G.R. No. L-15195. March 29, 1961
ANUNCIACION NARABAL DE NILO, GIL NILO, FELICISIMO NILO, FILEMON NILO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HONORIO ROMERO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, BR. III AND TH…
PAREDES, J.:
Case No. 1708, against the City of Davao, represented by the City
Engineer, to recover payment for the use as road way, of a part of his
land by the defendant City. On October 7, 1955, the City of Davao, thru
its Special Counsel, answering the complaint, interposed the
affirmative defense of prescription of action, pursuant to Sec. 43, No.
3, of Act No. 190, limiting the filing of the action to four (4) years.
On the same date, plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant in
default and to strike its answer, alleging that the period to file
answer expired on October 3, 1955, whereas the same was actually filed
on October 7, 1955. On October 20, 1955, and over the opposition of the
defendant, the lower court entered an Order; pertinent portions of
which are hereunder quoted:
“* * *. It is
admitted in the opposition of the defendant to plaintiff’s motion to
have the defendant declared in default and to strike its answer, that
there was negligence on the part of the City Engineer’s Office in not
immediately forwarding the papers to the City Fiscal’s Office. While
the negligence is admitted, there are no valid and meritorious grounds
alleged in said opposition which would justify the Court to disregard
the motion of the plaintiffs. The City Engineer’s Office should have
forwarded all the papers in this Case to the City Fiscal of Davao for
the preparation of the necessary pleadings and defense.In
view of the foregoing, this Court, finding out that the motion of the
plaintiff to declare defendant in default and to strike its answer is
well taken, declares defendant in default and orders its answer
stricken off the records.”
The motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendant, thru Leo D. Medialdea, its
Special Counsel, on March 7, 1956, of the above order, attaching
thereto affidavits and opposed by the plaintiff, was denied in an order
dated March 19, 1956. The Order of default as well as the order denying
the motion for reconsideration of said order was not appealed by the
respondent City of Davao.
Due to the death of plaintiff
Fausto Nilo, a motion for substitution was filed and the petitioners,
as heirs, became the plaintiffs. An amended complaint was filed on
March 3, 1958 and admitted by the trial court, without objection of
Special Counsel Medialdea, who was served with notice on March 3, 1958.
After reception of the evidence for the plaintiffs, the lower court, on
October 28, 1958, rendered a default judgment, to wit:
“*
* * Wherefore, this Court hereby rendering judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay the
amount of P2,248.00 at the rate of P2.00 per square meter as payment of
the land of the plaintiffs taken for road-way by the defendant after
which the plaintiff shall execute the necessary document of conveyance
in favor of the defendant, to pay the amount of P1,500.00 as attorney’s
fees and the costs of the proceedings.”
Under date of October 30, 1958, plaintiff presented a “Motion for
Execution” and on November 11, 1958, the corresponding Writ was issued.
On November 17, 1958, the defendant City of Davao, thru the City
Attorney A. L. Noel, filed a “Petition for Relief from Judgment”,
alleging for the first time, that the trial court acquired no
jurisdiction over the defendant City of Davao, because it was not the
City Engineer, but the City Mayor, who is under the law (Charter of the
City of Davao), the right official to represent the City, and who
should have been, served with summons (Comm. Act No. 51) ; that after
defendant was declared in default, the plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint, without serving copy thereof to the defendant; and that the
Republic of the Philippines should have been included as a party, the
subject matter of the’ complaint being a national highway.
The petition was opposed by plaintiffs, claiming that the court validly
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. City of Davao, the City
Engineer being an alter ego of the City Mayor and that Special
Counsel Medialdea of the defendant entered his appearance, filed
defendant’s’ Answer and presented an opposition to the motion to
declare defendant in default and strike out answer. Regarding the issue
on the amended complaint, plaintiffs pointed out that the Motion for
Admission of the Amended Complaint and the Amended Complaint itself
were served on the defendant thru the same Special Counsel Medialdea,
who appeared at the hearing for the admission of said amended
complaint. The Amended Complaint did not introduce substantial changes,
on the cause of action; it inserted merely, in their proper places, the
names and qualifications of the heirs of the deceased plaintiff.
On December 16, 1958, the lower court entered an Order, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder reproduced:
“In
the foregoing, this Court believes that it has not
acquired-jurisdiction over the defendant, the City of Davao, for the
same was not duly served with summons but the City Engineer, who is not
the legal representative of the City, and, therefore, hereby orders
that the judgment rendered in this case dated October 28, 1958 be set
aside and a new trial be held upon the amendments of the complaint with
the City Mayor as the representative of the defendant, the City of
Davao, and not the City Engineer. The plaintiffs are hereby directed to
serve a copy of the amended complaint on the defendant who must answer
the same within the reglementary period, and that the Sheriff, or any
person acting in his behalf, is hereby prohibited from executing the
judgment above stated.”
The motion for
reconsideration of the above order having been denied, the plaintiff
filed the present petition for certiorari, claiming that the respondent
judge in promulgating the said order, acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction and that there is no
appeal or plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisdiction over the parties may be acquired by voluntary appearance
in court, or by submitting pleadings in the court which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter. There is no dispute regarding the
fact that summons was served upon defendant City, thru the
representative named in said complaint; that for some negligence on the
part of its employees, the Answer of the City to the complaint was
filed out of time; that the City of Davao, as represented by the City
Engineer, was duly assisted by the City Attorney, thru Special Counsel
Medialdea; that the City Attorney did his best to defend the rights of
the City, as shown by the efforts he exerted to lift the default order
by a motion for reconsideration. The appearance of the City Attorney
for and in behalf of the City of Davao constituted a voluntary
appearance, sufficient in law to confer upon the court jurisdiction
over it. If defendant City believed that it was wrongly represented,
its City Attorney should have filed, a motion to dismiss, based on such
ground. Unfortunately, however, he did not. The doctrine of estoppel
now operates against respondent City of Davao. The erroneous
designation of the representative, when the defendant itself is named,
is, to our belief, not sufficient to set aside the proceedings had in
the case. Taking into account the actuations of the. defendant City of
Davao, assisted by its Special Counsel and/or City Attorney, and the
judicial pronouncements on the subject, we see no reason why the
technical error in procedure obtaining in the present case, can be a
sufficient ground to invalidate the default proceedings.
No
serious argument can be offered to rebut the fact that the default
judgment had already become final and executory. Respondent judge
himself has issued the corresponding writ of execution. Once a decision
has become final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case and the parties, except to correct clerical errors and/or to
enforce it. Of course, the rules (Rule 38) provide the remedies that a
party may pursue, like a Motion for Relief from Judgment. However,
before such motion can be properly acted upon, certain requirements are
provided for which respondent City of Davao failed to comply with. From
October 20, 1955, when defendant was declared in default or from March
19, 1956, when the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring
the defendant in default was denied, until November 17, 1958, when the
petition for relief from judgment was filed, the periods provided for
in Rule 38 have long elapsed (I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1957 Ed., Rule 38, sec. 3, p. 526). From the date of the Order of
default (October 20, 1955) to the date of judgment by default (October
28, 1958), more than three (3) years had supervened, without the
respondent City of Davao having filed opportunely any pleading to
protect itself, thereby rendering itself guilty of laches. It is
alleged in the petition for relief from judgment that the property,
subject of the complaint, being a national highway, the Republic of the
Philippines should have been included as a party defendants. This did
not pass beyond a mere allegation. In its answer, the defendant set up
only one defense and that is prescription of action. And the trial
court found that the defendant City occupied the property and the
presumption is that it used said road for its inhabitants.
In view of the foregoing facts, we find that the respondent judge acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
his Order of December 18, 1958 setting aside his decision of October
28, 1958 and his Order of February 13, 1959, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order. Said Orders should be, as they are
hereby, set aside and declared null and void. The judgment of October
28, 1958 is ordered revived and its execution is decreed. Without
costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.