THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF AGUSAN, AND FELIX M. ZAMAR, SR., AS PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF AGUSAN, PETITIONERS, VS. PASTOR D. AGO AND HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF F…

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prohibition, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
dismissing the appeal in Special Case No. 60 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan entitled: 
“Pastor D. Ago, petitioner, versus Felix G. Martinez, et
al., respondents”, for having been filed out of time.

The record of the case discloses that on September 29, 1958
herein private respondent Pastor D. Ago filed a petition for injunction with
preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
to restrain the Provincial Board of the Province of Agusan
from conducting another public sale of the lot formerly used for the official
residence of the Provincial Governor of Agusan for
the reason that he had acquired a vested right over the lot by virtue of the
approval and acceptance of his bid by the Provincial Board of Agusan on July 28, 1958.^[1]

On October 10, 1958,
the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed an answer to
the petition disputing the claim of Ago.^[2]

On August 14, 1964,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts^[3]
and upon their motion,^[4]
the respondent Judge rendered a decision on November 6, 1967, based upon the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties.^[5]

The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the decision on November 8, 1967^[6]
and, not satisfied with the verdict, it being adverse to the Provincial Board,
he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision on November 18, 1967,
stating as grounds therefor that:

“1.  Said decision
failed to consider the condition stipulated in the ‘Advertisement for Rebidding‘; and

“2.  That the petitioner failed to exhaust
all administrative remedies.”^[7]

The motion for reconsideration was denied on Dec­ember 12, 1967.^[8]
The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the order of denial on the following
day.^[9]
Thereupon, he filed a notice of appeal on December 28, 1967,^[10]
and on December 27, 1967, he requested an extension of time of thirty
(30) days from January 5, 1968 within which to deposit the appeal bond and
to submit the record on appeal.^[11] On January 3, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal deposited the appeal
bond^[12] and submitted the record on appeal.^[13] On July 22, 1968, Pastor Ago filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the appeal was not filed within the reglementary period.^[14]
The motion was opposed by the Provincial
Fiscal.^[15]

On July 26, 1968,
the respondent Judge dismissed the appeal as prayed for.^[16]
Whereupon, the Provincial Fiscal filed the instant petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prohibition, to annul and set aside the order of the
respondent Judge dismissing the appeal.

The petitioners claim that their appeal was perfected within the reglementary period because the motion for recon­sideration
of the decision filed on November 8,
1967 suspended the period for perfecting an appeal. ^[17]

The respondents, upon the other hand, maintain that the appeal
was filed late because the motion for reconside­ration is a pro forma motion and did not suspend the running of the period for
appeal.

The petition is without merit. 
The motion for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners on November 18, 1967 reads, as follows:

“MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

“COME NOW the defendants, Provincial Treasurer and Provincial
Board of Agusan thru the undersigned Provincial
Fiscal of Agusan and to this Honorable Court most
respectfully move for a reconsideration of the decision of this Honorable Court
dated November 6, 1967 based on the follow­ing grounds:

1.         
Said decision failed to consider
the condition stipulated in the “Advertisement for Rebidding”
(Annex “A”);

2.         
That the petitioner failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies.

ARGUMENTS:

“1.  SAID DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
CONDITION STIPULATED IN THE “ADVERTISEMENT FOR REBIDDING”. –

One of the conditions imposed in the “Advertisement for Rebidding” (Annex “A”) reads as follows:

“The right is reserved to reject any/or all bids, to waive any
informality therein or to accept the bid as may be most advantageous to the
government.”

which condition is likewise incorporated in
Sub­paragraph (d) of paragraph 11 of the Stipulation of Facts dated August 14, 1967.

“When the petitioner participated as a bidder and submitted
his bid, he is presumed to have agreed to such a condition imposed in the
advertisement for rebidding.

“The petitioner was granted a period of three (3) days from
receipt of the demand letter of the Provincial Board within which to tender
payment, but he failed to do so.  (par. 6
& 7, Stipulation of Facts).  Respondent
Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 470, Series of 1958 wherein the petitioner
was again granted another ten (10) days grace within which to tender full payment
of the purchase price otherwise his award will be considered revoked, but the
petitioner failed again to pay the amount of his bid (par. 7 & 8,
Stipulation of Facts).

“Such failure of the petitioner to tender full payment of the
price of his bid is a sufficient justification for the respondent Provincial
Board to revoke the award based on the foregoing condition imposed in the
Advertisement for Rebidding wherein the Respondent
Provincial Board has reserved the right to reject any/or all bids, to waive any
informality therein or to accept the bid as may be most advantageous to the
government.

“2. 
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: –

Before decisions of administrative bodies can be brought to the
courts for review, all administrative remedies must first be exhausted:

“We agree with counsel for the defendant (should be
respondent) that before resorting to take court action, plaintiff should have
exhausted all his administrative
remedies.  When the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the decision of the Director of the
Fish and Game Administration, Bureau of Science (now Bureau of Forestry), he
should have appealed to the President of the Philippines, who has control over
the official actions and decisions of all subordinate officers in the Executive
Department (Philippine Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10 (1).”… (DIMAISIP
VS. THE SEC. OF AGRICULTURE
& NATURAL RESOURCES, CA-G.R. No. 16306, July 31, 1957.)

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectully
prayed that this Honorable Court recon­sider its decision, dated November 6, 1967 declaring

“1. The award given to the petitioner as revoked or rejected
by Board Resolution No. 470, Series of 1968 (Annex “C”);

2. The right and authority of respondents to re-advertise the
property in litigation for another public bidding; and

3. For other remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and
proper in the premises.

Butuan
City, November 16, 1967.”^[18]

As will be seen, the herein petitioners did not point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the testimonial or docu­mentary evidence or to the provisions of
law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions as required under
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, but merely pointed out what the trial
court had allegedly failed to consider in arriving at its judgment.  This Court has ruled in many instances that motions for new trial (motion
for reconside­ration) on the ground that the judgment is contrary to law,
without pointing out the supposed defects as required under Section 2 of Rule
37 are pro forma and do not interrupt the running of the period for the
perfection of appeals.^[19] It results that the motion for
reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners is a pro forma motion.

Considering that the herein petitioners received a copy of the
decision of the trial court on November 8, 1967, and filed their notice of
appeal on December 28, 1967, after the lapse of fifty (50) days; and their
appeal bond and record on appeal on January 3, 1968, after the lapse of
fifty-six (56) days, their appeal was not perfected within the period
prescribed by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Santos, and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, (Chairman), concur on the sole ground that the appeal bond was
not filed on time.

Aquino, J., concur in the result. From December 13, 1967, when the provincial fiscal received a copy of the
order denying his motion for reconsideration, he had twenty days (the remainder
of the thirty-day reglementary period) within which
to perfect his appeal. That means that the deadline for the perfection of the
appeal was January 2, 1968.

The
appeal bond was filed on January 3, 1968. It was one day late. The motion
for the extension of the time within which to file the appeal bond was out of
order. The period for filing the appeal bond cannot be extended. Hence, the
petitioner’s appeal was not perfected within the reglementary
period (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 74 Phil. 235).

^[1]
Rollo, p. 27.

^[2]
Id., p. 31.

^[3]
Id., p. 36.

^[4]
Id., p. 39.

^[5]
Id., p. 40.

^[6]
Id., p. 70.

^[7]
Id., p. 52.

^[8]
Id., p. 56.

^[9]
Id., p. 58.

^[10]
Id., p. 57.

^[11]
Id., p. 58.

^[12]
Id., p. 61.

^[13]
Id., p. 62.

^[14]
Id., p. 63.

^[15]
Id., p. 70.

^[16]
Id., p. 76.

^[17]
Id., p. 85.

^[18]
pp. 52-53, rollo.

^[19]
Dineros vs. Roque, G.R. No.
L-38837, February 27, 1979, and other
cases cited therein.

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