GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (GSISEA) AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM SUPERVISORS UNION (GSISSU), PETITIONERS, VS. HON JUDGE CARMELINO ALVEN…

This is an action for declaratory relief instituted by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 40319), joining the Government Service Insurance
System Employees’ Association (GSISEA) and Government Service Insurance
System Supervisors’ Union (GSISSU) as party respondents.

The
petition was filed on May 29, 1959, or 11 days after the members of the
GSISEA declared a strike, who were, however, prevailed upon to return
to work 4 days later. Said petition seeks a resolution on the questions
of whether the GSIS is exercising governmental or proprietary functions
under the existing laws; whether its employees, who are governed by the
Civil Service Law, can compel it to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with regards to the terms and conditions of their employment;
and, finally, whether said employees can declare a strike. It is
alleged “that a judicial declaration on the abovementioned questions in
relation to the pertinent provisions of law is necessary because of the
labor dispute now pending between the GSIS and its employees affiliated
with the respondents GSISEA and GSISSU.”

On June 12, 1959,
the respondents GSISEA and GSISSU filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that it does not state a cause of action for
declaratory relief; that the court does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter for which relief is sought; and that any declaration by
the court on the questions raised is unnecessary and improper.

The said respondents having again declared a strike on June 23, 1959,
because of some alleged unfair labor practices on the part of the GSIS,
the latter on June 24, 1959, filed an amended petition for declaratory
relief, praying for preliminary injunction to enjoin certain alleged
illegal acts of the members of the respondents. In the meantime, the
latter had filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations,
and on July 1, 1959, a prosecutor of that court, after previous
preliminary investigation, filed with said Industrial Court a complaint
for unfair labor practices in violation of Sec. 4(a), subsecs. 1 and 4
of Republic Act No. 875. To this complaint, the GSIS filed its answer,
denying the charge of unfair labor practice and alleging, by way of
affirmative defenses, that the Government Service Insurance System is
exercising functions principally governmental in nature; that its
employees are prohibited from declaring strikes against it under sec.
11 of Republic Act 875; and that the strikes declared by the
complaining unions on May 18, and June 23, 1959 are illegal.

On July 2, 1959, the respondents GSISEA and GSISSU, in support of their
motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a motion and manifestation, calling
the attention of the court to the pendency of the unfair labor practice
case as well as CIR Case No. 896-V, which had been pending in the Court
of Industrial Relations long before the filing of the petition for
declaratory relief. The respondent Judge, however, on July 7, 1959,
denied the motion and granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for.

Alleging that the respondent Judge issued the above
mentioned order in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, the respondent unions filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. We granted due
course to the petition, and upon petitioners’ filing a bond of P200.00
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this court.

The petition is meritorious.

In the case of GSIS vs.
Castillo, et al., 98 Phil., 876; 52 Off. Gaz. (9) 4269; this Court had
already had occasion to pass upon the questions on which judicial
declaration in the present proceedings is sought. That case, which is
still pending with the Court of Industrial Relations, is a labor
dispute between herein petitioner GSISEA and the GSIS certified by the
Secretary of Labor to the Industrial Court on June 17, 1953, when
members of the said GSISEA declared a strike as a result of the refusal
of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS to grant all their 14 demands
regarding tenure and conditions of employment. The GSIS, after its
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction had been
denied, brought the case to this Court thru a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Industrial Court from hearing and
further proceeding with the case, it being contended that it was
engaged in the performance of a governmental function of the State.
Overruling the contention, this Court said: “* * * in Abad Santos vs.
Auditor General, 79 Phil., 190, the petitioner (GSIS) was spoken of a *
* * un verdadero negocio, una empresa gigantesca en que estan
vitalmente interesados miles de clientes * * * We need only add, to
show that the petitioner is in error, that its business of insurance is
not inherently or exclusively a governmental function; it is on the
contrary, in essence and practice, of a private nature and interest.”

The above pronouncements were reiterated and further explained in the case of Boy Scouts of the Phils., vs.
Araos 102 Phil., 1080, where this Court said: “And as to the Government
Service Insurance, it is well known that it invests its funds derived
from the contributions of government employees in huge amounts and at a
substantial interests and profits made therefrom are in part
distributed as dividends among its insured. Surely said insurance
entity does not operate for charity but in practice operates for
profits or gain for the benefit of those insured by it. This aside from
the fact that insurance has been generally considered and held by the
courts to be a business.”

Inasmuch as the petition for
declaratory relief in the present proceedings was filed to determine
whether or not the GSIS is a government agency performing governmental
functions, a question which has already been determined by no less than
the highest court of the land and in a case in which the GSIS itself is
a party, we do not see how the same could be justified. If declaratory
relief is not necessary or not proper where there is already an action
pending in another court involving the same issue, or where the
plaintiff has another more effective relief (Moran’s Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 2, 1957 ed., p. 150), with more reason should it
be improper or unnecessary when, as in the instant case, it appears to
be a moot case, since it seeks to get a judgment on a pretended
controversy, when in reality there is none. Indeed, in its true light,
the present petition for declaratory relief seems to be no more than a
request for an advisory opinion to which courts in this and other
jurisdiction have cast a definite aversion.

It should,
furthermore, be observed that the petition below seeking a judicial
declaration on whether members of the respondent unions as government
employees can declare a strike was filed after the latter had actually
gone on strike. Under sec. 2, Rule 66, a complaint for declaratory
relief will not prosper if filed after a contract or statute, the
construction of which is sought, has already been breached. (See Samson
vs. Andal, 89 Phil., 627.) To rule otherwise would be to
prejudge a pending case and to encourage multiplicity of suits. (De
Borja vs. Villadolid, 85 Phil., 36).

Finally, it is
also on record that an unfair labor practice case exists between the
parties in the instant case. That case has already been filed with the
Court of Industrial Relations and involves the same acts of the members
of herein respondent unions, which are sought to be enjoined in the
present petition for declaratory relief. It being apparent that the
present proceedings are closely interwoven with, if not actually
arising out of, the unfair labor practice case above referred to, which
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, the court
below has clearly no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
declaratory relief, much less issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for therein. (PAFLU vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 864; 52 Off. Gaz,, 5836; Reyes vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 880; 52 Off. Gaz., 6187; PAFLU vs. Caluag, G. R. No. L-9104, Sept. 10, 1956; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil., 1008; 52 Off. Gaz., 5644; Associated Watchmen and Security Union vs. Macadaeg, 101 Phil., 896; 54 Off. Gaz., 7397; Consolidated Labor Association of the Phils., vs. Caluag, 103 Phil., 1032; 55 Off. Gaz. [22] 4037; see also Erlanger and Galenger, Inc. vs. National Association of Trade Unions, (104 Phil., 17).

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
is granted, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
made permanent, with costs against the respondent GSIS.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Barrera, JJ., did not take part.