THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO SIBAYAN ALIAS ISIONG, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DIONISIO SIBAYAN ALIAS ISIONG, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

After due trial upon an information charging Dionisio
Sibayan, Pedro Moreno and Herminio
Caspillo of the crime of murder, committed, in the
language of the indictment, as follows:

“That on or about the 7th day of June, 1964, in the
Municipality of Talugtog, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction. of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously,
strike and hit one Lorenzo Grospe on his head with a
piece of hard wood for several times, thereby causing the instantaneous death
of said Lo­renzo Grospe,”

Pedro Moreno and Herminio
Caspillo were acquitted by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija
presided by Judge Placido C. Ra­mos, and Dionisio Sibayan, whose appeal is
the subject of this decision, was
adjudged guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the sum of P6, 000, to suffer the accessories provided by law,
and to pay the costs.

Witnesses for the prosecution, seven all told, were chief of
police Fidel Dumandan of Talugtog,
Carmen Castillo (surviving spouse of the deceased Lorenzo Grospe),
barrio captain Marceliano Caspillo
of Osmeña district in Talugtog,
Alejandro Soriano, mu­nicipal judge Alfredo Leybag of Talugtog, patrolman
Benjamin de Fiesta of the same municipality, and Dr. Artemio
Da Jose, rural health officer.

The integrated testimony of Carmen Castillo, Marceliano
Caspillo, Alejandro Soriano
and Benjamin de Fiesta points unerring­ly to the appellant Dionisio
Sibayan as the slayer of the deceased.

The victim Lorenzo Grospe and Dionisio Sibayan were neighbors.  It was about nine o’clock on the night of
June 7, 1964 when these two had an altercation, immediately followed by Sibayan attacking Grospe with, a
piece of hard wood, fracturing the latter’s skull, and causing his death.  Alejandro Soriano
and Benjamin de Fiesta identified Sibayan as the
assailant of the deceased. Soriano likewise declared
that he saw Sibayan standing over the dying victim;
de Fiesta further testified that he saw him run away from the scene of the
crime.  De Fiesta even gave chase but was
unable to apprehend him.  Supporting the
declarations of these two witnesses was the admission to Marceliano
Caspillo made by the appellant’s wife (Clarita
Castillo) in the presence of de Fiesta and Soriano
that her husband succeeded in killing Grospe inspite of her attempt to stop him.

Municipal judge Leybag testified that
he notarized exhibit A, which in essence is a sworn confession accomplished by Sibayan, and which substantially recites that it was he who
killed the deceased by hitting him on the head with a piece of wood.  Judge Leybag
further declared that he inquired from the appellant whether the confession was
voluntary and whether the statements contained there­in were correct and true,
and that Sibayan replied in the affirmative.

It is also undenied that in the morning
of the next day, Sibayan and his wife disappeared
from Talugtog, which fact left its indelible
impression on the judge a quo, prompting him to remark (in his
decision) in connection therewith that “Not only did he run away from the
scene of the incident but he disappeared entirely from Talugtog
that evening as well as in the following days. 
What Dionisio Sibayan
did was to fly away from the scene of the incident and from Talugtog.  According to him, he proceeded to Manila
to look for work.  It is strange,
however, why even his wife had to leave early that very morning.  If the purpose only of Sibayan
in going to Manila was to look for work, considering, however, that Dionisio Sibayan, is related to
the deceased Lorenzo Grospe, and it is the custom in
the rural communities for anyone to attend to the burial of his relatives, the
Court cannot reconcile itself to the explanation of Dionisio
Sibayan that instead of attending the burial of a
relative he would leave so early in the morning for Manila to look for
work.  At least, if this is so, his wife
should have remained but even his wife disappeared.  When Dionisio Sibayan left Talugtog that
evening and could not be seen anymore, the only logical conclusion that could
be established is that he really fled away from the scene of the crime.  This flight indicates the consciousness of
guilt on the part of Dionisio Sibayan.
“

It is our considered view that the court a quo
correctly accorded credence to the version of the prosecution.  The cumulative testimony of the prosecution
witnesses does not suffer from any infirmity; no bias of any form, shape or
substance is imputed to any of the State witnesses.

Only the appellant testified for the defense.  After a perceptive and careful examination of
his declarations, it is sufficient for as to state, in appraisal of his
testimony, that (1) his denial of the voluntariness
of the execution of exhibit A cannot
stand in the face of the positive testimony of Judge Leybag
to the contrary, and (2) that the material contradictions between the
appellant’s testimony in court and the contents of exhibit A render doubtful –
so the court noted, arid with which we agree – the veracity of his testimony in
court.

The court a quo found Sibayan
guilty of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.  Although the information explicitly alleges
that the crime was committed with evident premeditation and by means of
treachery, the court in its decision was strangely silent about these two
aggravating or qualifying circumstances. 
Nowhere in its decision does the court demonstrate the attendance of
these circumstances, and the record itself is barren of evidence in respect to
the presence of any of them.  We are
therefore not prepared to say that the offense was committed with any
aggravating circumstance.  As a matter of
fact, the evidence for the prosecution would seem to indicate that the
appellant and the deceased were facing each other when the fatal blow was
struck.

Under the proven factual milieu, the offense imputable to the
appellant is only simple homicide.

Homicide is penalized with reclusion temporal by
article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty that may be
imposed on the appellant is prision mayor
to reclusion temporal.  Here where
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are attendant, the
indeterminate penalty to be imposed should be in its medium period.  In our view, the ap­pellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years of prision mayor to sixteen (16) years of reclusion
temporal.  The indemnity to be paid
to the heirs of Lorenzo Grospe should be increased to
P12,000 (People vs. Pantoja,
L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468).

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is modified
in the sense that the appellant is adjudged guilty only of the crime of
homicide, and is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate imprisonment of from
nine (9) years of prision mayor to
sixteen (16) years of reclu­sion temporal, to indemnify the heirs
of Lorenzo Grospe in the sum of P12, 000, to suffer
the accessories provided by law, and
to pay the costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., did not take part.