G.R. No. L-26789. April 25, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DICTO ARPA AND MAALUM ARPA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Automatic review by this Court of the death penalty imposed by
the trial court on the accused for the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide.
In the information filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao, the accused, Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, was charged with the crime of Robbery with Triple
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 9694); alleged to have been committed as follows:
“That on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having boarded a motor banca named “MAMI I”, owned by Epimaco Mola, together with other
passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca
was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, the accused,
conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to steal the motor banca and by means of intimidation, the accused Dicto Arpa firing his .22 cal.
revolver to scare
the passengers of the banca, and fired at one
of the passengers, hitting the said passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and carried away
the said motor banca “MAMI I”, belonging to
the said Epimaco Mola,
valued at P2,100.00, to the damage and prejudice of the above-named owner in
the aforementioned amount of P2,100.00, and as a result of the jumping into the
sea of all the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso
Ville-gas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas, all passengers of the motor
banca were drowned and died.”
On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the
accused, through their counsel de oficio,
Atty. Bernardino Bolcan, Jr., manifested their desire
to plead guilty only as to the fact of “the killing of one of the persons
mentioned in the information,”[1]
denying the killing of the two other persons.
The fiscal, however, manifested that the State could not agree to the accused’s offer to plead guilty to only one homicide, since
“the two other persons were lost on the same occasion, . . because of the incident. They jumped overboard after the firing at one
of the victims, . .”[2]
The trial judge, Hon. Manses G. Reyes, accordingly did not accept the plea and
reset the arraignment for the next day, informing the accused that as the
prosecution was not agreeable to their qualified plea, they would have to enter
into trial.
When the case was called on the following day, the information
was read to the accused in the dialect they understood, and both accused
pleaded guilty, their counsel de oficio
invoking, in their favor two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
The fiscal objected to the appreciation of the latter circumstance,
remonstrating that “there could be no lack of intent when they immediately
fired at one of the victims point blank with a pistol, that is fatal.”[3]
The case was submitted and the trial court rendered thereafter
on March 11, 1966, its
decision, crediting the accused with the mitigating circumstance of their
voluntary plea of guilty, but rejecting the claimed mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, in view of “the nature and
gravity of the offense committed.”
The trial court further found two aggravating circumstances against the
accused, as follows:
“A
perusal of the information reveals the following allegations in the
information:
“X X X X X and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed
engine trouble. x x“
These allegations
to the mind of the Court constitute two aggravating circumstances. The first underlined portion constitutes the
aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in an uninhabited
place. (People vs. Rubia,
52 Phil. 172). And the second
constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime is committed on the
occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or
misfortune.
The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the
middle of the sea is a misfortune which tends to create confusions and
apprehensions of the passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime at such a time
the accused manifested greater perversity and instead of rendering help increased their
affliction by taking advantage of the said misfortune.
As it is, therefore, the accused in the commission of this crime
has one mitigating circumstance in their favor and two aggravating circumstances
against them, and offsetting one another there is still remaining one aggravating
circumstance against the accused.”[4]
Consequently, the trial court sentenced
each of the accused to the penalty of death and ordered both of them, jointly
and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas,
Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P6,000.00 for each of
them, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the
penalty imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola in the sum ofP2,100.00, and to pay the costs
proportionately.
For purposes of this review, Atty. Antonio L. Africa was
appointed counsel de oficio for the
accused, upon the latter’s request for such counsel. Said Counsel urges the reversal of the death sentence, and
the Solicitor-General recommends the affirmance
thereof Counsel for the accused in a well-prepared brief, assigns the following errors: –
“I. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ROBBERY WITH TRIPLE HOMICIDE.
“II. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINHABITED PLACE AND ON THE OCCASION OF A MISFORTUNE.
“III. THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED.
“IV. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.”
The accused, having voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information
come under the firmly settled doctrine of being deemed to have admitted all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances therein alleged.[5]
The first error assigned that “if the original criminal
design does not clearly comprehend homicide, (in view of the allegations in the
information that the accused’s intent was to steal
the motor banca and that accused Dicto
Arpa fired his 22 cal. revolver to scare the
passengers of the banca), but homicide follows the
robbery as an incident of the latter, the criminal acts should be viewed as
constitutive of two offenses, and not as a single special offense (of robbery
with homicide)”[6]
is without merit. Article 294, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the special, single and indivisible
crime of robbery with homicide with the use of violence against, or
intimidation of any person, imposes one distinct penalty of reclusion perpetua to death “when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.” In the
case of People vs. Mangulabnan et al,[7] this Court painted out that the
“English version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing
Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:
“1.º Con la pena de
reclusion perpetua a muerte,
cuando con motivo o’ con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.”
“We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence
of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would
result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November
26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and
259-260, respectively). This High
Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to
the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907;
April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be
taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-504).”
In that case, one of the two unidentified
co-participants of the appellant Mangulabnan climbed
up a table and fired at the ceiling, which was conceded to be “an unpremeditated act that
surged on the spur Of the moment and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein” that resulted in the
killing of said Vicente Pacson, but said appellant
having been shown to have participated in the criminal design to commit the
robbery with his co-defendants was held guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. Here, upon the accused
carrying out their criminal design to steal the motor banca,
one of them, Dicto Arpa,
started firing his revolver to scare the passengers and fired directly at one
of the passengers, hitting him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the
three passengers jumped into the sea and met their death by drowning. Even if we were to concede appellants’
contention that their original criminal design did not clearly comprehend
homicide, and that homicide followed the robbery “as an incident of the
latter”, still the deaths clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery and the trial court therefore correctly found them guilty of the
crime of robbery with triple homicide.
The remaining errors assigned concern the trial court’s appreciation and finding of two
aggravating circumstances as against one mitigating circumstance of a voluntary
plea of guilty in the commission of the crime and the mandatory imposition, as
a consequence, of the penalty of death.
We hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime
committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place. The accused, in having boarded at
Davao City the motor banca,
together, with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao,
and carrying out their criminal design of stealing the said motor banca, once it was in the middle of the sea and when it
developed engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver shots in order to
forestall any resistance, certainly cannot disclaim that they sought the
isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective without interference. As held by this Court in People vs. Rubia,[8]
the aggravating circumstance of the crime of homicide having been committed
in an uninhabited place must be considered, where the deed was committed at
sea, where it was difficult for the offended party to receive any help, while
the assailants could easily have escaped punishment, and the purely accidental
circumstance that another banca carrying the
eyewitnesses to the crime was also at sea in the vicinity at the time without
the assailants’ knowledge is no argument against the appreciation of said
circumstance.
We hold, however, against the trial court’s finding of a second
aggravating circumstance in that the crime was committed “on the occasion
of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or
misfortune.”[9]
In so holding, the trial Court reasoned:
“The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the
middle of the sea is a misfortune which tends to create confusions and
apprehensions of the passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime at such a time
the accused manifested greater perversity and instead of rendering help
increased their affliction by taking advantage of the said misfortune.”
(Decision, p. 3).
The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it
does not come within the context of the phrase “other calamity or
misfortune” as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code,
which refer to other conditions of distress
similar to those precedingly enumerated therein,
namely, “conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic”, such as the
chaotic conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the Philippines
during the last World War. The reason
for the provision of this aggravating circumstance “is found in the
debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity,
instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking
advantage of their misfortune to despoil them.”[10]
Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed when the
motor banca developed engine trouble.
It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever
to indicate that the engine trouble developed was a serious one such as to
create confusion and apprehension on the part of the passengers as perceived by
the trial court, and that the sane was not easily repaired; if at all, the indications are to the
contrary, for as alleged in the information, the accused succeeded in stealing
the motor banca at sea.
We hold also against the accused’s
claim of a second mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong. The trial court correctly held
that this circumstance could not, properly be appreciated in favor of the
accused “viewed from the nature and gravity of the offense
committed.” As previously pointed out by this Court in the case of People
vs. Boyles,[11]
the true nature of this circumstance “addresses itself to the intention of
the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal
act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under review
the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the resistance offered by the victim, was
compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with homicide, the plea of
lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted.” In the present case, the accused
embarked on their most reprehensible criminal design of pirating a motor banca at sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers
notwithstanding the lack of indications of any resistance, thus forcing them
to jump overboard in a desperate act of self-preservation only to be swallowed
by the sea. The accused cannot now
disclaim their lack of criminal intent and responsibility for the direct,
logical and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.
As thus established, therefore, the crime committed was Robbery
with Triple Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of the same
having been committed in an uninhabited place which is offset by the accused’s voluntary plea of guilty, and the proper
imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. (Article 294, paragraph 1 in relation to
Article 63, Revised Penal Code). The
compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of the victims should properly be
increased to P12,000.00. (People vs. Pantoja, G. R. L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968).
It may be noted that even if the accused were to be granted the
additional claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of intent, the said
imposable penalty would still be the same.[12] The question of the fact of death of
the two other passengers, since the
accused deny knowledge of the fact of their death, as their counsel in
the lower court claimed that there was no showing of such fact,[13]
although both counsels in this Court as well as in the lower court do not
dispute the “judicial admission by the accused appellants of the fact of
killing (death) of one of the persons named in the information”[14]
would not affect the nature of the single and indivisible crime of Robbery with
Homicide committed by the accused nor the proper imposable penalty as herein
established, since all the homicides perpetrated by reason or occasion of the
robbery are merged in the composite, integrated whole that constitutes the
crime of robbery with homicide.[15]
Nevertheless, we feel constrained to add that in reviewing the
records of the case, we were struck with the paucity of facts and evidence
attending the commission of the crime other than those stated in the
information and other circumstances that would aid the Court in its ordained
task of passing en consulta upon the
legality and propriety of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, e. g.
the age and education or lack thereof of the accused, and whether there were
other passengers who survived, aside from the three persons named in the
information as having drowned, as well as what the crew did, if anything, during the commission of
the crime. Were it not for the
conclusion here reached of imposing .the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the
additional aggravating circumstance of calamity or misfortune found by the
trial court, we might have been constrained to remand the case for new trial to
the court a quo in order to satisfy ourselves as to the degree of
culpability of the accused in relation to the death penalty imposed, especially
since the information did not expressly designate as such the aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court and there was no discussion nor spelling
out thereof whatever in the eight-page transcript of the entire
proceedings. We therefore reiterate the
rule of practice recommended since the early cases of U.
S. vs. Talbanos[16]
and U. S. vs. Rota,[17]
set out in Rule 118, section 5 of the Rules of Court,[18] and thereafter suggested in number of
cases, lastly, in the case of
People vs. Bulalake,[19]
where this Court said:
“It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a
matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of
conviction imposing the extreme penalty of death are subject to review by the
Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic review neither
the Court nor the accused could waive or evade it would seem that the proper
and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a plea of ‘guilty’ to
capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person with little or no
education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but
to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of
his plea.”
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the
accused are imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas, in the amount of
P12,000.00 for each of them, and
Epimaco Mola in the sum of
P2,100.00, and proportionately, to pay the costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ.,
took no part.
[1]
Transcript, p. 3
[2]
Id., p. 4
[3]
Id., p. 7
[4]
Decision, pp. 2-3.
[5]
People vs. Boyles, G. R. L-15308, May 29, 1964 and cases cited.
[6]
Appellants’ Brief, pp. 3-4; notes in parentheses supplied.
[7]
99 Phil. 992, 998-999.
[8]
52 Phil. 172, 175.
[9]
Decision, p. 3; Art. 14, par. 7, Revised Penal Code.
[10]
U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150, 157.
[11]
G. R L-15308, May 29, 1964.
[12]
Art. 63, Pars. 3 and 4, Rev. Penal Code.
[13]
Transcript, p. 4.
[14]
Brief for the Accused, p. 9.
[15]
People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1.
[16]
6 Phil. 541 (Oct. 29, 1906).
[17]
9- Phil. 426 (Dec. 22, 1907).
[18]
SEC. 5. Plea
of guilty — Determination of punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a
complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as
to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine
what punishment shall be imposed.
[19]
106 Phi. 767, 770 (Dec. 29, 1959).