ELPIDIO LLARENA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bonifacio Ysip, presiding, dismissing
a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Elpidio Llarena against
the Mayor of Manila in Civil Case No. 33216. The Court of Appeals in a
resolution promulgated on June 11, 1959 elevated the case to this Court
for resolution of the questions of law involved.

The Court of First Instance of Manila makes the following findings of fact:

“The
petitioner is employed as a carpenter in the Carpentry Shop of the
Dep’t. of Public Services of the City of Manila, duly appointed by the
Mayor and has been rendering service from October, 1946 to September
21, 1956; that sometime on September 13, 1955, a piano under attachment
in connection with a civil case before the war was found missing from
the Quiricada bodega of the said Dep’t. of Public Services and on
October 9, 1955, the respondent, the City Mayor, ordered an
investigation of the missing property, by a committee (Exh. A) composed
of Jose M. Regala, as chairman, Gregorio Ejercito and Pedro C. de la
Cruz, as members, and said committee, on April 3, 1956, filed its
memorandum (Exh. B) to the City Mayor, and recommended that the herein
petitioner, Elpidio Llarena, be fined in an amount equivalent to 15
days’ pay and be warned that the repetition of the same and similar
offenses will be dealt with more drastically. The City Mayor, in view
of the findings of the investigating committee, rendered a decision
dated September 11, 1956 (Exh. C), and on September 30, 1956, the Chief
of the Division of Building and Transportation Service thru the Dep’t.
of Public Services, dismissed the herein petitioner from the service
with prejudice to reinstatement (Exh. D). The questions to be
determined in this case are (1) whether the City Mayor or any of his
department chiefs has the power to dismiss from office an employee of
the City of Manila; and (2) whether the facts of this case can be
properly subject of a special remedy of certiorari with mandamus. With
respect to the first question, according to the facts on record, the
herein petitioner is not a presidential appointee nor a classified
civil service employee. Undoubtedly, Sec. 22 of Republic Act 409
commonly known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila empowers
the City Mayor to suspend and remove all city officers or employees not
appointed by the President, subject to appeal to the Sec. of Interior,
whose decisions should be final. The herein petitioner, at the hearing
of this case, expressly admitted that he did not appeal from the order
of the City Mayor dismissing him to the Office of the President.”

On appeal the questions raised are the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus as a remedy and the validity of the dismissal
of the petitioner-appellant.

Petitioner-appellant claims
that the petition may still lie even if he did not first appeal his
case to the Office of the President, because he was not aware of his
right to appeal, he having completed only fourth grade in the primary
school. This contention is without merit.

The rule in this
jurisdiction is that when an administrative remedy is provided by law,
relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will
act. Failure to exhaust this remedy is fatal.

“It
does not appear from the stipulation of facts or from any other portion
of the record that the petitioners-appellees and intervenor-appellant
Cornelio Diores ever appealed from the orders of the city mayor
removing them from their respective positions, as required in the
above-quoted provision of law. In pursuance of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies consistently adhered to by this
Court (De la Paz vs. Alcaraz, et al., 99 Phil., 130; 52 Off. Gaz. 3037; Miguel, et al., vs. Reyes, et al., 93 Phil., 542; Ang Tuan Kai & Co. vs. The Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143; Leonardo Montes vs.
The Civil Service Board of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil., 490), we are
constrained to rule that the petition should be dismissed on this
ground. Without costs.” (Cabanes, et al. vs. Rodriguez, et al. G. R. No. L-9799, May 31, 1957.)

The fact that petitioner is only a fourth grader in the primary school
does not excuse him from not knowing and availing of the administrative
remedy. The trial court was, therefore, correct in dismissing the
petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all
administrative remedies.

The second question is the validity
of the dismissal. Petitioner claims the Mayor has abused his discretion
in not following the recommendation of the Committee created by him. He
also claims he was removed without cause. Both claims lack merit. The
recommendation of the Committee is only advisory in nature. The Mayor
may or may not adopt its recommendation; he may modify the same, or
even create another committee to conduct another investigation. And he
is given wide discretion under Republic Act No. 409 to impose
administrative penalties. The fact that petitioner bought the piano
from the sheriff knowing the latter had no authority to sell and that
he helped remove the same from the bodega of the Government is,
certainly, dishonesty, which under the following Civil Service Rule
XIII, No. 6, is a sufficient cause for removal:

“6. * * * dishonesty * * *
notoriously disgraceful or immoral conduct * * * may be considered
reasons demanding proceedings to remove for cause * * *.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.