G.R. No. L-22320. May 22, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ AND DAMASO P. PEREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RICARDO P. HERMOSO AND THE CITY SHERIFF OF M…
CASTRO, J.:
On January 10, 1964 the
spouses Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez interposed the present
petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary
injunction from the order of January 4, 1964 of the respondent Judge
Gregorio T. Lantin of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which order
denied a motion for reconsideration of a previous order rejecting a motion to quash the writ of
execution herein controverted.
A chronology of the essential antecedent events is necessary for a clear understanding
of the case at bar.
On February 25, 1959 the respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso commenced civil case 39407 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge) against the petitioner
Damaso P. Perez and one Gregorio Subong, for the recovery of the principal sum
of P17,309.44 representing
unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business
of the said petitioner. Because at the
hearing neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared despite due notice
to the latter, Hermoso was permitted to present his evidence ex parte. On
April 11, 1960 judgment was
rendered ordering Perez and Subong to pay Hermoso jointly and severally the sum
of P17,309.44 with interest,
attorney’s fees and costs.
On June 21, 1960 Perez
and Subong appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their appeal
because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Then on February 4, 1961
the defendants elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit.
After the case was remanded to the court of origin, Hermoso moved
for execution of judgment, which was granted on July 1, 1961, and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on
August 15, 1961. Meantime, on July 11, 1961, Perez and Subong filed a
petition for relief from judgment, alleging excusable negligence. This petition was denied by the respondent
Judge on August 3, 1961. From the order of denial, Perez and
Subong on August 21, 1961 served
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On
August 23, 1961 the
respondent Sheriff of Manila levied upon 3,573
shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso P. Perez with the
Republic Bank. On August 30, 1961 Perez interposed an urgent
motion to stay execution, alleging that the levy on said shares was highly excessive
and unjust, considering that said shares have a total value of more than P357,300 while the judgment debt was only
P17,309.44. On September 2, 1961 the Sheriff served and
published the first notice of sale scheduling the auction sale of said shares for September 8, 1961. However, by order of September 7, 1961, the
respondent Judge suspended the sale on execution pending resolution of the
abovementioned urgent motion to stay execution.
On September 29, 1961 the respondent Judge promulgated two orders: the first denied the appeal of Perez and
Subong from the abovementioned order of August 3, 1961 rejecting their petition for relief from judgment, and
the second denied Perez’ urgent motion to stay execution.
Consequently, an October
4, 1961 the
respondent Sheriff served a second notice of sale resetting the auction
for October 10, 1961. This was cancelled by the Court of
Appeals which issued on October 9, 1961
a writ of preliminary injunction, pending hearing of Perez’ petition
for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA?G.R. 29962-R) filed on October 5, 1961 against the respondents
Judge and Sheriff, in which petition Perez alleged that (1) the levy upon his 3,573 shares of stock was manifestly
and patently unjust, and (2) the
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his statutory
right to appeal.
On November 15, 1962 the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Perez’ position with respect to
the extent of the levy at the same time that it upheld the denial of his motion
to appeal.
The case was remanded for the second time to the court of origin
on January 14, 1963. Subsequently, on January 18, 1963, the Sheriff published the third
notice of sale, this time for only 210 shares of stocks, setting the public
sale for January 24, 1963.
Two days before the scheduled sale on execution, or on January 22, 1963, a new twist was added to the already protracted
litigation when the petitioner Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, the wife of Damaso P.
Perez, filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for
injunction with ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction against Hermoso, the Republic Bank and the Sheriff of Manila (civil case 7532), wherein she contended
that the levied shares are conjugal assets which are not answerable for the
judgment debt of Damaso Perez, an obligation contracted not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal
partnership. On the following day, January
23, 1963, Judge Eulogio Mencias
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the ex parte
writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining once more the
respondent Sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. However, on October 4, 1963, Judge Mencias lifted the writ, in obeisance to the doctrine enunciated in Acosta vs. Alvendia
(L-14598, October 31, 1960) to the effect that courts of
first instance have no power to restrain
acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Incidentally, the abovementioned civil case 7532 was
dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon
motion of the complainant herself.
A month before the aforementioned writ was lifted, or on
September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to recall or
lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging the same reasons she advanced in civil case 7532 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which
are the self-same grounds upon which the herein petitioners anchor the petition
at bar — the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal
nature of the obligation of Damaso Perez. Neither Mrs. Perez nor her counsel attended the scheduled
hearings. On October 19, 1963 the respondent Judge
promulgated an order denying the
motion on the ground that “Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez is not a part in this case and that
this [the motion to lift execution] is not the remedy prescribed by the Rules
of Court in its Section 15 of
Rule 39 for the protection of her right”.
The writ of preliminary injunction having been lifted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution having been denied by the court a quo, the respondent Sheriff on October 18, 1963 caused the publication for
the fourth time of a notice of sale setting the
execution sale of 220 shares of stock for October 29, 1963.
On
October 23, 1963 Mrs. Perez
filed with the respondent Sheriff a third-party claim over the aforesaid 220 shares of stock, but the latter
was determined to proceed with the scheduled auction sale as he was protected
by an indemnity bond filed by the respondent Hermoso. On
October 25, 1963 Mrs. Perez, assisted by her husband, commended civil case 55292, denominated an action to
vindicate third-party claim with petition for preliminary injunction, in Branch XXII of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Federico Alikpala. As a consequence of the new action,
the projected execution
sale was suspended for the fourth time. On November 8, 1963 Judge
Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction prayed for in the aforesaid civil case 55292, on the grounds that (1) he has
no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction; and (2) the remedy
of plaintiff (Mrs.
Perez) is to lodge the third-party claim filed by her with the court
which issued the execution, “as
it has the inherent control of its ministerial officers and to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice.”
The aforesaid civil case 55292
was dismissed on March 20, 1964,
upon agreement of the parties after the institution of the petition at
bar.
On the same day (November 8,
1963), Damaso Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an “Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration”
of the order of October 19, 1963 which
denied his wife’s motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. In this latest motion, Perez adopted his
wife’s previous motion, and at the same time offered in lieu of the levied
stocks his alleged cash dividends in the Republic Bank in the sum of P19,985. In the same motion he asked for the suspension of the fifth scheduled auction sale set for November 11, 1963, which was granted ex parte.
On January 4, 1964, the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge.
After the respondent Sheriff had scheduled (for the sixth
time) the execution sale of the levied 240 shares of stock, the herein
petitioners on January 10, 1965 interposed the present petition, which was
given due course on January 15, 1964; the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued upon petitioners posting a
bond of P10,000.
The movants-petitioners main contention
is that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
recall the controverted writ of execution despite their avowal that the levied 240 shares of stock belong to their
conjugal partnership and as such cannot be made to answer for a judgment debt
which is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.
After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the
respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to quash the writ in dispute.
It is conceded that courts have jurisdiction to entertain
motions to quash their writs of execution because every court has the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes.[1] However,
the exercise of this power is well circumscribed. Thus, the proper court may quash the writ only in certain
situations, as when it appears that (a) it has been improvidently issued, or
(b) it is defective in substance, or (c) it has been issued against the wrong
party, or (d) the judgment debt has been paid, or (e) the writ has been issued
without authority, or (f) there has been a change in the situation of the
parties which makes such execution inequitable, or (g) the controversy has never been
submitted to the judgment of the court, and therefore no judgment at all has
ever been rendered thereon.[2] In the
instant controversy, not one of these accepted grounds exists.
Significantly, the spouses have not questioned the intrinsic
validity or regularity of the writ of execution. They have alleged none of the circumstances earlier enumerated or
other similar grounds which may warrant the quashal of the writ in dispute.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the
validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the
remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the
Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent
issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted
litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532
and 55292, only
to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of
thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Considering the antecedent facts, particularly CA-G.R. 29962-R,
even the remedy indicated above must fail, as Damaso Perez is now estopped
from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets. All along he has nurtured the impression
that the said shares are his exclusive property, which representation was enhanced by the fact that the same
are registered in his name alone.
It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive ownership
of the levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the
levy with respect to its excessive coverage, he never raised the question of
the conjugal nature of the levied shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo and in the
Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the
levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion
that he should have advanced with expected alacrity when he first
questioned the legality of the levy.
Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was
not a party in CA-G.R. 29962-R, the
judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her
husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter
ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in questioning
the legality of the levy on the ground aforestated in civil case 7532, which case was commenced only on
January 22,1963, 17 months after
the original levy was made on August 23,
1961.
Even granting that the court a quo could
properly take cognizance of the said motion to quash the writ of execution, the
movants-petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the levied shares
are conjugal assets and that the judgment debt is a personal obligation only
of Damaso Perez.
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they
repeatedly invoked article 160 of
the New Civil Code which provides that “All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.” As interpreted by this Court, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de, Ilano,[3] it was held
that “according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be
deemed conjugal property.” In the
recent case of Maramba vs. Lozano,
et al.,[4] this Court, thru Mr. Justice
Makalintal, reiterated that “the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property
acquired during the marriage,” and then concluded that since “there
is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired. . . the fact
that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.” Similarly,
in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock
were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband
alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.
Conceding, however, that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, they must still prove that their ganancial partnership is not liable
for the payment of the aforesaid judgment debt. This, they were unable to do. Their contention that the judgment debt is a personal obligation of only
one of them is devoid of evidentiary foundation. It is, to say the least, a futile attempt to rebut the
presumption that the husband, as head of the family and administrator of the
conjugal partnership, contracts obligations for the benefit of his family or
the partnership.[5]
The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the
shoe manufacturing business of the petitioner husband. Said business is an ordinary commercial
enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of which Damaso Perez had the right to
embark the partnership.[6] It is
well-settled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise
of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the
family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.[7]
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation
below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some
stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of
thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final
and executory. Some of the actions were
filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the
very ends of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid
by their counsel.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on official
leave.
[1]
Dimayuga vs.
Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143.
[2]
Moran, comments On The Rules of Court, Vol. 2, p. 258, and the cited therein.
[3]
63 Phil., 629, 639.
[4]
L-21533 June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474.
[5]
See J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 1964 ed., Vol. I, p. 186; Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1960 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 402-403; Francisco,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Bk. I, pp. 522?523.
[6]
Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger and Galinger, 56 Phil. 326.
[7]
Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336.