CATALINO CATINDIG AND BARBARA CARTA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO DE LEON, ROMANA BARRAQUIO AND GABRIEL BAYNOSA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the reso­lution of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated August
18, 1970, dismissing the appeal interposed by petitioners in CA-G.
R. No. 45340-R, entitled “Catalino Catindig, et al. vs. Lorenzo de Leon,
et al” due to their failure to file the printed record on appeal within
the reglementary period and the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1970 denying petitioners’ supplemental motion for recon­sideration
of the resolution dated August 18, 1970.

The records show that the herein petitioners are plaintiffs,
while private respondents are defendants in the Civil Case No. B-598, entitled “Catalino Catindig and Barbara Carta vs.
Lorenzo de Leon, Romana Barraquio and Gabriel Baynosa” of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.

In that civil case, plaintiffs-petitioners sought to compel the
defendants (herein private respondents) to surrender their certificate of title
No. 13725 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna and to acknowledge the contract of
sale executed by them in favor of the petitioners.  Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Laguna rendered a decision dated September 29, 1969 which, among others,
dismissed the complaint and ordered the document titled “Kasulatan ng
Pagbibilihang Tuluyan ng Bahagi ng Lupaing Tubigan” to be reformed to that
of equitable mortgage, redeemable by defendants-private respond­ents within a
period of 10 years from July 18, 1958 for the same amount of the equitable
mortgage.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on November 11, 1969 which was,
however, denied by the trial court for lack of merit.

Thereafter, a notice of appeal and an appeal bond were filed on December 18, 1969 by the herein
petitioners which were approved by the trial court.  The appeal having been perfected, the Clerk
of Court of the trial court forwarded all the records to respondent Court of
Appeals.

The counsels on record of the petitioners at the time the appeal
was perfected were Attorneys E. Bonifacio and Gonzalo Padua.  However, on May 20, 1970 said lawyers formally withdrew as counsels
for petitioners.  Atty. Arsenio G.
Velasquez formally entered his appearance in writing as the new counsel for
petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals on June 16, 1970.

In the meanwhile, a notice to file a printed record on appeal
dated May 25, 1970 was sent
by the Court of Appeals to petitioners’ former counsels, Attys. Bonifacio and Padua
who received such notice on June 3,
1970.  Atty. Arsenio
Velasquez failed to comply with the directive of the respond­ent Court of
Appeals to file a printed record on appeal within the reglementary period
stated in said notice because he never received a copy of such notice.  Neither did Attys. Bonifacio and Padua
comply with the notice to file a printed record on appeal because of their
honest belief that they were relieved of such responsibility, having previously
withdrawn their appearance as counsels for petitioners.  On May
20, 1970, petitioners paid the docket fee.  The deadline for submitting the printed
record on appeal was August 2, 1970.

Respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution dated August 18, 1970 dismissing the appeal
of petitioners for failure to file printed record on appeal within the period
prescribed in the Notice of May 25,
1970.  (p.
62, Annex M to petition, Rollo).

On August 11, 1970,
Atty. Velasquez made inquiries at the office of the Clerk of Court of
respondent Court of Appeals, and he found out that a notice to file a printed
record on appeal was sent to Attys. Bonifacio and Padua.  Without losing time, Atty. Velasquez caused
the hurried printing of the record on appeal and filed the same with respondent
Court of Appeals on August 18, 1970
accompanied by a manifestation explaining the unfortunate circumstances that
caused the failure of the petitioners to comply with the notice to file a
printed record on appeal.

Subsequently, a motion to reconsider the order of dis­missal was
filed by petitioners on September 23,
1970 which was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated October 5, 1970.  Again, petitioners filed a supplemental motion
for reconsideration of resolution dated August
18, 1970 which was also denied in a resolution issued by respondent
Court of Appeals on December 29, 1970.

This instant petition for review on certiorari of the reso­lutions
dated August 18, 1970 and December 29, 1970 issued by respondent Court of
Appeals was given due course by this court in its resolution on January 27,
1971.

The issue is whether respondent Court of Appeals acted correctly
in dismissing the appeal of petitioners for failure to file the printed record
on appeal within the reglementary period.

We hold that petitioners’ appeal should be reinstated in
consonance with the dictates of justice and fair play.  In the case of Lazarte vs. Court of Appeals,
78 SCRA 544, this Court said that the failure to timely file the printed mimeo­graphed
copies of the record on appeal for the convenience of
the members of the appellate courts may be excused for justifiable
reasons.  In the words of this Court:

“Hence, the petition at bar which the Court finds to be
meritorious and therefore grants on the strength of controlling jurisprudence
that such failure o timely file the printed mimeographed copies of the record
on appeal for the convenience of the members of the appellate courts (as the original
record on appeal as filed with and approved by the trial court is duly attached
to the original record of the case) may be excused for justifiable reasons
since the appellate court has the discretion to dismiss or not to
dismiss the appeal but said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.” (see also Philippine National Bank
vs. Phil. Milling Co., 26 SCRA 712, Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120)
.

In the instant case, when Atty. Velasquez, counsel for
petitioners, found out on August 11, 1970 that a notice to submit and file a
printed record on appeal was sent to the petitioners’ former counsels, he lost
no time in causing the printing and filing of the same on August 18, 1970, the
very day when the questioned resolution dismissing the appeal was issued by the
respondent Court of Appeals.  On May 20, 1970, herein petitioners paid
voluntarily the Appellate Court docket fee. 
These facts strongly reveal that petitioners never intended to abandon
their appeal as to warrant its dismissal. 
An appeal may be reinstated, even after the remand of the record to the
trial court, where it appears that the dismissal of the appeal was made under
the erroneous impression that the appellants had abandoned their appeal
(Balajadia vs. Pineda, L-45335, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 464; Marquez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-45423, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 523; Heirs of Celestino vs.
Court of Appeals, L-38690, September 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 22; Krug vs. Meehan, 239
Pac, 2nd 46; 4 C. J., 609).

Again, there is no dispute that the printed record on appeal was
actually filed on August 18, 1970,
though filed 16 days late.  The filing of
the printed record on appeal is not a requirement for the protection of the
prevailing party, and non-compliance therewith within the time prescribed
causes no substantial prejudice to anyone. 
It is patent that the delay in filing the printed record on appeal was
not due to a desire to delay or defeat the ends of justice.  In the case of Lopez vs. Court of Appeals,
(75 SCRA 402), this Court held that: 
“To apply to petitioners the legal requirements strictly would not
only tend to block the right to review to which a party is entitled under the
law, but also would amount to a complete departure from what we said in the
cases of Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., et al. (26
SCRA 712, 715) and restated in Maqui and Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (69
SCRA 368) that the provision of Section 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal manifestly
confers a power and does not impose a duty. 
What is more, it is directory not mandatory.  Hence, it should be exercised with a great
deal of circumspection considering all the attendant circumstances.”

The case of Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, supra, is
applicable to this case.  As aptly stated
by this Court therein in ruling that the slight delay in the submittal of
respondent court’s copies of the record on appeal could not possibly prejudice
any substantial rights:

“A rigid adherence to the technical rules and pro­cedure
disregards the fundamental aim of procedure to serve as our aid to justice, not
as a means for its frustration, and the objective of the Rules of Court to
afford litigants just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
controversy.  Thus, excusable
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure or lapses in the literal
or rigid observation of a procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline
provided therein should be overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and
indecisive in the interest of fair play and justice when public policy is not
involved, no prejudice has been caused adverse party and the court has not been
deprived of its authority or jurisdiction.” (Economic
Insurance Co. vs. Uy Realty Co., 34 SCRA 744; Cf. Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil.
315).

Moreover, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on
their merits.  The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not override sub­stantial justice.  If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated. 
(Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 121; Mc Entee
vs. Manotoc, 3 SCRA 279; Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 441).

And as We said in Obut vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 547:  “What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.” (See also Marquez vs.
Court of Appeals, 77 SCRA 524; Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Espiritu,
69 SCRA 36; Aznar, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 330; Gregorio
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 72 SCRA 120; Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA
401).

More significantly, the cardinal rule remains that the
discretionary power to dismiss appeals or not must always be exercised wisely
and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.  (Marquez vs. Court of Appeals, 77 SCRA 527;
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 124; Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA
68; Piedad vs. Batuyong, 55 SCRA 763; Limon vs. Candido, 27 SCRA 1166).

WHEREFORE, respondent appellate court’s resolutions
dismissing petitioners’ appeal are set aside and the case is remanded to it for
further proceedings and disposition of the appeal on its merits.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.