G.R. No. L-5183. December 29, 1952
BENJAMIN DUJON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. HIEROTEO VILLAROSA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
PARAS, C.J.:
in the municipal court of Bacolod City against the defendant-appellant (Hieroteo
Villarosa) for the recovery of a sum of money. Under date of December 20, 1948,
an answer was filed, signed by “H. R. Villarosa & Jose Y. Hilado” as
attorneys for the appellant. After hearing, the municipal court rendered a
decision against the appellant, from which the latter appealed. On March 9,
1949, the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental sent a
notice by registered mail to the appellant himself, informing that the case was
docketed in said court on March 4, 1949, on appeal from the municipal court of
Bacolod City, in accordance with section 7, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court. On
June 16, 1949, the appellee filed a motion praying that the appellant be
declared in default for his failure to file an answer. On June 17, 1949, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued an order of default. After
the reception of appellee’s evidence, said court rendered a decision,
sentencing the appellant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,240.96, with
interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 16, 1948, plus 25 per cent of
said amount for attorney’s fees, and the costs. His two motions for
reconsideration having been denied, the present appeal was interposed by the
appellant.
There is no dispute as to the fact that notice of the docketing
of the case in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, on appeal from
the municipal court of Bacolod City, was sent by registered mail to the
appellant who, however, failed to get the notice from the post office
notwithstanding the usual three notices served on him, and that no notice
whatsoever was sent to Atty. Jose Y. Hilado. It is insisted for the appellant
that, inasmuch as he was represented by counsel in the municipal court, the
notice of the clerk of the court of first instance regarding the docketing of
the appealed case in his court, should have been served on his counsel, the
notice to the appellant himself not being a notice in law, under section 2 of
Rule 27 of the Rules of Court and the cases of Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil., 44, and
Esquivas vs. Sison, 61 Phil. 211.
Even assuming that section 2 of Rule 27 is applicable, and
without deciding whether, under section 7 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court,
requiring the clerk of the court of first instance “to notify the parties” of
the docketing of the appealed case, the notice may be sent to the parties
themselves, though represented by counsel, it is clear that the trial court did
not err in issuing the order of default and in rendering the subsequent judgment
against the appellant, because in the municipal court the appellant filed and
signed his answer jointly with Atty. Jose Y. Hilado as counsel for and in his
own behalf. The notice sent to him by the clerk of the court of first instance
was therefor patently in conformity with section 2 of Rule 27, requiring that if
a party has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made
upon his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court. The frivolity of the present appeal should be very
apparent to the appellant, a lawyer.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so
ordered with double costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
and Labrador, JJ., concur.