PORFIRIO RILLORAZA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. JUDGE PEDRO ARCIAGA, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS, EULALIA BANAYAT, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

The jurisdictional issue thrust upon us stems from facts
following:  On June 18, 1963, respondent Eulalia Banayat, head teacher,
filed in the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, against petitioner, a
criminal complaint for the crime of direct assault upon a person in authority,
allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union,^[1] On
February 7, 1964, petitioner moved to quash, planted on lack of
jurisdiction.  This was denied.  Hearing on the merits, in the
court’s exercise of original jurisdiction, commenced.  Three prosecution witnesses were able to
testify.  Stenographic record of their
testimony was taken.  On June 3, 1964, petitioner went to the Court of First
Instance of La Union on certiorari and prohibition.^[2]
On October 8, 1964 the
Court of First Instance of La Union came out with an order declaring the
proceedings conducted by respondent municipal judge null and void, and
directing him to desist from continuing with the hearing of the case, and to transmit the
record thereof to the Municipal Court
of Naguilian, La Union, for the necessary preliminary investigation. 
Hence, the present appeal.

1.  A
choice is forced upon us as to
which of two statutes should govern the jurisdictional boundaries of the
Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union: Republic Act 2613 or Republic Act
3828.  For convenience, we reproduce the
penultimate paragraph of Section 87 (c), Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of
1948), as it was mended by said Republic Act 2613, which took effect on August 1, 1959, viz:

“Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and judges
of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance
to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by
law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six
years or fine not exceeding three thousand
pesos or both xxx.”

Upon the other hand, the
same particular provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948, amended by Republic Act
2613, was subsequently amended by Republic Act 3828 which took effect on June 22,
1963 and which
reads:

“Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and
sub-province and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offence committed within
their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousands
pesos or both, x x x.”

A
rule long respected is that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a
criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time
the action is instituted.^[3]  Since prosecution here was started on June 18, 1963 when Republic Act
2613 was in force, this law should be looked up to in ascertaining whether or
not respondent judge had jurisdiction to try the case.  By this statute, the
justice of the peace court in provincial capitals was empowered to hear and
determine cases where the penalty involved “does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both.” The charge is
direct assault upon a person in authority, encompassed in Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code.  The penalty provided
therein is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand
pesos.  Therefore, the Justice of the
Peace Court
of San Fernando, the capital of
La Union, has jurisdiction to try
this case.

2.  The lower court, however,
is of the impression that the
passage of Republic Act 3828 on June
22, 1963, i.e., four days after the criminal complaint was lodged
in court, operates to divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, of
jurisdiction, and place it in the Court of First Instance of the same province.^[4]
Because, so the court states, Republic Act 3828 limits jurisdiction of
municipal courts in provincial capitals and city courts only to crimes
“committed within their respective jurisdictions in which the
penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional
or fine not exceeding P6,000 or both”; and also when the justice of the
peace court goes beyond the
limits of the jurisdiction it possesses at the time of the trial, its actuation
may be questioned as the offense with which the petitioner is tried is no longer within the class of
crimes placed by law under its
jurisdiction.” This is incorrect. 
Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction
remains with the court until the case is
finally determined therein.  A
subsequent statute removing jurisdiction “will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached.”^[5]
This Court, as early as 1913, observed that “[i]t is a subversion of the judicial power to take a cause from a
court having jurisdiction before its final  decision is given.”^[6]  So it is, that in Iburan
vs. Labes, 87 Phil. 234, 238, we
declared that [w]here a court
originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be
overturned and impaired by any legislative enactment unless express prohibitory
words^[7]
are used, and jurisdiction duly acquired under an existing statute is not taken
away by a subsequent statute prescribing a different method of commencing an
action.”

We, accordingly, rule that passage of Republic Act 3828 did not
take away jurisdiction aver the case from the Municipal (Justice of the Peace)
Court of San Fernando, La Union.

3.  There is no point to the
argument that Republic Act 3828 is also penal in nature and, therefore, should be given retroactive effect, as it is favorable to the
accuse.  All that
petitioner could muster on this point is
that under the new law he would be afforded all opportunity for a preliminary
investigation in Naguilian.  There is not much to this argument.  The case has gone quite far in the San Fernando
court.  Except for possible delay, we
perceive no appreciable
advantage to petitioner.  The least that
can be said is that in a situation like the present, where hearing has already
started, it would not serve public interest any to upon the action, refile it in another court, discard the testimony already
recorded, and start the case a new.

And then, both laws, as is RA 296 which they amend, merely
delineate the jurisdiction of courts. 
They do not speak of facts or omissions punishable by law.  They do not define crimes nor provide
penalties therefore.  Penal statutes
refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for some violation or
transgression of some of their provisions.^[8]  Republic Act 3828 cannot have, as it did not
provide for, retroactive effectivity.

Accordingly, we reverse and set aside the order of the Court of
First Instance of La Union of October 8, 1964, dismiss the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, and direct that the Municipal Court of San
Fernando, La Union, continue with Criminal Case No. 4967 of said court until
final determination thereof.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Criminal Case 4987 of the Justice of the Peace Court of San Fernando, La Union,
entitled “The People of the Philippines, plaintiff,
vs. Dr. Porfirio Rilloraza,
accused.”

^[2]
Civil Case 1961 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, entitled Porfirio Rilloraza, petitioner, vs.
Judge Pedro Arciaga, in his capacity as Judge, Municipal
Court, San Fernando, La Union, and Eulalia Banayat, respondents.”

^[3]
People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715, 717; People vs.
Romualdo, 90 Phil.
739, 744; Ferrer vs. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172, 175; Paringit
vs. Masakayan L-16578, July 31, 1961; People vs.
Adolfo, L-24191, March 31,1965.

^[4]
See Section 44 (f), Judiciary Act of 1948.

^[5]
People vs. Pegarum, supra
at p. 717, citing
16 C.J., sec. 246, p.
181.

^[6]
Government vs. Gale, 24 Phil. 95, 100; emphasis supplied.

^[7]
No prohibitory words are employed in R.A. 3828.

^[8]
31 Words and Phrases, Perm. ed., p 589; 2 Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary Third revision, p.2551.