, 747 (1960); and from Justice
Malcolm in People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201, 209 (1927).
[25]
Cf. People v. Cudalina, L-34969, April 29,
1975, 63 SCRA 499; People v. Ordenio, L-33829,
Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Sarile,
L-37148, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v. Velasco, L-31922, Oct.
29, 1976, 73 SCRA 574; People v. VillaÂmala,
L-41312, July 29, 1977, 78 SCRA 145; People v. Rapada,
L-31654, Nov. 22, 1977, 80 SCRA 273.
[26]
Decision of the lower court, 56-57.
[27]
48 Phil. 527 (1925).
[28]
110 Phil. 839 (1961).
[29]
L-32996, August 21, 1974,
58 SCRA 505.
[30]
L-35494, September 18, 1974,
60 SCRA 11.
[31]
L-28810, March 27, 1974, 56
SCRA 84.
[32] Ibid,
93.
[33]
L-33926, July 31, 1974, 58
SCRA 265.
[34] Ibid,
270.
[35]
L-35785, May 29, 1974, 57
SCRA 114.
[36]
L-30543, July 15, 1975, 65
SCRA 24.