REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, AND LIM GO, RESPONDENTS.

Before us is a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary
injunction by the Republic of the Philippines
against Judge Gregorio D. Montejo (of the Court of
First instance of Zamboanga
City) and Lim Go.  Pending determination of the petition on the
merits, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was sought, to
restrain the private respondent Lim from representing himself to be, and
exercising the rights or privileges of, a citizen of the Philippines.  The petitioner further prays that after due
hearing, the respondent judge be directed not only to approve its record on
appeal filed in connection with naturalization case 157,^[1]
but as well to elevate it together with all pertinent records to this Court for
review.  On October 22, 1964 we issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.

The petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed
“a grave palpable and wanton abuse of discretion, in a manner amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction” when he dismissed its appeal which was
perfected on time, and that this unwarranted dismissal entitles the petitioner
to the remedy of mandamus.

The antecedent facts are not complicated.

On November 23, 1960
the private respondent Lim filed a petition for naturalization with the CFI of Zamboanga City.  City
Attorney Pascual S. Atilano
of Zamboanga
City appeared for the Solicitor
General when the petition was heard on December
15, 1961.  On the following
December 16, the respondent judge rendered judgment granting the petition.

On February 18, 1964
the private respondent moved that he be allowed to take the oath of
allegiance.  After due hear­ing on the
motion, the respondent judge in his order of February 22 declared that the
private respondent has met all the requirements of Republic Act 530, ordered
the registration of the decision of December 16, 1961, and authorized the
private respondent to take his oath, which the latter forthwith did on the same
day.

On March 12, 1964
the city attorney, for the petitioner and in representation of the Solicitor
General, appealed the order of February
22, 1964 on the ground that it “is contrary to law and the
evidence.” At the same time he asked for a first extension until April 22, 1964 to file the
Government’s record on appeal.  He
averred that he needed “more time to study, evaluate and assess the
evidence [taken] during the hearing to take oath.” This was opposed by the
private respondent.  A second extension
until June 15, 1964 to file
the record on appeal was thereafter granted, upon the city attorney’s plea that
he needed more time “to study, evaluate and assess other evidence from the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration and other national
agencies of government, and in the interest of justice.” A third extension
until July 15 was sought on May 29,
1964, which was opposed by the private respondent who decried the
“apparent pattern on the part of the State to unduly delay and
harass” him, as “four months had already elapsed without the State
having filed its record on appeal.”

The respondent court, on June 26, 1964, warned Vicente G. Largo,
a special counsel of Zamboanga City who represented
the petitioner in lieu of the city attorney who was unavailable, that “if
the Record on, Appeal is not filed on said date [July 18, 1964] the government
will be barred from filing the appeal.” Instead of heeding this order, the
said special counsel, on July 14, 1964,
moved for another extension (the fourth) until August 4, 1964 to file the record on appeal.  This motion was of course opposed by the
private respondent.

On July 22, 1964
the respondent court dismissed the appeal. 
In its order of the same date, the court brushed aside all the reasons
relied upon by the petitioner in support of its motions for extension of time
to file the record on ap­peal as

“flimsy and unfounded, taking into
consideration that for the preparation of the Record on Appeal * * * all the
appellant has to do is compile the necessary pleadings appearing on the records
and the same could be done not necessarily by the one who personally handled
the case(s) for the government during the hearing, but by any of his
representatives in the City Attorney’s Office; and the period of about four (4)
months is more than sufficient to do so.”

The court concluded that “the State
has been negligent and is deemed to have abandoned its intention to
appeal.”

The special counsel’s motion for reconsideration was thereafter
denied.

Hence the present recourse.

The issue is simple:  Did
the respondent court incur in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appeal of the Government because of its failure to file its record on appeal
after it was given more than four months to do so?

Under section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ap­peal
“may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of
appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.” The period may be
extended by the trial court if it appears, on the basis of justifiable reasons,
that the appellant needs more time to prepare and file the record on appeal.^[2]

Motions for extension of time to file a record on appeal are
addressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Did the respondent court in this case
exercise its discretion correctly?  We
hold that it did.

Ample time was afforded the petitioner to prepare and file its
record on appeal.  It was given three
extensions covering, all told, a period of four months and ten days.  The record on appeal intended to be filed is
not voluminous.  Its contents are limited
to those relating to the appealed order of February 22, 1964, and those necessary “for the
proper un­derstanding of the issue involved, together with such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time.”^[3]
The reasons invoked for the extensions, to our mind, demonstrate either a
culpable ignorance on the part of the city attorney of Zam­boanga
City of the pertinent and applicable Rules of Court or a desire to harass the
private respondent.  “Time to study,
evaluate and assess the evidence [taken] during the hearing to take oath”
would normally be needed in the preparation of the brief; the gathering of
“other evidence from the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Bureau of Immigration and other national agencies of the government” has
absolutely no relevance to the preparation of the record on appeal – by no
means a formidable task – which can be done with facility even by a mere
clerical assistant who is adequately trained and properly oriented.

Nowhere in the four corners of the record of this case is the
slightest indication of abuse of judicial discretion which would justify this
Court in interposing its powers of interven­tion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, and the order appealed
from is affirmed.  The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
“In the Matter of the Petition of Lim Go to be Admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.”

^[2] Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831, 832-833.

^[3]
Sec. 6, Rule 41, Rules of Court.