FLORENCIA VITUG, DEMANDANTE Y APELANTE, CONTRA DONATA MONTEMAYOR Y OTROS, DEMANDADOS Y APELADOS.

Vitug versus Montemayor

The Case

This is a case about a widow, a stepdaughter, and thirty parcels of land in Pampanga. Florencia Vitug sued her stepmother, Donata Montemayor, claiming a share of those parcels as heir of her deceased father, Clodualdo Vitug, who had been Donata's husband. Florencia says the parcels are conjugal property and must be divided among the heirs; Donata says they are hers alone. The case matters because it settles two things a reviewee must know: first, that land bought with conjugal funds during the marriage is conjugal property regardless of whose name appears on the deed, and second, that when only one party appeals, the Supreme Court reviews only the errors that party raised — the unappealed portions become final as to that party and cannot later be reopened.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. That court held that the thirty parcels were bought with conjugal funds, but it inferred from the spouses' conduct that Clodualdo intended to give the whole ownership to his wife. It therefore ordered Donata to pay Florencia one twelfth of one half of the purchase price, or 4,081.02 pesos, plus six percent interest from the filing of the complaint. Both sides appealed. Donata's appeal went directly to the Supreme Court and was decided in May 1952; the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment against her, finding no error in the points she raised. Florencia's appeal went to the Court of Appeals, but at the request of the parties, because of the amount involved and because only questions of law were raised, that court elevated the record to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided Florencia's appeal in October 1953, ruling in her favor on the nature of the parcels. Donata then filed a second motion for reconsideration, arguing that the earlier judgment had already become final and barred the later decision. The Court denied that motion in a resolution dated November 1953.

Facts

Clodualdo Vitug was first married to Gervacia Flores, with whom he had three children. One of them, Julio, left a daughter, Florencia Vitug, the plaintiff. Clodualdo then married Donata Montemayor in January 1898, and they had eight children.

During the marriage, Donata inherited from her parents several parcels declared for taxation at 9,461.87 pesos and producing 365 pesos a year. Through the industry and effort of both spouses, these nipa and mangrove lands were converted into fishponds and later sold for a total of 116,468.37 pesos. Setting aside the 9,461.87 pesos attributable to Donata's inherited lands under Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, 107,006.50 pesos remained. From this amount the spouses bought twenty-two parcels from Felipe Guanzon and Epifania Alvendia in December 1927 for 30,000 pesos, and eight parcels from Roberto Toledo and Gil, Jr. in November 1928 for 65,000 pesos. The deeds and transfer certificates were issued in the name of Donata Montemayor. In all, 95,000 pesos of the fishpond proceeds went into the thirty parcels now in litigation.

After Clodualdo died on May 20, 1929, Donata initiated the intestate proceedings over his estate and was appointed administratrix. The inventory she submitted did not include the thirty parcels. A project of partition dated July 22, 1933 contained a clause in which the widow renounced her ganancial rights over the conjugal properties in favor of her children and the children of the deceased, so that both separate and conjugal properties would form the mass to be divided in twelve equal shares. The court approved the project in December 1936. Florencia later sued for her share of the thirty parcels, and the trial court, while finding the parcels conjugal, held that Clodualdo had intended to transmit full ownership to Donata and awarded Florencia only a share of the price.

Issues

• Whether or not the thirty parcels of land are conjugal property of the spouses Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor, despite the deeds and certificates of title being in Donata's name alone.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding Florencia one twelfth of one half of the purchase price instead of a share in the parcels themselves.
• Whether or not the project of partition and the order approving it in the intestate proceedings bar the present action under the principle of res judicata.
• Whether or not Florencia is entitled to a share in the fruits or products of the parcels from the death of Clodualdo.
• Whether or not the judgment in the earlier appeal, which had become final, barred the Supreme Court from deciding the later appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1401 of the old Civil Code provides:

Se reputan bienes gananciales los adquiridos por titulo oneroso durante el matrimonio a costa del caudal comun, bien se haga la adquisicion a nombre de la sociedad conyugal, bien se haga a nombre de uno solo de los conyuges.

This is the core provision: property bought onerously during the marriage with common funds is conjugal, whether the acquisition is made in the name of the partnership or in the name of only one spouse.

Article 1404 of the old Civil Code provides:

Las mejoras o aumentos que a costa del caudal comun se hicieren en los bienes propios de uno de los conyuges, perteneceran a la sociedad conyugal, abonandose el valor del suelo al conyuge a quien pertenezca.

This explains why the value of Donata's inherited lands was set aside before the fishpond proceeds were treated as conjugal.

Article 1334 of the old Civil Code, as invoked in the decision, prohibits donations between spouses:

No se podra hacer donacion entre conyuges durante el matrimonio, ni el marido a la mujer, ni la mujer al marido.

This is why any supposed donation by Clodualdo to Donata of his share in the parcels could not stand.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the thirty parcels are conjugal property. They were acquired by onerous title during the marriage with funds from the conjugal partnership, and under Article 1401 the name appearing in the deeds and certificates does not matter. The Court rejected the trial court's inference that Clodualdo intended to give the whole ownership to his wife. A transmission and acceptance of real property by gratuitous title is not presumed; it requires the formalities of a public instrument, and even a formal donation between spouses would be void under Article 1334.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in awarding Florencia a share of the price rather than of the parcels. The claim is directed against the thirty parcels, not against their acquisition value. Since the parcels are conjugal, one half belongs to Donata and the other half must be divided among the eleven brothers. Florencia is therefore entitled to one eleventh of one half of the thirty parcels.

On the third issue, the Court held that the project of partition and the order approving it do not constitute res judicata. Both referred only to the properties described in the inventory, and the thirty parcels were not included. There is no identity of the thing in litigation between the two cases, and the order was the result of a simple agreement, not of a hearing that discussed the true nature of the properties and the applicable law.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Florencia is entitled to one eleventh of one half of the products of the parcels from May 20, 1929, the date of Clodualdo's death. Since the parties agreed that the parcels produced 8,000 pesos annually before the war, her share is 363.63 pesos a year. If the parties cannot agree on how to deliver her share, the trial court shall appoint a commission of partition.

On the fifth issue, in the resolution denying reconsideration, the Court held that there was no res judicata from the earlier appeal. In civil cases appealed directly to the Supreme Court, only the errors assigned are reviewed; the Court does not correct unassigned errors on its own, and unappealed errors are deemed consented to by the interested party. The earlier affirmance covered only the portion challenged by Montemayor, not the portion challenged by Vitug in the later case.

Doctrine

First, property acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund is conjugal, whether the acquisition is made in the name of the conjugal partnership or in the name of only one spouse. The name on the deed is not controlling; the source of the funds is.

Second, a donation of real property between spouses during the marriage is void under Article 1334, and a gratuitous transmission of realty is never presumed — it requires the formalities of a public instrument.

Third, an heir claiming conjugal property may demand a share in the property itself, not merely in its acquisition price, because the claim is directed against the thing and not against its value.

Fourth, a judicial approval of a project of partition does not bar a later action when the properties in question were not included in the inventory and there is no identity of the thing in litigation.

Fifth, in civil cases, only assigned errors are reviewed on appeal; unassigned errors are deemed waived or consented to, and a judgment that affirms the appealed decision binds only the portions actually challenged.

Disposition

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Florencia Vitug, declaring the thirty parcels conjugal, awarding her one eleventh of one half of the parcels and of their products from May 20, 1929, and denying Donata Montemayor's motion for reconsideration.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: conjugal property is determined by the source of the funds, not by the name on the title, and a spouse cannot receive conjugal realty by donation during the marriage. Examiners use this case to test Article 1401 of the old Civil Code, the prohibition on donations between spouses, and the rule that only assigned errors are reviewed in civil appeals.