REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. IGMEDIO YAP AND HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS, OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

On March 19, 1965
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
rendered its decision in Civil Case No. H-4834, granting the petition of herein
respondent Igmedio Yap for naturalization as a
Filipino citizen.  The Provincial Fiscal
of Negros Occidental received a copy of the decision on March 31, 1965; the Solicitor General received a copy on
the following April 7.  Upon instruction
of the Solicitor General the Provincial Fiscal, thru his assistant, filed with
the trial court a notice of appeal and the corresponding record on appeal on May 5, 1965.  In an order dated September 1, 1965, the trial judge disapproved the
same on the ground that the decision had become final, copy thereof having been
received by the Provincial Fiscal on March
31, 1965.  The Provincial
Fiscal moved to reconsider but was turned down in another order of October 27, 1965.  Thereupon, the Government filed the instant
petition, praying among other things:

“(a)    That after hearing,
judgment be rendered to declare both Orders of respondent judge dated September
1 and October 27, 1965 as illegal, null and void, as it was issued in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion;

“(b)    To order respondent
judge Honorable Carlos Abiera who is presiding Branch
VI of the Court of First Instance of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, to approve the “Record on
Appeal” (Annex “B” hereof);”

The only question here is whether the thirty-day period to appeal
should be counted from notice of the decision to the Provincial Fiscal or to
the Solicitor General.  This question,
and the arguments of herein respondents in support of their position, have
already been resolved by this Court. 
Thus in the case of Republic vs. Chiu, G. R. No. L-20846, Oct. 31, 1964, 12 SCRA 352,
involving the same factual background as that of this case, it was held:

“There is no question that the appearance of the City Attorney
for the government, in the hearing, was authorized.  This authorization, however, in the light of
the foregoing provision of law,^[1]
cannot be construed to have divested the Solicitor General of his control of
the stand or defense of the State, nor did it make of the City Attorney of Davao the counsel of record for the oppositor Republic
of the Phi­lippines.  Note that the law prescribes that the
Solicitor General shall appear on behalf of the government “either himself
or through his delegate or the provincial
fiscal concerned.” It did not say, “the Solicitor General or
the provincial fiscal” can appear on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
in order to make of the latter an alter­nate of the state counsel.  As thus worded, what the law allows is merely
the physical substitution of the Solicitor General in such proceedings.  Consequently, notwithstanding the delegation
to the City Attorney of the duty to appear at and attend the hearing in this
case, the Solicitor General remained the counsel of record for the oppositor.  This is
not a case where a party litigant is represented by two lawyers, notice to one
of whom is notice to the client.  Here,
the City Attorney did not appear as counsel for the Republic, but merely as representative of the Solicitor General
who, as stated, remained the counsel of record for the Republic.

“As the Solicitor General received copy of the decision of the
lower court on August 17, 1962,
the period to appeal would have expired on September 16, 1962. The filing of the notice of appeal and
record on appeal on September 4 and 6, 1962, respectively, were therefore made
on time.”

The remedy of mandamus pursued by the Solicitor General is
proper, the relief prayed for being to order respondent Judge to give due
course to the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the writ is granted; the orders of respondent
Court dated September 1 and October
27, 1965 are hereby set aside; and the said Court is directed to
approve the record on appeal and certify the same to this Court.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
SEC. 10.  Hearing of the Petition.-
No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any election. The hear­ing shall be public, and the
Solicitor General, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial
fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Commonwealth (now Republic) of the Philippines at
all the proceedings and at the hearing. If after the hearing, the court
believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications required by, and none of
the disqualifications specified in this Act, and has complied with all
requisites herein established, it shall order the proper naturalization
certificate to be issued and the regis­tration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as, required in section ten of Act
Numbered Three thousand seven hundred and fifty-three.” (Rev.
Naturalization Law)