ANUNCIACION NARABAL DE NILO, GIL NILO, FELICISIMO NILO, FILEMON NILO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HONORIO ROMERO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, BR. III AND TH…

Nilo versus Romero

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by the heirs of Fausto Nilo against Judge Honorio Romero of the Court of First Instance of Davao and the City of Davao. The Nilos had won a default judgment ordering the City to pay for a portion of their land taken and used as a road way. The respondent judge then set that judgment aside on the ground that the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the City, because summons had been served on the City Engineer rather than the City Mayor. The case matters because it is the classic ruling on jurisdiction over juridical persons acquired by voluntary appearance, on the binding effect of a final and executory judgment, and on the strict periods for a petition for relief from judgment.

Procedural History

Fausto Nilo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Davao against the City of Davao, represented by the City Engineer, to recover payment for the City's use of part of his land as a road way. The City, through its Special Counsel, answered and raised prescription as an affirmative defense, but the answer was filed late. The trial court declared the City in default and ordered its answer stricken from the records, and it denied the City's motion for reconsideration. The City did not appeal either order.

After Fausto Nilo died, his heirs were substituted, and an amended complaint was admitted without objection. The trial court then received the plaintiffs' evidence and rendered a default judgment in their favor. A writ of execution issued. The City then filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the trial court granted, setting aside the judgment and prohibiting its execution. After reconsideration was denied, the Nilos came to the Supreme Court on certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction, with no appeal or other plain and adequate remedy available.

Facts

On September 7, 1955, Fausto Nilo sued the City of Davao to recover payment for the City's use of a part of his land as a road way. Summons was served on the City through the representative named in the complaint, the City Engineer. The City's answer was filed out of time because of negligence in the City Engineer's Office in forwarding the papers to the City Fiscal's Office. On the plaintiff's motion, the trial court declared the City in default and struck its answer, and it denied reconsideration. The City never appealed those orders.

Fausto Nilo died, and his heirs were substituted as plaintiffs. An amended complaint was filed and admitted without objection from the City's Special Counsel, who was served with notice and appeared at the hearing. The amended complaint introduced no substantial change in the cause of action; it merely inserted the names and qualifications of the heirs. After receiving the plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court rendered a default judgment ordering the City to pay 2,248 pesos at 2 pesos per square meter for the land taken, plus 1,500 pesos in attorney's fees and the costs. A writ of execution issued.

The City then filed a petition for relief from judgment, raising for the first time that the court had no jurisdiction because the City Mayor, not the City Engineer, was the official authorized to represent the City and to receive summons; that the amended complaint had not been served on it; and that the Republic should have been impleaded because the road was a national highway. The trial court granted relief, set aside the judgment, and barred execution. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the City of Davao despite the service of summons on the City Engineer instead of the City Mayor.
• Whether or not the default judgment had become final and executory, and whether the petition for relief from judgment was filed within the periods allowed by the Rules.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment and prohibiting its execution.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on relief from judgment, whose periods the City failed to observe. The Court states the governing principle this way:

Once a decision has become final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and the parties, except to correct clerical errors and/or to enforce it.

This rule bears on the case because the default judgment had long become final when the City sought relief, leaving the trial court no power to disturb it.

The decision also applies the rule on acquisition of jurisdiction over the parties, which the Court articulates as follows:

Jurisdiction over the parties may be acquired by voluntary appearance in court, or by submitting pleadings in the court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

This rule bears on the case because the City's counsel appeared and litigated, curing any defect in the service of summons.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that jurisdiction over the City was validly acquired. Summons was in fact served through the representative named in the complaint, and the City, through its City Attorney and Special Counsel, appeared, answered, opposed the motion for default, and moved for reconsideration. That appearance was voluntary and sufficient in law to confer jurisdiction. If the City believed it was wrongly represented, its remedy was a motion to dismiss on that ground, which it never filed. The Court held that estoppel operates against the City, and that the erroneous designation of the representative, when the defendant itself is named, is not sufficient to set aside the proceedings. The technical error in procedure could not invalidate the default proceedings.

On the second issue, the Court held that the default judgment had already become final and executory, and that the respondent judge himself had issued the writ of execution. A petition for relief from judgment is available, but only upon compliance with the periods fixed by Rule 38. From the order of default in October 1955, or from the denial of reconsideration in March 1956, until the petition for relief was filed in November 1958, those periods had long elapsed. More than three years passed between the order of default and the judgment by default without the City filing any timely pleading to protect itself, rendering it guilty of laches.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the final judgment and prohibiting its execution. The allegation that the Republic should have been impleaded never passed beyond a mere allegation; the City's only defense in its answer was prescription, and the trial court found that the City occupied the property and is presumed to have used the road for its inhabitants.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by voluntary appearance, and a defendant who submits pleadings and litigates through counsel confers jurisdiction on the court, curing any defect in the service of summons. Second, where the defendant itself is correctly named and the error lies only in the designation of its representative, that technical error does not invalidate the proceedings, and estoppel bars the defendant from later raising it. Third, once a judgment becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and the parties, except to correct clerical errors and to enforce the judgment. Fourth, a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within the periods fixed by Rule 38, and failure to do so, coupled with years of inaction, amounts to laches that bars relief.

Disposition

The Court granted the petition, set aside and declared null and void the orders of the respondent judge, revived the default judgment of October 1958, and decreed its execution, without costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that voluntary appearance by counsel confers jurisdiction over the defendant, and that a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed. Examiners use this case on jurisdiction over juridical persons, on the effect of a final judgment, and on the strict periods and laches barring relief from judgment.