G.R. No. L-23465. October 31, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CASTO ALEJANDRINO ALIAS “TORRES” ALIAS “GUAN YEK” ALIAS “GY” ALIAS “G.I” ALIAS “TATANG”, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 31, 1979 SECOND DIVISION FERNANDO, C.J.:
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FERNANDO, C.J.:


A decision by the then lower court Judge Conrado
V. Vasquez, subsequently a Justice of the Court of Appeals, now retired,
convicting Casto Alejandrino
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act,[1]
is assailed in this appeal.  The
principal contention is that such a statute is unconstitutional for being violative of the ex post facto and freedom of speech and assembly
guarantees.  Our decision in People v. Ferrer[2] upholding its validity had foreclosed that question. 
The last two errors assigned in the appeal deal with the alleged failure
of the evidence to demonstrate the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.  A careful scrutiny of the
decision as well as the records of the case easily reveals the weakness of such a submission, the evidence being more than
sufficient to demonstrate the culpability of appellant.  Affirmance is thus indicated.

The facts may be culled from the well-written decision of the
then Judge Vasquez:  “The evidence
presented in this case consisted almost wholly of that presented by the
prosecution.  After the prosecution
rested, the accused waived the presentation of any testimonial evidence in his
behalf, and rested the case upon presentation and admission of Exhibits 1 to 6.  The inquiry in this case becomes, therefore,
a determination of whether or not the prosecution has complied with the
two-witness rule requirement for conviction of the accused for the offenses
with which he is charged in the above quoted information.  Insofar as the membership of the accused in the Communist Party of the Philippines
is concerned, the record contains an express admission by the accused of such
membership.  In one of the hearings of
this case held on February 15, 1962,
the accused asked the Court’s permission to read a written petition for
postponement which he was allowed to do. 
The written petition was then submitted and made a part of the
record.  Although the accused refused to
sign the same, it was marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution and adopted as
Exhibit 2 for the defense.  It reads in part:  ‘I am asking for the postponement of the
trial until after the Supreme Court renders decision on the constitutionality
of Republic Act 1700.  If the Act is
voided the case is dismissed.  On the
other hand, if the constitutionality of Republic Act 1700 is upheld then all
that this court had to do is pass judgment because I am not denying my membership
in my Party which this Court could interpret as the same party that is
outlawed by Republic Act 1700
.  In
either case, all concerned will be saved the trouble of a long trial.’ * * * It
could thus be seen from the above document presented by the accused himself
that he admits his membership in the party which was outlawed by Republic Act. No. 1700.  Consider­ing
that this manifestation was made on February
15, 1962, it also constitutes an admission that such membership was
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1700, which
was approved on June 20, 1957.  Said membership was also shown by the
testimonies of a host of witnesses presented by the prosecution.  The overt acts committed by the accused on
which at least two witnesses of the prosecution testified to are the
following:  (1) The conference of the Huks at Telabastagan, a barrio
near Angeles, Pampanga in the first week of March,
1958; (2) the armed encounter between government troops and the dissident group
headed by the accused in the same place in the last week of March, 1958; and
(3) the conference of the Huks held in barrio Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
in mid-November of 1957.  The conference
of the Huks in the sugarcane fields at Telabastagan in the first week of March, 1958 was testified
to by prosecution witnesses Ricardo Mendoza, Juan Singian,
Melencio Guevarra and Exequiel Santiago. 
They testified that they were in group of Huks
that stayed at barrio Telabastagan; that in the first
week of March, 1958, a conference was held thereat; that present in the
conference were the accused who presided the same, Pedro Taruc,
Linda Bie, Davidson, Sumulong,
Ignacio Dabu, and others; that the conference lasted
three or four days; and that these witnesses acted as guards around the place
where the conference was held.  The
conference at Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, in November of 1957, was testified to by
prosecution witnesses [Lazaro] Esteban and Rufino [Aquesa] who both declared
that they were former Huks; that they were assigned
as security guards in the conference held at Biak-na-Bato
in November, 1957; that present in the conference were [Casto]
Alejandrino, Pedro Taruc,
Linda Bie, Davidson, and others; and that the
conference lasted about two days.  The
encounter between the Huks and government forces at Telabastagan in the last week of March, 1958 had been
testified to by prosecution witnesses Ricardo Mendoza, Juan Singian,
Melencio Guevarra and Exequiel Santiago. 
They similarly declared that the accused led one of the groups of Huks that participated in that encounter that the exchange
of shots with government troops lasted for about thirty minutes; that the
accused carried two firearms on that occasion, namely, an automatic carbine and
a German Luger pistol which he used in firing in the
direction of the government forces; and that the accused exhorted his men to
fight.”[3]

As noted at the outset, the judgment appealed from must be
affirmed.

1.     
There is no need to discuss anew
the question of the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.  The very extensive opinion of the late Chief
Justice Castro, both when the case was first decided and subsequently in the
motion for reconsideration, had explained in detail why such a statute is not
susceptible to the reproach of its being violative of
the constitutional guarantees of prohibiting an ex post facto
legislation as well as the respect to be accorded freedom of expression and
freedom of peaceable assembly.  While the
writer of this opinion dissented from the decision of the Court, it must be
respected, constituting as it does the express and manifest will of this
Tribunal.
[4]

2. Nor is there any substance to the allegation in the last two
errors that the two-witness rule was violated. 
As was pointed out in the able decision of the then Judge Vasquez, the
conference of the Huks at Telabastagan,
a barrio near Angeles, Pampanga, in the first week of
March, 1958 was testified to by prosecution witnesses Ricardo Mendoza,[5]
Juan Singian,[6]
Melencio Guevarra[7] and Exequiel
Santiago.[8]
Equally so, two witnesses, Lazaro Esteban[9]
and Rufino Aqueza,[10]
who admitted that they were former Huks declared that
they were assigned as security guards in the conference held at Biak-na-Bato in
November, 1957 and that appellant Casto Alejandrino was among those present at such
conference.  It lasted about two
days.  As far as the encounter between
the Huks and the government forces at Telabastagan in the last week of March, 1958 is concerned,
the evidence of record discloses the testimony of prosecution witnesses Ricardo
Mendoza,[11]
Juan Singian,[12]
Melencio Guevarra[13]
and Exequiel Santiago.[14]
There is, therefore, proof, to quote from the decision “that the accused
led one of the groups of Huks that participated in
that encounter that the exchange of shots with troops lasted for about thirty
minutes; that the accused carried two firearms on that occasion, namely, an
automatic carbine and a German Luger pistol which he
used in firing in the direction of the government forces; and that the accused
exhorted his men to fight.”[15]

3. The futility of this appeal is thus obvious.  The well-written opinion of the then Judge
Vasquez cannot be assailed for having been erroneous in any respect.  With the refusal of appellant to present
testimony on his behalf, the case had to be decided on the evidence supplied by
the prosecution.  The outcome was
therefore predictable.  The testimony
thus offered sufficed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The stage of moral certainty was
reached.  The constitutional presumption
of innocence had been overcome.  It bears
repeating that this Court, in the language of People v. Mahinay,[16]
“has consistently adhered to the doctrine of according respect to findings
of fact of the trial judge, unless it could be shown that a fact or
circumstance has been overlooked or has
been misinterpreted.”
[17] Certainly then, there is no basis for
overturning the decision of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.  With costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion,
Jr., Santos, and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.


[1]
Republic Act No. 1700 (1957).

[2]
L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA
382.

[3]
Decision, Appendix to Record on Appeal,
99-103.

[4]
The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 30, 1974 as reported in 56 SCRA 793.  The writer of this opinion dissented
anew.  Cf. Lava v. Judge de Veyra, L-23761, September 4, 1979.  As pointed out in the concurring opinion of
Justice Teehankee in this case, when the motion for
reconsideration was denied, he filed a concurring and dissent­ing opinion.

[5]
T.s.n., Session of January 26, 1961, 9.

[6]
Ibid, Session of February 23,
1961, 9-10.

[7]
Ibid, Session of March 23, 1962,
4.

[8]
Ibid, Session of July 27, 1962,
19-20.

[9]
Ibid, Session of August 24,
1962, 8-9.

[10]
Ibid, Session of September 28,
1962, 5-6.

[11]
Ibid, Session of January 26, 1961, 9-10.

[12]
Ibid, Session of February 23, 1961, 10-12.

[13]
Ibid, Session of March 23, 1962, 5.

[14]
Ibid, Session of July 27, 1962,
19-21.

[15]
Decision, Appendix to
Record on Appeal, 103.

[16]
L-31654, November 22, 1977, 80 SCRA 273.

[17]
Ibid, 276. 
The following cases were cited:  United
States v. Losada,
18 Phil. 90 (1910); People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927); People v.
Cristobal, 110 Phil. 741 (1961); People v. Angcap, L-28748, Feb.
29, 1972, 43 SCRA 437; People v. Carandang,
L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 72
SCRA 259.  Cf. People v. Macaraeg, L-32806, Oct. 23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285; People v.
Cudalina, L-34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499;
People v. De la Victoria, L-30037, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 400; People v.
Ordonio, L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v.
Sarile, L-37148, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v.
Berame, L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184; People, v.
Alonso, L-32163, Oct. 19, 1976, 73 SCRA 483; People v. Velasco, L-31920,
Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 574.