CASINO ESPAÑOL DE MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MAMERTO FERIA, RESPONDENTS.

Respondent Mamerto Feria was employed as a cook by herein petitioner Casino
Español de Manila from February 2, 1952 up to November 10, 1958 when he was
suspended and subsequently dismissed by the petitioner. Whereupon on July 8,
1959, Feria filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition praying for
his reinstatement with back wages from the time of his dismissal; for the
payment of unpaid services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays; for payment
of differential pay for services rendered at night in the sum to be determined
by the Court; plus attorney’s fees. Herein petitioner (respondent below), in its
answer, denied the factual basis of Feria’s claims and specially contended that
the CIR had no jurisdiction to try the case against it on the ground that it is
a non-stock corporation organized, not for profit and gain but to promote a
closer relationship among the Spanish residents in these Islands and to foster
the development of their interests; to afford recreation and entertainment to
the members thereof, and to assist the latter in any manner allowable under its
Articles of Incorporation.

After the trial on the merits, the respondent court rendered a decision
ordering herein petitioner to pay to Feria an additional compensation of 25% for
the services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays and for service rendered at
night from February 2, 1952 up to November 10, 1958. The respondent court did
not, however, pass upon the prayer for reinstatement. After the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, the petitioner appealed to this Court by certiorart
upon the sole issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the CIR Co take
cognizance of the case. It is already a settled matter which need not be further
discussed—and the petitioner does not dispute—that the Court of Industrial
Relations has jurisdiction, among others, over cases involving hours of
employment under the 8-Hour- labor law and claims arising thereunder by an
employee or an ex-employee seeking reinstatement (Paflu v. Tan, L-9115, August
31, 1956; National Shipyard & Steel Corporation v. Almin, et al., L-9055,
November 28, 1958; Prisco v. CIR, L-13806, May 23, 1960). What, in effect, is
the point raised in this proceeding is that there is no cause of action against
petitioner because the law (Com. Act 444) is not applicable to it, it not being
engaged, it is contended, in any industry or occupation mentioned in Section 2
of the law.

The provisions of Commonwealth Act 444, pertinent to the present controversy,
are Sections 2 and 4 thereof which read respectively as follows:

“x x x x

“Sec. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or
occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers,
laborers wno prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and
persons xn the personal service of another and members of the family of the
employer working for him.

“Sec. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or
center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during
Sunday’s and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least
twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: PROVIDED HOWEVER,
That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public
service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication, xxx x.” (Italics supplied).

It is to be noted that Section 2 refers to the “persons employed”, that is,
the employee or the person who performs the labor. Section 4 refers to
the employer. that is the person or entity that engages or employs the
laborer. Therefore, the phrase contained in Section 2—”employed in any industry
or occupation—does not refer to the employer but to the employee, that is, the
person who works either in an industry or in an occupation.

Upon the other hand, Section 4 refers to “person, firm or corporation,
business establishment or place of center of labor.” This section does not
require that the (employee)”or the one giving the work or requiring the labor,
should engage in an industry. It is enough that he be the one in whose
favor labor or work is rendered.

The respondent Feria in the present case is a person included in Section 2,
because he is employed in his occupation as cook and, therefore, Section: 2 is
applicable to and protects him. On the other hand, petitioner Casino Espartol de
Manila is the “place of labor” or the place where respondent Feria renders his
labor in pursuance of his occupation as cook. Clearly, petitioner is within the
purview of Section 4. Note that this section does not limit the “person, firm,
Jor corporation or place or center of labor” only to business enterprises
established for gain or profit. The law, both in its letter and in its spirit
and purpose, does not make such a distinction, and no justification is suggested
for us to make one. Under the circumstances, it seems clear that herein
respondent Feria, who is covered by Section 2 of the 8-Hour-Labor Law, has a
cause of action against the petitioner which is not exempt under the provisions
of Section 4 thereof.

It is claimed, however, that petitioner Casino Español de Manila, being a
non-stock corporation not established for profit or gain, the Court of
Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to entertain the action brought against
it by respondent Feria, citing the cases of U.S.T. Hospital Employees
Association v. Sto. Tomas University Hospital (L-6988, March 24, 1954); San Beda
College v. Court of Industrial Relations (L-7649, Oct. 29, 1955); Quezon
Institute v. Velasco and Parazo (L-1742 & L-7743, Nov. 23, 1955); Marcelo v.
Philippine National Red Cross (L-9448, May 28, 1957); Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. Araos (L-10091, Jan. 29, 1958); and University of San Agustin v.
Court of Industrial llelatinns (L-12222, May 28, 1958). Whatever rulings or
statement may have been rendered or said in the aforecited cases, however, can
not be invoked herein or made applicable to the case at bar.

It must be remembered that, as previously declared, the issue involved in
this proceeding is whether there exists a cause of action against the
petitioners, in connection with the demands of respondent Feria for additional
compensation under Commonwealth Act 444.

The U.S.T. Hospital Employees case, supra, was decided on
the question of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations over
the dispute presented before it, taking into account the nature of the
petitioners’ (workers) employment in the light of the definition given in
Section 39-(d) of Republic Act 772 (Workmen’s Compensation Act). The
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Commonwealth Act 103, was again the
issue resolved in the case of San Beda College vs. CIR, supra.
In both instances, the character or nature of the occupation to which the
employers were engaged, i.e., caring for the sick and maintaining or providing
education for young men, respectively, were of considerable weight. The elevated
and lofty purpose for which the Philippine National Red Cross was established
and dedicated was also the main reason that moved this Court into holding the
said institution exempted from liability, in the Marcelo case. In the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines and University of San Agustin
cases, aside from being litigated on a different ground (unfair labor practice),
the fact that their organization and maintenance are for the education and
instruction of, the encouragement, development and promotion of character and
patriotism in, the youth of the land, underscored and rationale of
those decisions.

The same thing can not be said of herein petitioner. True it may be that it
is a non-stock corporation not organized for profit or gain, yet it can not be
contended that petitioner’s operations, aimed at providing service, comfort and
benefit only to its members and their guests, give to such undertaking the
benevolent or lofty nature, characteristic of those treated in the cited cases.
And it can not be doubted that upon dissolution or termination of the existence
of this club, whatever profits it may have accumulated will redound to the
benefit of its members.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.