REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, AND LIM GO, RESPONDENTS.

Republic versus Montejo

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Judge Gregorio D. Montejo of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City and against the private respondent Lim Go. The Government asks the Supreme Court to undo the trial court's dismissal of its appeal in a naturalization case and to compel the judge to approve and elevate its record on appeal. The case matters because it fixes the standard of review for a trial court's refusal to grant further extensions of time to perfect an appeal: such motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Supreme Court will not substitute its own judgment absent a grave abuse of that discretion.

Procedural History

Lim Go filed a petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. The City Attorney of Zamboanga City appeared for the Solicitor General at the hearing, and the trial court, through Judge Montejo, rendered judgment granting the petition. More than two years later, the private respondent moved to be allowed to take the oath of allegiance. Over the Government's objection, the trial court issued an order finding that he had met all the requirements of Republic Act 530, ordered the registration of its earlier decision, and authorized him to take his oath, which he did the same day.

The City Attorney, representing the Solicitor General, appealed that order and obtained successive extensions of time to file the Government's record on appeal. After three extensions, a fourth was sought. The trial court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State had been negligent and was deemed to have abandoned its intention to appeal. The special counsel's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Republic then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, and the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for while the case was pending.

Facts

On November 23, 1960, Lim Go filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. The petition was heard on December 15, 1961, with the City Attorney appearing for the Solicitor General, and on the following day the respondent judge rendered judgment granting the petition.

On February 18, 1964, the private respondent moved that he be allowed to take the oath of allegiance. After hearing, the trial court declared in its order of February 22 that he had met all the requirements of Republic Act 530, ordered the registration of the decision, and authorized him to take his oath, which he forthwith did on the same day.

On March 12, 1964, the City Attorney appealed the order of February 22 on the ground that it was contrary to law and the evidence, and asked for a first extension until April 22 to file the Government's record on appeal. A second extension until June 15 was granted. A third extension until July 15 was sought and was opposed by the private respondent, who decried what he called an apparent pattern on the part of the State to unduly delay and harass him. The trial court warned the special counsel that if the record on appeal was not filed by July 18, the Government would be barred from filing the appeal. Instead of complying, the special counsel moved on July 14 for a fourth extension until August 4. On July 22, the trial court dismissed the appeal, brushing aside the Government's reasons as flimsy and unfounded, and concluding that the State had been negligent and was deemed to have abandoned its intention to appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Government's appeal for failure to file its record on appeal after it had been given more than four months to do so.
• Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the remedy of mandamus to compel the approval of its record on appeal and the elevation of the records for review.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

An appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.

This fixes the period for perfecting an appeal and identifies the record on appeal as one of its essential components, which the Government failed to file on time.

Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, cited by the Court on the contents of the record on appeal, provides:

The record on appeal shall include the order or judgment appealed from, and such other matters as are necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.

This shows how limited the task was, since the record need only contain the appealed order and the data showing timely perfection, which bears directly on whether four months was ample time.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. Motions for extension of time to file a record on appeal are addressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Court found that the trial court exercised its discretion correctly. Ample time had been afforded the petitioner: three extensions covering, all told, a period of four months and ten days. The record on appeal was not voluminous, its contents being limited to those relating to the appealed order and the data showing timely perfection. The reasons invoked for the extensions demonstrated either a culpable ignorance on the part of the City Attorney of the applicable Rules of Court or a desire to harass the private respondent. The Court noted that time to study, evaluate and assess the evidence would normally be needed in the preparation of the brief, and that the gathering of other evidence from the National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration and other national agencies had absolutely no relevance to the preparation of the record on appeal, which can be done with facility even by a mere clerical assistant who is adequately trained and properly oriented. Nowhere in the record was there the slightest indication of abuse of judicial discretion that would justify the Court's intervention.

On the second issue, because no grave abuse of discretion attended the dismissal, the Republic was not entitled to mandamus to compel the approval of its record on appeal or the elevation of the records. The petition therefore failed.

Doctrine

Motions for extension of time to file a record on appeal are addressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Supreme Court will not interfere absent a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The period for perfecting an appeal under Section 3 of Rule 41 may be extended by the trial court only on the basis of justifiable reasons showing that the appellant needs more time to prepare and file the record on appeal. A record on appeal is a simple compilation of the appealed order and the data showing timely perfection under Section 6 of Rule 41, so reasons unrelated to that task, such as studying the evidence or gathering records from other agencies, do not justify repeated extensions. Failure to file the record on appeal despite ample time warrants dismissal of the appeal, and the State is not exempt from the rules of procedure.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the order appealed from was affirmed, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Remember the single line: motions for extension of time to file a record on appeal are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Supreme Court intervenes only on a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case to test the standard of review for discretionary orders on appeal perfection and the principle that the Government, like any litigant, is bound by the Rules of Court.