DIOSDADA SABINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CONRADO CUBA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

On September 29, 1959 Diosdada Sabino, a widow, filed a complaint for
forcible entry and detainer in the Justice of the Peace Court of Albuera, Leyte
against Conrado Cuba, her first cousin, alleging, among others, that on May 25,
1959 defendant, through force, intimidation, threat and stealth, dispossessed
her of one-third of a parcel of land owned by her which contains an area of
2.9500 hectares.

The property allegedly owned by plaintiff is the same property declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Floro Sabino, her father, under Tax Declaration
No. 2960, with the following boundaries: North—Clemente Lunzaga; East—Eulalio
Velarde; South—Matilog River; West—Lucia Sabino.

After trial, the Justice of the Peace Court rendered judgment for plaintiff,
awarding damages. Defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance at Ormoc
City.

On January 13, 1960 the parties entered into an amicable settlement, signed
by both of them and their respective counsel, stating:

“In order to buy peace and to promote the harmonious relations between the
parties, they being relatives, they have agreed to settle this case amicably,
with the following terms and conditions, to wit:

“1. That the plaintiff hereby agrees to pay the sum of Two Hundred and Fifty
Pesos (P250.00), payable in one month from date hereof, to the defendant;

“2. That the defendant hereafter recognizes the absolute ownership and
possession of the plaintifi over the entire property described under Tax
Declaration No. 2960 of Albuera, Leyte, including the portion subject of this
litigation; and that defendant therefore agrees further to restore unto the
possession by the plaintiff the property complained of by plaintiff in this
case, upon receipt of the aforesaid amount, and thereafter the plaintiff shall
enjoy the fruits thereof including the right to harvest the rice now planted by
him and appropriate the same;

“3. That hereafter defendant further warrants to defend plaintiff’s title
over the said entire property declared under Tax Declaration No. 2960 against
any claim whatever by third parties or his
privies.”

Said agreement was submitted to the court for approval.

Thereafter, on January 13, 1960, the Court of First Instance rendered the
following judgment:

“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in accordance with the foregoing
amicable settlement without pronouncement as to costs, with notice to the
plaintiff and the defendant as well as Attys. Barte and Aguipo in open
court.”

The stipulated amount of P250.00 was paid by plaintiff to defendant who in
turn delivered the fruits of the land in litigation to the former, after some
delay.

On May 20, 1960 defendant filed a motion praying for the modification of the
judgment. He therein alleged that on the strength of the judgment plaintiff and
some companions demanded from him on May 19, 1960 the surrender of possession
over a portion of the property declared under Tax Declaration No. 2960 although
said portion is not included in the land originally involved in the complaint
for forcible entry and detainer filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Albuera; that he has been in possession of said portion since 1948 when it was
adjudicated to him by the municipal mayor of Albuera and the “barrio lieutenant
of Damula-an; and that it was only on May 19, 1960 when he came to know that
said portion forms part of the property declared under Tax Declaration No. 2960.

Acting on the above motion, the court issued on June 24, 1960 the following
order:

“For the purpose of determining the claims of the parties, Mr. Manuel Cantiga
is hereby commissioned to make an ocular inspection of the land in question in
order to determine the boundaries as well as the area, emphasizing in his report
the claim of the parties, with notice to Attorneys Barte and Aguipo in open
court.”

The commissioner made his ocular inspection on July 16, 1960 and on November
10, 1960 he submitted his report, the pertinent portion of which reads:

“x x x When I arrived at the meeting place I and Conrado Cuba immediately
started inspecting the lots in litigation to determine the boundaries as well as
the area. For the purpose of this I made a sketch of the entire area of the land
under Tax Declaration No. 2960. Said sketch is hereto attached, marked “A1 and
made an integral part of the report. The Commissioner noted that the boundaries
of the land under Tax. Decl. No. 2960 are different on ocular inspection from
that as described by plaintiff in her complaint, because the actual boundaries
are as follows:

North	—	B. Prieto, Igano, J. Dominguito and Clemente Lunzaga;
South	—	Matilog River;
East	—	Clemente Lunzaga; and
West	—	Provincial Road;
		Area—60,017 sq. m. more or less.

“From the sketch marked ‘A’ there is a portion marked ‘B’.

“This is the ‘portion in litigation. The boundaries of which are as
follows:

North	—	Igano and J. Dominguito;
South	—	Marcelino Sabino;
East	—	Pascual Sabino and Eligio Sabino; and
West	—	Conrado Cuba and Diosdada Sabino.
		Area—7,359 sq. m. more or less.

“This is the subject of the amicable settlement dated Jan. 13, 1960. This is
the same area possessed by defendant and claimed by the plaintiff the only
subject of litigation and the only subject of the amicable settlement.

“The portion marked ‘C’ was not a subject of this litigation and this portion
was possessed by defendant Conrado Cuba, the area of which is 12,312 sq. m. more
or less. The boundaries of which are as follows:

North—B. Prieto
East—Land in litigation
South—Diosdada
Sabino
West—Provincial Road.

“The plaintiff after the amicable settlement took the portion marked ‘C’ from
defendant Conrado Cuba using the amicable settlement as the weapon according to
the defendant CONRADO CUBA.

“The persons present during the ocular inspection were:

1. Diosdado Cuba
2. Ildefonso Sabino and
3. Cresencio Sta. Iglesia
(policeman)”

On December 22, 1960 the court approved the commissioner’s report.

On January 8, 1961 plaintiff moved for the reconsideration of the approval of
the commissioner’s report on the ground that the same did not reflect faithfully
the facts relating to the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 296O; and that the
court had no jurisdiction to alter its decision after it has become final. On
January 18, 1961 this motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, plaintiff
has appealed directly to this Court on questions purely of law.

In issue is the jurisdiction of the court a quo to reopen the case
after its judgment became final and had been executed.

Defendant-appellee maintains that the case may be reopened with a view to
modifying the Judgment in question, even after execution, for the same, being
one based on a compromise, did not have tne effect of a final judgment as to
constitute res judicata. He cited and relies on the case of Saminiada
v. Mata, 92 Phil. 427. The ruling in said case however has no
application here for the reason that there the judgment in controversy “was
merely an interlocutory order because something had yet to be done, i.e., the
segregation agreed upon, which together with the court’s approval, will be the
ones to give it finality.”^[1]

Defendant-appellee’s theory runs counter to Article 2037 of the Civil Code
which provides:

“Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.”

The rule is well settled that a judgment upon a compromise has the force of
res judicata between the parties, and cannot, and should not, be disturbed
except for vices of consent or forgery, it being the obvious purpose of such
compromise to settle, once and for all, the issues involved and bar factual
disputes and controversies thereon.^[2] As
aptly stated by this Court through Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, a judgment upon
a compromise is—

“x x x in the nature of a contract and is in effect an admission by the
parties that the judgment is a just determination of their rights on the facts
of the case, had they been proved. Even more than a contract (which may be
enforced oy ordinary action for specific performance), the compromise agreement
is part and parcel of the judgment, and may, therefore, be enforced as such by a
writ of execution. In fact, a compromise has upon the parties the eiTect and
authority of res judlcata.”^[3]

It has all the force and effect of any other judgment and is conclusive upon
the parties and their privies.^[4]

Defendant-appellee would want to set aside the judgment in question on the
ground of mistake in that he was not aware that the land in his possession since
1948 was part and parcel of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
2960.

The circumstances obtaining in this case, however, would bar him from seeking
the re-opening of the case on the ground of mistake. The amicable settlement,
where he recognized the ownership and possession of plaintiff Sabino not only
over the portion involved in the forcible entry and detainer case but also over
the entire property described in Tax Declaration No. 2960, was signed by him
as well as by his counsel. Hence, it cannot be said that he did not know the
contents and extent of said agreement. Furthermore, the records show that as
early as February 16, 1960 defendant Cuba petitioned for a writ of execution
against plaintiff Sabino for the payment of the amount of P250.00 due him
pursuant to the judgment. Said amount was paid to him and later, after
delivering to plaintiff the fruits of the land, defendant Cuba manifested in
open court that he would not disturb plaintiff Sabino’s possession over the
property in question. In other words, he has induced the poor widow to rely on
his solemn pledge to recognize her dominion over the entire property described
in Tax Declaration No. 2960, collected and received from her the stipulated
amount of P250.00 and, when plaintiff Sabino demanded of him to comply with his
prestation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court, he refused
to do so and conveniently asked for the modification of the judgment, alleging
mistake in entering into said compromise. Defendant-appellee is estopped from
questioning the terms of the compromise agreement after having received the
P250.00 which, as to him, constituted part of the consideration of said
agreement.

Appellee Cuba asserts that in the complaint for forcible entry and detainer
(par. 3) appellant claims only an area of 2.9500 hectares, whereas the
commissioner subsequently allegedly found that the property under Tax
Declaration No. 2960 contains an area of 6.0017 hectares. The implication is
that appellant is entitled to ownership and possession over only 2.9500
hectares, and not more. Suffice it to state that in the same complaint (par. 2)
she also stated the boundaries of the property in question. And in case of
discrepancy between the area and the boundaries, the latter prevails.^[5]

The judgment in question^[6] is final
and has been fully executed in respect to plaintiff Sabino’s obligation
thereunder. To modify it for the purpose of avoiding its enforcement against the
defendant is beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court. The jurisdiction of the
court over a given case after its judgment has become final and executory lies
in the enforcement of such judgment.^[7]

Summing up, viewed under the principle of a binding contract, the doctrine of
estoppel and the provisions of law concerning finality of judgment,
defendant-appellee Cuba can no longer seek the amendment of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the order dated June 24, 1960 appointing a commissioner to
conduct an ocular inspection of the property in question; the order dated
December 22, i960 approving the commissioner’s report; and, the order dated
January 18, 1961 denying the motion to reconsider the order of December 22,
1960, are hereby set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.