RICARDO PRESBITERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF ESPIRIDION PRESBITERO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, HELEN CARAM NAVA, AND THE PROVINCIAL …

Petition for a writ of certiorari against the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

It appears that during the lifetime of Espiridion Pres-j bitero,
judgment was rendered against him by the Court of Appeals on October
14, 1959, in CA-G. R. No. 20879.

“* * * to execute in favor of the. plaintiff, within
30 days from, the time this judgment becomes final, a deed of
reconveyance of Lot No. 78S of the cadastral survey of Valladolid, free
from all: hens and encumbrances, and another deed of reconveyance of a
7-hettaie portion of. Lot No.. 608 of the same cadastral survey, also
free from all liens and encumbrances or upon failure to do so, to pay
to the plaintiff the value “of each of the said properties, as may he
determined by the Court a! quo’ upon evidence to be piespnted by the
parties .before it. The defendant is further adjudged to pay to the
plaintiff the value of the products received by him from the- 5-hectare
portion equivalent to 20 cavans of palay per. hectare every year, or
125 cavans yearly,! at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from /1951 until
possession of the said 5 hectare portion is finally delivered, to the
plaintiff with legal interest thereon from the time the complaint was
filed; and1 to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Pl,000.00 by way, of
attorney’s fees, plus costs.”

This judgment, which became final, was. a modification of  a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in its
Civil Case Nq. 3492, entitled “Helen Caram Nava, plaintiff, versus
Espiridion Presbitero, defendant”. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel, .in
a letter dated December 8, 1959, sought, in vain, to amicably settle
the ease through, petitioner’s son, Ricardo Presbitero. When no
response was forthcoming, said counsel asked for and the court a quo
ordered on June 9, 1960, the issuance of a partial writ of execution
for the sum of P12.250.00. On the following day, June 10, 1960 said
counsel, in another friendly letter, reiterated his previous suggestion
for an’ amicable settlement, but the same produced no fruitful result.
Thereupon, on June 21, 1960, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the
sugar quotas alloted to plantation audit Nos. 26-237, 26-2S8, 26-239,
26-240 and 26-241 adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and. “registered
in the name of Espiridion Presbitero as the original plantation-owner”,
furnishing copies of the writ of execution and the notice of
garnishment to the manager of the Ma-aO’Sugar Central Company, Bago,
Negros Occidental, and the Sugar Quota Administration at Bacolod City,
but without presenting for registration copies thereof to the Register
of Deeds.

Plaintiff Helen Caram Nava (herein respondent) then moved the court,
on June 22, 1960, to hear evidence on the market value of the lots;
and-after, some hearings, occasionally protracted by postponements, the
trial court, on manifestation of defendant’s willingness to cede the
properties in litigation, suspended the proceedings and ordered him to
segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to the plaintiff from the
mass of properties belonging to the defendant within a period to expire
on August 24, 1960, and to effect the final conveyance of the said
portion of Lot 608 and the whole of Lot Y88 free from any lien and
encumbrance whatsoever. Because of Presbitero’s failure to comply with
this order within the time set forth by the court, the plaintiff again
moved on August 25, 1960 to declare the market value of the lots in
question to be P2,500.00 per hectare, based on uncontradicted evidence
previously adduced. But the court, acting on a prayer of defendant
Presbitero, in an order dated August 27, I960, granted him twenty (20)
days to finalize the survey of Lot 608, and ordered him to execute a
recon-, veyance of Lot 788 not later, than August 81, 1960 Defendant
again defaulted; and so plaintiff, on September 21, 1960, moved the
court for payment by the defendant of the sum of P35,000.00 for the 14
hectares of land at P2,500.00 to the hectare, and the court, in its
order dated September 24, 1960, gave the defendant until October 15,
1960 either to pay the value of the 14 hectares at the rate given or to
deliver the clean titles of the. lots. On October 15, 1960, the
defendant finally delivered Certificate of Title No. T-28046 covering
Lot 788, but not the title covering Lot 608 because of an existing
encumbrance in favor of the Philippine National Bank. In view thereof,
Helen Caram Nava moved for, and secured on October 19, I960, a writ of
execution for P17,500.00, and, on the day fbllowmg wrote the sheriff to
proceed with the auction bale of the sugar quotas previously scheduled
for November 5, 1960. The sheriff issued the notice of auction sale on
October 20, 1960.

On October 22, 1960, death overtook the defendant Espiridion Presbitero.

Proceedings for the settlement of his estate were commenced in
Special Proceeding No. 2936 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental; and. on November 4, I960, the special administrator,
Rieardo Presbitero, filed an urgent motion, in Case No. 3492, to set
aside the writs of execution, and to order the sheriff to desist from
holding the auction sale on the grounds that the levy on the sugar
quotas was invalid because the notice thereof was not’ registered with
the Register of Deeds, as for real property, and that the writs, being
for sums of money, are unenforceable since Espiridion Presbitero died
on October 22, 1960, and, therefore, could only be enforced as a money
claim against his estate.

This urgent motion was heard on November 5, 1960, but the auction
sale proceeded on the same date, ending in the plaintiff’s putting up
the highest bid for P34,970.11; thus, the sheriff sold 21,640 pieuis of
sugar quota to her.

On November 10, 1960, plaintiff Nava filed her opposition to
Presbitero’s urgent motion of November 4, 1960; the latter filed on May
4, 1961 a supplement to his urgent motion; and on May 8 and 23, 1961,
the court continued hearings on the motion, and ultimately denied it on
November 18, 1961.

On January 11, 1962, plaintiff Nava also filed an urgent motion to
order the Ma-ao Sugar Central to register the sugar quotas in her name
and to deliver the rentals of these quotas corresponding to the crop
year 1960-61 and succeeding years to her. The court granted this motion
in its order dated February 3, 1962. A motion for reconsideration by
Presbitero was denied in a subsequent order under date of March 5,
1962. Wherefore, Presbi-¦ tero instituted the present proceedings for
certiorari.

A preliminary restraining writ was thereafter issued by the court
against the respondents from implementing the aforesaid orders of the
respondent judge, dated February 3, 1960 and March S, 1962,
respectively. The petition further seeks the setting aside of the
sheriff’s certificate of sale of the sugar quotas made put in favor of
Helen Caram Nava, and that she be directed to file the judgment credit
in her favor in Civil Case No. 3492 as a money claim in the proceedings
to settle the Estate of Espiridion Presbitero,

The petitioner denies having been personally served with notice of
the garnishment of the sugar quotas, but this disclaimer cannot be
seriously considered, since it appears that he was sent a copy of the
notice through the chief of police of Valladolid on June .21, 1960, as
certified to by the sheriff, and that he had actual knowledge of the
garnishment, as shown by his motion of November 4, 1960 to set aside
the writs of.. execution and to order the sheriff to desist from
holding the auction, sale.

Squarely at issue in this case is whether sugar quotas are real
(immovable) or personal properties. If they be realty, then the levy
upon them by the sheriff is null ‘ and void for lack of compliance with
the procedure prescribed in’Section 14, Rule 39, in relation with
Sectidn 7, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, requiring “the filing with
the register of deeds a copy of the orders together with a description
of the property * * *”

In contending that sugar quotas are personal property, the
respondent, Helen Caram Nava, invoked the test formulated by Manresa (3
Maiiresa, 6th Ed., 43), and opined that sugar quotas can be carried
from place to place without injury to the land to which they are
attached, and are not one of those included in Article 415 of the Civil
Code, and not being thus included, they fall under, the category of
personal properties, in accordance with No. 4 of Article 416, which
provides:

“Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:

* * * * * * *

“4.
In general, all things which can he transported frcm place to place
without impairment of the real property to which theyare fixed.”

* * * * * * *

Respondent likewise points to evidence she submitted that sugar
quotas are, in fact, transferred apart from the plantations to which
they are attached, without impairing, destroying, or diminishing the
potentiality. of either quota or plantation. She was sustained by the
lower court when it stated that “it is a matter of public knowledge and
it is universal practice in this province, whose principal ‘industry is
sugar, to transfer by sale, lease, or otherwise, sugar quota
allocations from one plantation to any other” and that it is “specious
to insist that quotas are improvements attaching to one plantation when
in truth and in fact they are no longer attached thereto for having
been sold or leased away to be used in another plantation”. Respondent
would add weight to her argument by invoking the role that sugar quotas
play in our. modern social and economic life, and cites that the Sugar
Quota Office does not require any registration with the Register of
Deeds for the validity of the sale of these quotas; and, in fact, those
here in question were not notej down in the certificate of title of the
land to which they pertain; and that Eicardo Presbitero had leased
sugar quotas independently of the land. The respondent cites further
that the U. S. Philippine Trade Relations Act, approved by the United
States Congress in 1946, limiting the production of unrefined sugar” in
the Philippines did not allocate the quotas for said unrefined sugar
among lands planted to sugarcane but among “the sugar producing mills
and plantation OWNEES”, and for this reason Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 873, issued by Governor General Murphy, authorizes the
lifting of sugar allotments from one land to another by means only of
notarized deeds.

While respondent’s arguments are thought-provoking, they cannot
stand against the positive mandate of the pertinent statute. The Sugar
Limitation Law (Act 4166, as amended) provides—

“Sec. 9. The allotment’ corresponding to each piece
of land under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be an
improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto * * *”

and Eepublic Act No. 1825 similarly provides—

Sec. 4. The production allowance or quota
corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled
thereto. * * *”

And Executive Order No. 873 defines “plantation” as follows:

“(a) The term ‘plantation’ means any specific area
of land under sole or undivided .ownership to which is attached an
allotment of centrifugal sugar.”

Thua, under express provisions, of law, the sugar quota allocations
are-accessories to land, and can not have independent existence away
from a plantation, although the latter, may vary. Indeed, this Court
held in the casa of Abelar.d.8. t>s,-Lopez, 74,Phil. 844, that even
if a contract 6f sale of haciendas omitted ‘”tha right, title,
interest, Jjarticipatipn, action (and) rent” which the grantors had tit
might -have in relation to the parcels of land sold, the sale would
include the quotas, it being provided in Section 9, Act 4166, that the
allotment is deemed an improvement attached to the land, and that, at
the time the contract of sale was signed, the lands devoted to sugar
were practically of no.use without the sugar allotment.

As an improvement attached to land, by. express provision of law,
though not physically so united, the sugar, quotas are inseparable
therefrom, just like servitudes and other real rights over an
immovable. Article 415 of the Civil Code, in enumerating what are
immovable properties,

“10. Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property? (italics supplied)

It is by law, therefore, that these properties are immovable or
real, Article 416 of the Civil Code being made to apply only when the
thing (res) sought to be classified is not included in Article 415.

The fact that the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (U. S Public Law
371-79th Congress) allows transfers of sugar quotas does not militate
against their immovability. Neither does the fact that the Sugar Quota
Office does not require registration of sales of quotas with the
Register of Deeds for their validity; nor the fact that allbca-tion of
unrefined sugar quotas is not made among lands planted to sugarcane but
among-“the sugar, producing mills and plantation OWNERS” since the
lease or sale of quotas are voluntary transactions, the regime, of
which is not necessarily identical to involuntary transfers or levies;,
and there cannot be a’sugar plantation owner-without land to which the
quota  is attached”; and there can exist no quota without there being
first a corresponding plantation

Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, ft is
impertinent to discuss the survival or non-survival of claims after the
death of the judgment debtor, gauged from the moment of actual levy.
Suffice it to state that, as the case presently stands, the writs of
execution are not in question, but the levy on the quotas, and, because
of its invalidity, the levy amounts to no levy at all. Neither is it
necessary, or desirable, to pass upon the conscionableness or
unconscionableness of the amount pror . duced in the auction sale as
compared with the actual value of the quotas inasmuch as the sale must
necessarily be also illegal.

As to the remedial issue that the respondents have presented: that
certiorari does not lie in this case because ,the petitioner had a
remedy in the lower court to “suspend” the auction sale, but did not
avail thereof, it may be; stated that the latter’s urgent motion of
November 4, 1960, a day before the scheduled sale (though unresolved by
the court on time), did ask for desistance from holding the sale.

Wherefore, the preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby
made permanent, and the sheriff’s certificate of sale of the sugar
quota in question declared null and void. Costs against respondent Nava.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala JJ., concur.