AUYONG HIAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

On motion of the Solicitor General urging the dismissal of the
appeal Ground:  The issues raised have become
moot and academic.

Following are the background facts:

On September 1, 1958,
the Republic started suit^[1]
against Auyong Hian in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to enforce collection of defendant’s
deficiency income taxes, itemized as follows:

On October 20, 1961,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.  This judgment was, however, set aside and the
hearing reopened by order of February 1, 1962.

After rehearing, the
trial court, on July 12, 1963, adjudged:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and again at the defendant, Auyong
Hian, and orders said defendant Auyong
Hian to pay to the plaintiff the amounts of P185,43, P6,148.83, P1,787.39, P569.98, P4,027.50 and
P147,519.00, plus sur­charges for delinquency equivalent to five percent (5%)
of the above amounts and one percent (1%) monthly interest from February
21, 1957, until fully paid.  With costs against the defendant.”

Two
motions for reconsideration
and/or new trial – the first dated July 24, 1963, and the other, October 30, 1963 – were rejected by orders of October 19, 1963 and December 2, 1963.

Auyong Hian appealed to
the Court of Appeals.

On
September 20, 1966, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, thus: 
“WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed in
toto with costs against the defendant-appellant.”

Auyong Hian sought to have the appellate court’s judgment reviewed on certiorari
by this Court.^[2] By resolution of this Court dated December
14, 1966, we dismissed his petition for lack of merit.  This dismissal became final and executory on March 31, 1967.

In the meantime, in the
Court of Tax Appeals, Auyong Hian,
on September 9, 1963, filed a “Petition for Review,”^[3] questioning the correctness of the very same assessments
for deficiency income taxes made by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
and subject of the litigation concluded as just stated. 
These assessments again are:

On December 2, 1963, respondent
Commissioner moved to dismiss the
petition, because: (1) the
Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction to take cog­nizance of the case as the 30-day
period within which to bring an appeal to said court had already lapsed; and (2) there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

On March 3,
1964, the Court of
Tax Appeals dismissed the case, as prayed for.

Reconsideration sought
was, on August 3, 1964, rejected.

The case at bar is a direct appeal from the dismissal
order of the Court of Tax Appeals.

Required by this Court to
comment on respondent’s motion to dismiss the present appeal, planted upon the
ground, as heretofore stated, that the issues raised have become moot and
academic, petitioner Auyong Hian
puts forth the argument that the prior decision definitely concluded in L-26790
does not consti­tute res judicata
to the present case.  This posture does
not deserve consideration.  And, the
appeal must be dismissed.  For, as
rightly suggested by the Solicitor General, it has, indeed, become moot and
academic.^[4]

Identity of subject matter between Civil Case 37371 and CTA Case
1449 is beyond debate.  Both involve assessments for deficiency
income taxes for the years 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 in the
aggregate sum of P160,233.13.  The trial court’s judgment in Civil Case
37371 finding for the plaintiff, was appealed to the
Court of Appeals.  It was affirmed in toto by said court. 
Not contented, appellant (petitioner herein) came to this Court on
appeal by certiorari.  His petition was
denied.  Implicit in that denial is this Court’s unqualified
approbation of the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
With the finality of this Court’s resolution dismissing the peti­tion
for certiorari, the question as to
the amount of the deficiency income taxes of Auyong Hian for the years 1946-1951 inclusive, became settled
matter.  The correctness of these
assessments may not now be inquired into. 
Because “[p]ublic policy and sound
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law”, and [t]he very object for which courts were instituted was
to put an end to controversies.”^[5]

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the appeal herein is hereby dismissed.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case
No. 37371 entitled “Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff vs.
Auyong Hian,
defendant.”

^[2]
Auyong Hian vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., L-26790.

^[3]
CTA Case No. 1449, “Auyong Hian, petitioner, vs. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondent.”

^[4]
In pari cansa:  General Offset Press Inc., Co. vs. Anatalio, L-20467 and L-20468, July 26, 1966. 
In this case, GOP filed a complaint for ejectment
against defendants in the
Municipal Court of Quezon City.  Judgment was rendered in its favor.  To
thwart immediate execution, defendants filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  Thereafter,
he appealed the municipal
court’s decision in the ejectment case also to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.  Again, GOP won on appeal.  Defendants then interposed an appeal to this Court.

While the ejectment
case was on appeal with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, defendants lodged
in the same court an action to quiet title over the same parcel of land, subject of the ejectment
suit.  It was dismissed.  Appeal from
this dismissal to the Court of Appeals was also dismissed, appellants’ brief having been filed out of
time.  A petition for certiorari
(L-25598) filed with this Court
suffered the same fate for having been registered out of time.  Dismissal
of the action to quiet title thus became final.

GOP then moved to dismiss the
appeal of the ejectment case to this Court Ground: It has become moot and
academic upon the finality of the order in
the action for quieting of title. 
We granted this motion and, on reconsideration, affirmed.  We there said:

“We find no
reason for reconsidering our resolution of April 20, 1966.  With the dismissal by this Court of G.R. No.
L-25598, the title and ownership
of GOP over the disputed property, as
against a similar claim thereto by the herein
appellants, became an established, settled
and incontestable fact.  Thus, the
one and sole issue raised by the same appellants in the appeal at bar is indeed now moot and academic.  To be
sure, no fair or useful purpose can be realized by either of the parties
hereto if the present appeal were still to be maintained.  For, if this Court were to allow appeal to
take its regular course and
decide the same on the merits in favor of the appellants, then it would have
caused the promulgation of two utterly conflicting decisions, namely: its resolution dismissing G.R. No. L-25598 and its decision on the merits finding the appellants the
real owners of the land in dispute. 
On the other hand, if this Court were to decide this appeal on the
merits in favor of the appellees, then exactly the
same result would have been realized as were this case to be dismissed, as we do dismiss it now. “

^[5]
Dy Cay vs. Crossfield
& O’Brien, 38 Phil. 521, 526.