THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FLORO RODIL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the
death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary.  Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

“That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of
Indang, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger,
with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then
and there, wil­fully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official
duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death.

“Contrary to law.”

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the
following facts:

At about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the
deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana, together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, and Patrolman Felix Mojica of
Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang
market (pp. 2, 3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p.
21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).  While they
were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant
outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. 
Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt.
Masana, then in civilian clothing, accom­panied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after
identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his
waist had a license.  Instead of
answering the question of Lt. Masana, appellant moved one step backward and
attempted to draw his gun.  PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant’s gun from appellant’s waist and
gave it to Lt. Masana.  After that, Lt.
Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant.  PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed.  Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a
separate table about one and one-half (1½) meters from the table of Lt.
Masana’s three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971).  After the two were already
seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant’s gun on the table.  After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of
coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun,
and after signing it, he asked appellant to counter­sign the same, but
appellant refused to do so.  Instead, he
asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. 
Lt. Masana rejected appellant’s plea, telling the latter that they would
talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite.  When Lt. Masana was about to stand up,
appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt.
Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours
thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n.,
Nov. 22, 1971).

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three
companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo
Ligsa and police­man Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table
about one and one-half (1½) meters away from that occupied by the accused and
Lt. Masana, stood up to assist Lt. Masana; but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan
of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant,
was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or
grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the
accused-appellant.  Imme­diately thereafter,
the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26,
28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the
latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours
later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).  Dr. Felicisimo
del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following
findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits “D” and
“D-1” (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:

“Postmortem findings.

“General:

“Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis
with postmortem lividity over the dependent portions of the body.  Pupils are dilated.  Finger and toe tips are pale.  There is an exploratory laparotomy incision
at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with
eighteen (18) stitches applied.  There
are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9
cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline
with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain stick­ing out of each,
respectively.

“TRUNK:

“(1) Stab
wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards and slightly
upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.

“(2) Stab
wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards and to
the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.

“(3) Stab
wound, abdomen, mea­suring 0.9 by 0.2 cm., just left of the anterior midline,
96 cm. above the heel, 11 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and to the
left, perforating the greater curva­ture of the stomach and the gastric
vessels, grazing the liver, perforat­ing the diaphragm and infero-medial border
of the lower lobe of the right lung.

“(4) Impact
abrasion, right sca­pular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.

“UPPER
EXTREMITIES:

“(5) Incised
wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5
cm., just medial to its anterior midline.

“(6) Incised
wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.

“Five hundred (500) cc. blood and
blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.

“There are four (4) sutures
applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the stomach.

“There is nothing remarkable in
the unaffected organs internally.

“REMARKS:

“Cause of death is cardio-respira­tory arrest due to severe
shock and intrathoracic hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the
body, perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe
of the right lung.”

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains
and relies on the following facts:

At about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the
accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the market place of Indang,
Cavite, in order to take their lunch. 
They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21,
22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971).  Inside the
restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his
left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking
beer alone.  While the accused and his
wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and
asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit.  After receiving an
affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his
table.  The accused accepted the
invitation, so the two moved over to the officer’s table where the deceased
offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still
hungry.  In the course of their
conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about
smuggling to the PC.  The accused
informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the
authorities.  Lt. Masana then asked the
accused for his identifi­cation card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit,
which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhib­it “1”, bearing
his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League
of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter’s ID was
fake, and after the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to
take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his
pocket.  Because of his refusal to give
his ID card to Lt. Masana, the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice,
demanded: “Will you give it to me or not?” (p. 71, Ibid).  Still the accused refused to surrender his ID
to Lt. Masana.  Thereupon, the latter
pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two
(2) times.  Immediately, blood gushed
from his head and face.  When Lt. Masana
was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right
hand of the officer, pulled his “pangsaksak” and stabbed the officer
two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the
restaurant (pp. 74, 75, 79, Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender to the authorities.  But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the
Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite.  The
Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered
that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n.,
Ibid).  Thereupon, the Chief of Police
asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building.  Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of
Indang, Cavite, accom­panied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just
across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid;
p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971).  After he
was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to
the municipal building, where he was detained for two days before he was picked
up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC
Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n.,
Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.

I

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by
clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed, 14
SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA
60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473, 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149,
152; People vs. Berio, 59 Phil. 533, 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509,
514).  Moreover, to prove justification,
the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51
SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarra, 25 SCRA 491,
496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264,
270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil.
772).  The rationale for this
jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim,
the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes
to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the
deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana, who committed unlawful aggression when the
latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he refused to
surrender his (accused’s) ID to him.

This claim does not merit belief.

The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the
deceased because the same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter
hit him with the handle of his (deceased’s) gun.  WE cannot perceive how this refusal of the
accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating
the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt,
knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter’s gun had earlier
been taken away from him.  Besides, an
agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use
force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active
resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to
be obeyed by the offender.  Furthermore,
the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was
unarmed when the incident happened, he being then on leave.  As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian
clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). 
WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had
every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the
deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he
might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms.  Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the
ines­capable conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who
initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased
resulting in his death.

The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased
before he parried the third blow.  This
claim is belied by the record.  During
the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar
produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his
ID, thus -?

“Court

“Q   Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the
Court)”

[pp. 86, 88, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1971].

Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries
of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical findings,
Exhibit “3”, which reads:

“Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound, ½ inch, parietal region

(2) lacerated wound, 1½ inches, rt.
ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid
area” [Exh. “3”; p. 116, rec.].

The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person
(pp. 76, 77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).  It
also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the
accused were facing each other.  If that
was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused,
holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side
of his head and on his right earlobe?  WE
find that this parti­cular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who
first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow
and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of
the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted.  Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each
other, and it appearing that they were both right-handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov.
22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce
land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the recipient of
the blow.  WE, therefore, reject such
claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course of
human behavior.

The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness
PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried with both hands the
thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the
edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.

When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang,
Cavite, on his way to the municipal building from the scene of the stabbing
incident pur­portedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told
the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his
(Masana’s) gun.  On his return from the
clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the
municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to
the Tagaytay PC Headquarters.  During all
this time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or
other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense.  It was only on July 8, 1971, after the lapse
of more than two and one-half (2½) months that he claimed self-defense during
the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang,
Cavite (p. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). 
If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so
informed the Chief of Police at the first oppor­tunity.  He only allegedly told the Chief of Police,
who allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit
him with a gun.  He did not tell the
Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense.  This claim of the accused made before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an
exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24,
1971.  Such claim does not deserve
credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow
the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, both disinterested and unbiased
witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any showing as
to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full
faith and credit as a whole.

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same
day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state
witnesses that the police was present during the incident between the appellant
and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the
knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.

II

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or
homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority?

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was
murder because “it was established by the prosecution that during the
stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon
mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. 
x x x Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly
weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the
latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia
or treachery” (p. 14, Appellee’s brief).

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the
cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10,
4190).

WE do not agree with the Solicitor General.  Alevosia or treachery is belied by the
following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:

“COURT

“Q   What is the truth?

“A    The truth is that when I saw that Floro
Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo Masana, Masana parried him and his head
(Rodil’s head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an
injury and blood oozed from his head” (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972;
underscoring supplied).

Then, on cross-examination, the same
witness testified:

“ATTY. MUÑOZ

“Q   You said that Floro Rodil’s head was bumped
on the edge of a table, and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that
correct?

“A    Yes, sir.

“Q   Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

“A    When Masana parried his stab with his
hands he accidentally bumped his head on the table.

“Q   Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much
bigger than Lt. Masana?

“A    Yes, sir.

“Q   You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was
pushed to the extent that he bumped his head on the table?

“A    The force of Lt. Masana might have been
strong in parrying.

xx           xx          xx          xx

“Q   When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was
Lt. Masana already stabbed?

“A    It could be that he was already stabbed or he
was not yet stabbed.”

[Pp. 30-31, 33,
t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis added].

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the
testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses, WE can only
conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when the
stabbing took place.  As such the attack
was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same with his
hand.  As a matter of fact, the force he
used in warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head
on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical
treatment.  In short, the attack on the
victim was made on the spur of the moment. 
The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a
finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167).  Besides, the record failed to show that the
accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission
of the crime, making it at the same time impossible or hard for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 111 Phil. 546, 553, citing the
case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). 
Neither does it show that the accused employed means directly and
specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself.  On the contrary, it shows that the accused
was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were
police officers.  Furthermore, there was
an alter­cation between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by
the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment when the
victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with
it stabbed the victim in the chest. 
Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on
his victim was the latter’s performance of official duty, which the former
resented.  This kind of evidence does not
clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.  Alevosia is not to be presumed, but
must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril,
51 Phil. 670, 675).  This is so because
in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or
treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execu­tion thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised
Penal Code].

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew
because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent
of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple
reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew
that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person
in authority.  The information simply
alleges that appellant did “attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while
the latter was in the performance of his official duties, x x.” Such an
allegation can­not be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to
justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the
imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver
offense.  Like a qualifying circum­stance,
such knowledge must be expressly and speci­fically averred in the information;
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowl­edge, like a
qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. 
Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the
appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being
“in contempt of or with insult to the public author­ities” (Par. [2],
Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an “insult or in disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, x x x” (Par. 3,
Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).

It is essential that the accused must have knowl­edge that the
person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority (People vs. Villaseñor, 35 SCRA 460 [1970]; People vs. Rellin, 72
Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear, et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967),
it was held that failure to expressly allege in the information that the
accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority does
not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein
from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was
a person in authority.  Thus, the
information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:

“The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio
Balbar of the crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority, com­mitted as
follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio
Cumba, Municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a
public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the
occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed,
and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester
Gonzales.  That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circum­stances of having committed it inside the school
building and during school classes.

“Contrary to law.”

And the ruling of the Court was:

“Direct assault is committed ‘by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, x x shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate
or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance’ (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code).

“By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978),
‘teachers, professors, and persons charged with the super­vision of public or
duly recognized private schools, colleges and univer­sities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148.’ This special
classi­fication is obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and
respect while in the performance of their official duties.  The lower court, however, dismissed the
informa­tion on the ground that there is no express allegation in the
information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority.  This is clearly
erroneous.

“Complainant was a teacher. 
The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her
duties.  He therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she was so by speci­fic provision of law.  It matters not that such knowledge on his
part is not expressly alleged, complainant’s status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse
non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).  This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expe­diency,
policy and necessity.”

But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA
305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault reads:

“That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio
Languyin, Municipality of Polillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto
Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astejada, each of whom was armed
with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coralde, conspiring and con­federating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces of
wood one Rufino Camonias, a coun­cilman of barrio Languyin of said
municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said councilman was
engaged in the actual performance of his duties.”

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

“Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the
complaint or in the information that the offended party was an agent of a
person in authority and that such fact was known to the accused.  The absence of such allegation is fatal in
this case.”

The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari.

This Court held that the fiscal’s proper course of action is not
a petition for review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid
information against the accused, for the following considerations:

“The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly
observed that ‘(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not
on the merits.  There is want of factual
finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.

“It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal’s
contention, the information was deficient in that it did not allege an
essential element of the crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge
of or knew the position of authority held by the person attacked, viz.
that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority under
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See
U.S. vs. Alvear, 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. II,
Padilla’s Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].

“What was held in People vs. Balbar, 21 SCRA, 119,
1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is suffi­cient that the information
alleged that the accused knew the position of authority, held by
the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then engaged in the
perform­ance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to allege
further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in
authority, since ‘this is a matter of law’ thus:

‘Complainant was a teacher. 
The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her class­room and engaged in the performance of her
duties.  He therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law.  It matters not that such knowledge on his
part is not expressly alleged, complainant’s status as a person in
authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil
Code).  This article applies to all kinds
of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons
of expediency, policy and necessity.’

“Since the ‘decision’ of acquit­tal was really a mere
dismissal of the information for failure to charge an offense and was not a
decision on the merits with factual findings as per the trial judge’s own
disavowal, it is patent that the fiscal’s proper course is not the present
petition but the refiling of a valid information against respondents-accused,
as here­in indicated.

“ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to
the refiling of a valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove
in­dicated” (underscoring supplied).

The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of
Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case; because the information
in the former is strik­ingly similar to the information in the latter and does
not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that
the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be
appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Mesana, identified
himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a mem­ber of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to
the victim.

The term “rank” should be given its plain, ordinary
meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or standing as a grade
in the armed forces (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or
social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said
officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf,
p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer
in order to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters
of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to determine
his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing, rela­tive
position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade,
including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a posi­tion (Vol. 36,
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his
corporal (People vs. Mil, 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of
the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by
a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the
murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cab­ling, 7 Phil. 469, 474; People
vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor
(People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder of a city chief of
police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero, 88
Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First
Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreon, CA 52 OG 7644),
the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — ­a mere chancellor
(People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606-607), and the killing of an army general
(People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).

As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of
Appeals, those “generally con­sidered of high station in life, on account
of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected.  Therefore, whenever there is a difference in
social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating
circumstance sometimes is present” (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code
Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).

The difference in official or social status between a P.C.
lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of
murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely
murder, then the aggravating circumstance of dis­regard of rank or contempt of
or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because
either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. 
But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only.  Consequently, either aggravating circumstance
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder
or frustrated murder, the aggravat­ing circumstance of disregard of rank was
appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in
the Civil Service Commission, was charged with and convicted of the murder of
the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were
charged with and convicted of murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin
Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano
Castañeda;

(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and
convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero, supra — where the accused chief of
the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police Department was convicted of
murder for the killing of the chief of police.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public
authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can like­wise
be appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly estab­lished that Chief
of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in
the same restaurant when the incident occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who
embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and
there­after brought him to the municipal building of Indang.  And appellant admittedly knew him even then
as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to the
municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in
the restaurant during the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al.
(19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs.
Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority
refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of
police is not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in
authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not
justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which
is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code.  There is no extended reasoning of the
doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public
authority should compre­hend only persons in authority.  The lawmaker could have easily utilized the
term “persons in authority” in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article
14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and
152.  The lawmaker must have in­tended a
different meaning for the term public authority, which may however include,
but not limited to persons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain,
barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority or a public
authority.  Even a public school teacher
is now considered a person in author­ity under CA 578 amending Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil. 228).  So is the town municipal health officer
(People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal
councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya,
CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24).

The chief of police should therefore be considered a public
authority or a person in authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority
to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to
apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the
aforementioned offi­cials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to
arrest malefactors although speci­fically mentioned as persons in authority by
the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957.  The town
chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality
as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the
municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the school premises
or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdic­tion
of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the appellant should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum
period of reclusion temporal, the penalty prescribed for
homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR
DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK,
APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO OFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO 20
YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN
ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., in the result.

Barredo, J., votes with J.
Teehankee in his brief concurrence.

Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concurs
with the partial dissent of J. Melencio-Herrera.