G.R. No. L-25438. April 25, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF WILLIAM SAY CHONG HAI, WHOSE ALIASES ARE “WILLIAM FRANCISCO SAY”, “FRANCISCO T. SAY”, “FRANCISCO SAY Y TY”, “WM. FRANCISCO SAY CHONG HAI” AND “F…
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for naturalization,
the lower court, notwithstanding the admitted but unauthorized used of aliases
by applicant William Say Chong Hai
and his reliance on the testimony of two of his former professors in the San Beda College, came to the
conclusion that there was no bar to his acquisition of Philippine
citizenship. Accordingly, in the decision
of July 19, 1965, such petition was granted.
As perhaps could have been expected the obstacle to the
grant of citizenship being rather formidable in character, the government
appealed. The appeal must be sustained
and the judgment of the lower
court reversed.
1. The first error assigned by the Republic of
the Philippines would assail the failure of the lower court, the use by petitioner of aliases without judicial authority being undoubted, to deny
his petition for naturalization as under the circumstances he could not be
held as having conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner.
The brief for appellant would support its assignment of error
thus: “Petitioner uses several aliases interchangeably. Thus, in his Birth Certificate, Exhibit 9,
his name appears as Francisco William Say Chiang Hai
while in his Alien Certificate of Registration, his name appears as William Say
Chiong Hai Likewise,
petitioner also used the name of William Say Chiong Hai in his Immigration Certificate of Residence * * *
while in his Income Tax Returns for the years 1960, 1961 and 1962, * * *, he
used the name of Wm, Francisco Say Chiong Hai. In his
Residence Certificate A for the years 1960, 1961 and 1962 * * *, he used the
name of William Francisco Say and in the statement of assets, income and
liabilities he filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, he added the middle
name ‘Ty‘ to the name William Francisco Say Chiong Hai.”[1]
It was likewise set forth in such brief: “Petitioner
himself admitted in open court that most of the time he uses two names, William
Francisco Say, by which he is commonly known in the community, and William Say Chiong Hai, which he uses in
signing parcel posts * * *. He also
admitted that when signing papers in business transaction, he uses the name of
William Francisco Say Chiong Hai,
William Francisco Say and William Francisco Say interchangeably * * *.”[2]
As indicated above, the stand of the Republic of the Philippines
is unassailable. Such an error was
indeed committed. The decision was
rendered on July 19, 1965. This Court
made clear in a ruling on March 31 of that year, Ang
Tee Yee v. Republic,[3]
“that the unexplained and unauthorized use of an alias was sufficient to
deny a petition for naturalization.” As a matter of fact, in a 1962
decision,[4]
such a fact would indicate that the conduct of petitioner was not beyond
reproach and would therefore be a ground for the failure of his petition for
naturalization. An objection based on
such a ground was considered by us valid, again, in a decision rendered on June
21, 1965, barely a month before the lower court granted the petition for
naturalization.[5]
Petitioner, to whom such an act could be attributed, is thus deemed
“unworthy of Philippine citizenship.[6]
“On two occasions recently, we have reiterated the doctrine that such an
unlawful use of an alias suffices or warrants the denial of a petition for naturalization.[7]
It is thus clear that the lower court failed to exhibit
sufficient awareness of decisions that should be deemed controlling. Shortly before the appealed decision was
rendered, we did emphatically state in Cheng v. Republic,[8]
that the use of an alias without authorization is “fatal to the application
for naturalization. ” Less than a year ago, in Chan De v. Republic,[9]
we had occasion to employ the
same formulation when we considered the failure to mention the other names as “fatal to the proceedings.”
How would the brief for petitioner-appellee
seek to impart plausibility to what, as had been clearly shown above was an
erroneous appraisal of the state of the law by the lower court? It would rely on Rao
Bin Chiong v. Republic[10]
which it considered as speaking to the effect that the unauthorized use of
aliases by the applicant is merely a minor transgression, involving no moral turpitude or
wilful criminality, [and] cannot by itself obstruct
the grant of his application for naturalization, if he has all the necessary
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen.”[11]
What the brief for appellee fails to mention is that
since then from Yu Seco v. Republic[12]
to Chan De v. Republic,[13]
our decisions are impressive both as to
number and unanimity in pointing out, as already mentioned, the infirmity,
fatal in character, of the illegal or unauthorized use of an alias.[14]
2. The second assigned error is equally meritorious. The lower court did err in not finding that
the character witnesses presented by petitioner could not be considered as
credible persons within the meaning of the Naturalization Act.
As noted in the appellant’s brief: “Petitioner’s
character witnesses are not credible persons within the meaning of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Although both were
at one time or another petitioner’s professors or teachers at San Beda College, their acquaintance with petitioner was
limited to school activities and very little else. Their testimonies themselves are patently
insufficient because they fail to give details about petitioner’s life and
character to show how well they know him and why they believe him
to be qualified for Filipino citizenship.
Recaredo Enriquez testified that during the
time that he has known petitioner, he could not even remember the topics they
talked about, but may be ‘it was a common topic or just a small talk’ * * *. On the part of witness Zosimo
C. Ella, he admitted that his acquaintance with petitioner is more of the
relation between professor and student; their meeting had taken place only in
the classrooms * * *.”[15]
The lower court viewed the matter differently. Thus: “As to the other ground of the
opposition, the Court finds after examining the testimony of the character
witnesses of the petitioner that said witnesses have known the petitioner since
1946 when the petitioner was a primary student at San Beda
College, and their dealings with the petitioner extend through the high school
and college years of the petitioner both inside and outside of the school
activities. They therefore had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and character of the petitioner. Such being the case, the said witnesses are
competent persons to testify, as they did testify favorably, on the conduct and
reputation of the petitioner.”[16]
Here, again, the lower court failed to exhibit fidelity to
our controlling decisions, which, it must ever be borne in mind, should be
treated with the utmost respect and deference by inferior tribunals. As early as July 18, 1951, this Court, in an
opinion by Justice Tuason, relying on American
decisions of a persuasive character, stressed the importance of character
witnesses. Thus: “In the case of In
re Kornstain, 268 Fed. Rep. 182, the court expressed
the same idea and reasoned: ‘In naturalization petitions, the Courts are peculiarly at the mercy of the
witnesses offered by the candidate.
Such candidate takes care to see that only those who are friendly to
him, are offered as witnesses. The
Courts cannot be expected to
possess acquaintance with the candidates presenting themselves for naturalization-in
fact, no duty rests upon them in this particular; so that witnesses appearing before them are in a way insurers of the
character of the candidate concerned, and on their testimony the courts are of
necessity compelled to rely. A witness
who is incompetent renders an application void.
(United States v. Martorana, 171 Fed. 397, 96
C.C.A 353) A competent witness cannot be substituted for an incompetent
one. (United States v. Gulliksen, 244 Fed. 727, 157 C.C.A. 175.) The question of a
witness’ qualifications in naturalization proceedings is therefore a matter of
more than usual importance.'”[17] After setting forth the above, the opinion
stated that the above reasoning is “sound and reasonable and therefore we made it
“our own.”[18]
We went further in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic,[19]
a 1961 decision. Thus: “The law
requires that a
vouching witness should have actually known an applicant
for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him
the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a
vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the
character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity
compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent
and reliable. And he is only
competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had
the opportunity to observe
him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known
him. Such knowledge Flores did not
possess. He is, therefore, disqualified
to act as
character witness.”
It does not admit of doubt then
that to impute the utmost credence to testimony coming from character witnesses,
who were professors in the San Beda College, where
petitioner studied, would be to disregard the realities of the situation. Whatever may be said of the extent of
knowledge a
teacher or a professor may have of a student as such, even
if it be admitted that a certain degree of intimacy could have been assumed, it
cannot rise to that degree of certainty as to his possessing all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications that a court of justice must rely upon to be rightfully
possessed of that requisite confidence in the award of citizenship. Nor is this the only objection. It has been shown that the knowledge acquired
of petitioner dated only from 1946.
Again, the period required for the acquaintance that must exist for
such witnesses to be deemed credible was not present Had the lower court in
this instance, as in the first error assigned, been more exacting in its
appraisal of the testimony thus offered, it could not have fallen into this
error.[20]
More specifically, the
use of a tutor or professor as attesting witnesses had in at least three cases
been frowned upon by this Court because of the far from persuasive nature of
their testimony:[21] We do so again.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of July 19, 1965 by
the lower court is hereby reversed, with costs against petitioner-appellee.
Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave.
Barredo, J., on official leave.
[1]
Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
L-20305.
[4]
Wang I Fu v. Republic, 6 SCRA 93.
[5]
Go A Leng v. Republic, L-19836.
[6]
Chang v. Republic, 16 SCRA 718 (1966).
[7]
O Ku Phuan v. Republic, 20 SCRA 1219 (1967).
and Tan Khe Shing v.
Republic, 22 SCRA 896, (1968).
[8]
L-20013, March 30 1965.
[9]
23 SCRA 943 (1968).
[10]
L-13526, November 24, 1959.
[11]
Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, p. 8.
[12]
L-13441, June 30, 1960.
[13] 23 SCRA 943 (1968).
[14]
Cheng v. Republic, 107 Phil. 33 (1960); Lim Bun v. Republic, 1
SCRA 1054 (1961); Ng Liam Keng v. Republic, 1
SCRA 1210 (1961); Koa Gui v. Republic, 5 SCRA
679 (1962); Wang I Fu v. Republic, 6 SCRA 93 (1962); Ong
Khan v. Republic, L-19709, Sept. 30, 1964; Uy
Eng Hiok v. Republic, L-17118, Nov. 17,
1964; Cheng v. Republic, L-20013, March 30, 1965; Ang
Tee Yee v. Republic, L-20305, March 31, 1965; Pablo Lee v.
Republic, L-20148, April 30, 1965; Saw Cen v.
Republic, L-20310, April 30, 1965; Go A Leng v.
Republic, L-19836, June 21, 1965; Chiu Bok v.
Republic, L- 19111, June 22, 1965 Vy Tian v. Republic, L-19918, July 30, 1965; Tan v.
Republic, L-20287, July 30, 1965; Dy v. Republic,
L-20152, Feb. 28, 1966; Chang v. Republic, 16 SCRA 718 (1966); Ko Bok v. Republic, 16
SCRA 738 1966); Lee Tit v. Republic, 16 SCRA 735 1966); Kock Tee Yap v. Republic, 17 SCRA 1 (1966); Soglou v. Republic, 17 SCRA 184 (1966); Ong Hock Lian v. Republic,
17 SCRA 188(1966); Chan v. Republic, 17 SCRA 474 (1966); Lim v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 424 (1966); Cosme Go Tian An v. Republic,17 SCRA 1053 (1966); Dy Bu Si v. Republic, 18
SCRA 580 (1966); Tee Viw v. Republic, 18 SCRA
696 (1966); Dy v. Republic, 18 SCRA 858 1966);
Chua Tek v. Republic, 19 SCRA 719 1967 ; Wong Chui v. Republic, 19 SCRA
805 1967 ; Tan Chua v. Republic, 19 SCRA 797 (1967); O Kee Phuan v. Republic, 20
SCRA 1219 (1967); Tan Sen v. Republic, 21 SCRA
,478 (1967); Ho Ngo v. Republic, 21 SCRA 967 (1967); Tan Khe Shing v. Republic, 22
SCRA 896 (1968); Chua Uan v. Republic,
L-20952, May 22, 1968.
[15]
Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6.
[16]
Record on Appeal, p. 44.
[17]
Cu v. Republic, 89 Phil.
473, 478.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
1 SCRA 622, 624.
[20]
Cf. Lim Ching Tian v.
Republic, 1 SCRA 622 (1961); Ng Liam Keng v.
Republic, 1 SCRA 1210 (1961); Que Choc Gui v. Republic, 3 SCRA 194 (1961); Chua Pun v.
Republic, 3 SCRA 652 (1961); Uy v); Republic, 5 SCRA
114 (1962); Yan Hang v. Republic, 5 SCRA 185
(1962); loo Yuen Tsi v.
Republic, 5 SCRA 407 (1962); Sy Peñero
v. Republic, 6 SCRA 322 (1962); Go v. Republic, 6 SCRA 364
(1962); People v. Susukan, 6 SCRA 545 (1962); Uy Chin Hua v. Republic, 6
SCRA 675 (1962); Yu Kiu Tian
v. Republic, 6 SCRA 770 (1962); Serwani (Nanki Hiranand) v.
Republic, L-18219, Dec. 27, 1963; Uy Tian It (Peter Uy Lorenzo) v.
Republic, L-18248, Dec. 27, 1963; Kwan Kwock Haw v.
Republic, L-18521, Jan. 30, 1964; Albert Ong Lin
Chuan v. Republic, L-18550, Feb. 28, 1964; Koh
Chet v. Republic, L-17223, June 30, 1964; Paul Teh
v. Republic, L-19830, Sept. 30, 1964; Pedro T. Uy
v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Uy Ching Ho v. Republic, L-19582, March 26, 1965; Vy Tian v. Republic,
L-19918, July 30, 1965; Lim Cho Kuan
v. Republic, 16 SCRA 21 (1966); Yu An Kiang v. Republic, 16 SCRA
129 (1966); Ko Bok v.
Republic, 16 SCRA 738 (1966); Yap v. Republic, 17 SCRA 8 (1966); Chin
Hong v. Republic, 17 SCRA 220 (1966); Aug Dit Kue v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 385 (1966);-Lim v. Republic, 17 SCR& 424 (1966) ;
King v. Republic, 18 SCRA 179 1966 ; Tae Viw v.
Republic, 18 SCRA 696 1966 ; Wong Chui v. Republic, 19 SCRA 805 (1967 ;
Yap v. Republic, 20 SCRA 19 (1967); 0 Ku Phuan
v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1219 (1967); Hao Guan Seng v. Republic, 21 SCRA 75 (1967); Joo King Yog v. Republic,
22 SCRA 515 (1968); Chan De v. Republic, 23 SCRA 943 (1968).
[21]
Ong Ling Chuan v. Republic, L-18550,
February 28, 1964; Wong Chi v. Republic, 19 SCRA 805 (1967); Yap v. Republic, 20 SCRA 19
(1967).