CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. CECILIO LEDESMA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of
Basilan City on January 7, 1954, took his oath of office on the same
date, and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments oil April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P.
Garcia, in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month
for having been found guilty of gross negligence, violation of law, and
dereliction of duty.

Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of
Basilan. City with two offenses, one for disobedience of an order of
his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and another for oral
defamation (Criminal Case No. 438); for which he was suspended from
office by the then Executive Secretary Fortunate de Leon. He asked that
his order of suspension be lifted but it was denied. After the
prosecution had rested its case and without requiring the accused to
submit his defense, ‘ the latter was acquitted in the two criminal
cases above-mentioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even
if no formal administrative charges were instituted against him, or any
administrative investigation conducted of said charges.

On April 38, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo wrote
Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services
as chief of police of Basilan City and has designated Ceeilio Ledesma
in his place ‘ requesting him at the same time to turn over his office, to Ledesma; The nomination of Ledesma having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of
police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted
an action for guo warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the
Court of First Instance of Basilan City seeking his reinstatement on
the ground that his removal from office without cause as provided by
law was in violation of our Constitution.

The court a guo, after hearing, dismissed the complaint holding
“that the removal of petitioner from office by the President was made
in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act 288 know.ii as the
Charter of the City of Basilan, whereupon Fernandez appealed to this
Court on purely questions of law.

The letter which was sent by Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo to
petitioner-appellant informing him of the termination of his employment
reads as followsj

“Sir:

I wish to inform you that the
President has terminated your services as Chief of Police of the City
of Basilan and has designated Mr. Ceeilio Ledesma in your stead. It
will, therefore, be appreciated if you can turn over the said, office
to Mr. Ledesma -upon receipt hereof.

		Very truly yours,
		(Sgd.) JUAN C. PAJO
		Executive ..Secretary”

It is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has
put an end to the services of appellant as” chief of police of Basilan
City on April 28, 1959, and this he did pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him ‘ by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as the
Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows.

“SEC. 17.- Appointment and removal of officers and
employees-Compensation. —The President shall appoint with the consent
of’. the Commission on “Appointments, the municipal, judge
and-auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer,,the city
treasury-assessor,’ the city attorney, the chief of police and the
other chiefs of ‘ departments of.the city which’ may fee created
from.time to time and the President may remove at his discretion any
of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge,
who may be removed only according to law.” (Italics supplied)

As may be noted, under the aforesaid section,, the President is
vested with the authority to appoint, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, among-others, the chief of police, and in
connection with such power the same section says “the President may .
remove at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the
exception of the municipal-judge, who may be, removed only according to
law.” Verily, the President interpreted said removal clause as meaning
that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under
the chapter at his discretion or pleasure with the exception of the
municipal judge who may be removed only according to law, and in the
exercise of such power he terminated . the services of appellant as
chief of police. The court; a quo sustained this stand justifying the
action of the , President and this is now assigned by appellant as
error.

We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law. says that
the President may remove at his discretion any of the appointive
officers of the city with the exception of the. municipal judge who may
be removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative
intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive
officers dependent upon the pleasure of the President. If such were not
the case, it would not have made a distinction in point of removal
between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. This
distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic
Act No. 288 is there any mention that the term of office of the chief
of police, and for that matter of any appointive officer, with the
exception of the municipal judge, should be for a fixed period. The
fact that no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of
an intention to make it dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of
the appointing power. And Congress is not wanting in power to do so
for, as it was aptly said: “A public office is the right, authority
and, duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating ¦power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign function
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public” (7 Mechem, Public Officers, Section’ 1; See also 42 Am. Jur.,
944-955; Italics supplied). And in Alba vs. Alajar, 100 Phil., 683; 53
Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 1452, this Court also said: “Congress can legally
and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent
upon the pleasure of the President.”

Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he
contends that the act of the President in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to
the position of .chief of police of Basilan City in his place is
tantamount to his removal without cause from office in violation of
Section 4, Article XII, of our Constitution, invoking in support
thereof pur ruling in the cases of De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil,
289; 48 Off. Gaz., 1791 and Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off.
Gaz., 93. But this contention cannot, be sustained considering that the
position of the chief of police does not have a fixed term. As already
said, it was made dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the
President, whereas the cases invoked by appellant relate to positions
for which, the law fixes a definite, term of office.: What is in point
here is- the case of Alba vs. Alajar, supra,’ wherein this Court made
the following pronouncement:

” ‘The pervading error of the respondents lies in
the fact that they insist on the .act Qf the President in designating
petitioner Alba in the pl^ace. of respondent Alajar as one of removal.
The .replacement of respondent Alajar is y.ot removal, but an
Expiration of kts tcume, which is “one of the ordinary modes of
terminating official relations. On this score, section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative in the
Santos us, Mallare. case, is different from section 8 of Republic Act
Ho. 603. Section 2545 refers to removal at pleasure while section 8 of
Republic Act No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of the
President.

‘”Clearly, what is involved here is not the
question of removal, or whether legal cause should precede or not that
removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office and the
tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the
pleasure of the President.

” ‘The cases relied upon by
respondents are, therefore, in-opposite to the instant proceedings. For
all of them relate to feint oal of officials in violation of laws which
prescribe fixity of term.

” ‘Even assuming for the moment
that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act itself is
valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no
fixity of tenure has been provided for, and the pleasure of the
President has been exercised in accordance with the policy laid down by
Congress therein.’ ‘

Wherefore, the deeision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Bengzon, C..J.,Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.