THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PEDRO PETILLA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon dated August 8, 1951, sustaining the motion to quash interposed by the
accused in criminal case No. 10758 and dismissing the case with costs de oficio
and the cancellation of the bond filed by him for his provisional release.

On August 31, 1949, an information charging Pedro Petilla with
the crime of slight physical injuries was filed in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Gumaca, Quezon province. Upon petition of both parties, this case was
heard by the Justice of the Peace jointly with another for frustrated homicide
tiled against the same accused. During the hearing, the Justice of the Peace
found that the injuries suffered by the offended party would require more than
thirty (30) days to heal and so, believing that the case was beyond his
jurisdiction, he forwarded said case, together with that of frustrated homicide,
to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings. On December 17, 1949,
the provincial fiscal amended the information charging the accused with serious
physical injuries and praying that the Justice of the Peace be ordered to
conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation (criminal case No. 10620).
This petition was favorably acted upon. The accused having waived his right to
preliminary investigation, the case was returned to the Court of First Instance
where on February 22, 1950, the accused filed a motion to quash alleging, among
other grounds, that if the case be continued he would be placed in jeopardy. On
February 28, 1950, the court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case
with costs de oficio.

His motion for reconsideration having been, denied, the
provincial fiscal, on March 22, 1950, moved that the case be returned to the
Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca for trial on the merits on the original
information contending that said Justice of the Peace committed a mistake in
failing to act upon the erroneous belief hat he had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. This motion was favorably acted upon and the record of the case
was sent back to the Justice of the Peace. On June 17, 1950, however, the
provincial fiscal asked for the provisional dismissal of the case alleging that
on that same date he was filing in the Court of First Instance an information
for serious physical injuries, and accordingly the Justice of the Peace
dismissed the case provisionally and forwarded the record to the Court of First
Instance.

On June 17, 1950, as above stated, a new case was initiated in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon with the filing of a new information for
serious physical injuries (criminal case No. 10758). On July 7, 1950, the case
was sent to the Justice of the Peace for preliminary investigation. After this
was held the record was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, and on July 6,
1951, the accused again filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:

“1. That the above-entitled case has already been quashed by
this Honorable Court in its order dated February 28, 1950 (Annex A) ;

“2. That if the prosecution has not been satisfied with the
order of the Court of 28 February 1950, he should have appealed from said order
within the time allowed by law;

“3. That the prosecution has exceeded and gravely abused its
discretion in reviving once again a case that has already been quashed by the
Court thereby initiating” and encouraging what the court abhors, that of
multiplicity of suits and endless litigations; and

“4. That it is submitted that rulings and orders of this
Honorable Court must at least be binding upon itself,” (Page 36, criminal case
record No. 10758.)

On August 8, 1951, the court sustained the motion and dismissed
the case holding in part as follows:

“It is the opinion of the court that the order of February 28,
1950, has become final and executory. If the prosecution in criminal case No.
10620 believed that this court had committed an error in ordering that the
information in said case be quashed, with costs de oficio, it should have
appealed from said order within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court. Not
having done so, this court now is absolutely powerless to disregard said final
order and proceed with this criminal case No. 10758 for the same crime which is
charged in criminal case No. 10620. There is res adjudicata.” (Page 48, criminal
case record No. 10758.)

The case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by
the Solicitor General.

This case is unfortunate in view of a series of mistakes
committed by the officials who intervened in its prosecution. The first error
committed refers to the order of dismissal entered by the lower court on
February 28, 1950, wherein the court quashed the case on the ground that the
filing of the amended information charging the accused with serious physical
injuries constituted double jeopardy which barred the Government from
prosecuting it. This is a mistake. The charge contained in the original
information was for slight physical injuries because at that time the fiscal
believed that the wound suffered by the offended party would require medical
attendance only for a period of eight days, but when the preliminary
investigation was conducted the Justice of the Peace found that the wound would
not heal until after a period of thirty days, and so he forwarded the case to
the Court of First Instance for further action. It, therefore, appears that the
act which converted the crime into a more serious one had supervened after the
filing of the original information. And this supervening event can still be the
subject of amendment or of a new charge without necessarily placing the accused
in double jeopardy, as held by this court in the recent case of People vs.
Manolong ^* G. R. No. L-2288. Said the court:

“The Constitution enjoins that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy or punished for the same offense. (Art. Ill, section 120.) In an
attempt to implement this constitutional mandate, the Rules of Court (Rule 113,
section 9) make conviction or acquittal of the accused a bar to his subsequent
prosecution, not oniy for the same offense, but also for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information. In the present case there is no question that
the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the last information
necessarily includes the lesser offense charged in the first complaint and of
which the accused was convicted in the justice of the peace court, , and there
should likewise be no question that, were we to follow the doctrine laid down by
this court in People vs. Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488, and reiterated in People vs.
Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz., 268 we would have no alternative but to dismiss the
present appeal. However, this court in its recent decision in the case of Melo
vs. People et al., 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, has already repealed the doctrine laid
down in the Tarok case as contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy as
intended by the Constitution and the Rules of Court and ‘obnoxious to the
administration of justice,’ and has reverted to the rule that ‘where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing
at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense’ (15 Am. Jur. 66), the
accused cannot he said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense.” That rule applies to the present case where, after the first
prosecution for a lesser crime, new facts have supervened which together with
those already in existence at the time of the first prosecution, have made the
offense graver and the penalty first imposed legally
inadequate.”

But the mistake which in the opinion of the court has thwarted
the chance of the prosecution is the failure of the provincial fiscal to appeal
from the order of the lower court of February 28, 1950. Had he done so the error
committed would have been remedied. Instead, he asked for the return of the case
to the Justice of the Peace Court for trial on the merits under the original
information. Such a step was of no useful purpose, a fact which he later
realized when he filed a motion for provisional dismissal. Another mistake he
committed was to file a new information for the same offense (criminal case No.
10758) which was properly dismissed on the ground of res judicata. It is true
that the order of February 28, 1950, was erroneously entered for reasons which
perhaps, might be ascribed to the conflicting decisions that had been rendered
regarding the application of the principle of double jeopardy, but the failure
of the fiscal to appeal was. unfortunate as it rendered said order final and
executory.. Whether rightly or wrongly, said order stands and cannot now be set
aside or rendered ineffective. That order is binding upon the parties. That
order has the effect of res judicata upon the Government.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without. costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

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* 85 Phil., 829.