IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF CHUA UAN ALIAS PETER CHUA TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. CHUA UAN ALIAS PETER CHUA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILI…

Appeal taken by the Government from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 5040 granting the petition of Chua Uan,
alias Peter Chua, to be allowed to take his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On January 30, 1960,
a decision was rendered by the abovementioned court in Civil Case No. 5040
granting appellee’s application for naturalization as
a Filipino citiizen. 
The Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental, in
representation of the Solicitor General, appealed from said decision to Us (G. R. No. L-16923) claiming, that it was contrary to the
provisions of Section 2, paragraph of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended,
which requires applicants for citizenship to be able to speak and write English
or Spanish and any principal Philippine dialect.  On September
12, 1960, however, a motion to wit draw the appeal was filed by
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot
and Solicitor Hector C. Fule and the same was granted
by Us.

The decision of January 30, 1960 having become final, on February
6, 1962 appellee filed with the lower court a
petition to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen.  After due hearing, the court, on October
27, 1962, issued the
appealed order.

The Government claims that the Court a quo erred:  firstly, in not finding that appellee had not conducted himself in 3 proper and
irreproachable manner; secondly, in not holding that appellee
can not speak and write any one of the principal Philippine languages; thirdly,
in not holding that appellee failed to prove
indubitably he had not left the
Philippines since the promulgation of the decision granting his petition
for naturalization and lastly, in granting appellee’s
application for oath taking.

In support of the first
the Government contends that appellee had used the alias
Peter Chua without legal authority, as shown by his own petition for
naturalization; the document Exhibit A, which is a clearance issued by the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros; Exhibit B, which is a
similar document issued by the office of the Provincial Fiscal of the same
province, and lastly, his own certificate of baptism Exhibit M.

Upon an examination of the record, however, We find that appellee
has satisfactorily explained the use more apparent than real – of the name
Peter Chua.  According to his uncontradicted testimony, he has not used nor does he
intend to use said alias; that he has always signed his name as Chua Uan;
that the alleged alias was made to appear in his baptismal certificate, without his knowledge and consent,
through an honest mistake committed by a price of San Sebastian Catholic Church
where be Teas baptized on March 11, 1953.

The Government not only
made no attempt to disprove this testimony but likewise utterly failed to prove
that appellee – personally – had ever made use of the
aforesaid alias.  Exhibits A, B, and M
where said alias appears as referring to him are documents issued and/or signed
by other parties.  On the other hand, it is obvious that appelee’s application for
naturalization was made the name of Chua Uan,
alias Peter Chua, for the purpose of making said application conform with what appeared on appellee’s
certificate of baptism.  Indeed, had he
not done so, he could be charged with failing to disclose a material fact.

The Government attempts to prove its contention in the second
alleged error by pointing to the fact that appellee’s
own application for naturalization simply        
alleges that he knew “how to read, write and speak in Chinese language; he
also knows how to read and writ, the English language and speak and understands
Filipino dialects”, and that in the very decision of the lower court of
January 30, 1960 the Court simply said that “petitioner knows how to write
and speak the English language any he speaks and understands Ilongo dialect”. 
From this the conclusion is drawn that appellee
failed to prove that he could speak and write at least one of the
principle Philippine languages.

In this regard, we are of
the opinion that the decision of January 30, 1960, reasonably construed, means
that the petitioner in the case not only spoke but could write in the Ilongo dialect; for if the Court did not mean this
precisely, it would have dismissed the petition.

Moreover, this question
may now be deemed finally settled by reason of the motion for the withdrawal of
the appeal in G. R. No. L-16923 filed by Solicitor General Barot and Solicitor Fule upon the
ground that, after a careful
study of the evidence, they found no ground warranting the prosecution of the
appeal; that upon an examination of the record they had discovered that appellee had demonstrated his competence on this
point.  As stated heretofore, we granted
the petition accepting these allegations as true.  Consequently, the Solicitor General may not
now be heard to say that appellee failed to prove his
ability to write at least one of the principal Philippine dialects.

In connection with the
third assignment of error, the Government admits that during the hearing
on appellee’s petition for leave to take the oath as
a Filipino citizen, testified under oath that since the promulgation of the decision of January 30, 1960, he had
never left the Philippines having dedicated himself to his profession as cashier of Bacolod
United Hardware, Bacolod City, and that during the intervening period he had not been
convicted of any offense or violation of any rule or regulation promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities nor committed any act prejudicial to the best
interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policy.  In fact, this testimony was accepted as true
and sufficient by the court a quo.  On
the other hand, the Government made no attempt whatsoever to show that any
portion thereof was not true.  We, therefore, find this third contention of the appellant to be
untenable.          

The fourth and last assignment of error is but a mere corollary
of the previous three.  Having arrived at
the above conclusions, We believe that no further
discussion thereof is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order being in accordance with law, the same is affirmed, without
costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., in the result.