G.R. No. L-12624. May 25, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. GANTANG KASIM, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., BONDSMAN AND APPELLEE.
PARAS, C.J.:
First Instance of Cotabato charging Gantang Kasim, Lanao Moro and
Talodsuk Hadji, Makamad with the crime of theft of large cattle. When
the case was called for hearing on June 8, 1956, the court was informed
by defense counsel Atty. Mama Sinsuat that accused Lanao Moro could not
be located. On motion by the fiscal, the trial court issued an order of
confiscation of the bond filed by the said accused and the Luzon Surety
Co., Inc., and said Company was given thirty days within which to
produce the body of the accused and to explain why judgment against the
bond should not be rendered.
On three occasions, the Surety Company asked for, and was granted,
postponements to enable it to produce the body of the accused. On
October 25, 1956, it filed a motion conceding partial confiscation of
the bond to the amount of P1,000, and asked the court a quo
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The motion was granted, and an
order was made directing the bonding company to pay to the government
the sum of P1,000 as partial liability under the bond. The warrant of
arrest was likewise issued.
The present appeal is on the question whether or not the trial court
has authority to relieve the bonding company from a part of its P4,000
liability under the bail bond by ordering a mere partial (P1,000)
confiscation of the bond, even though the body of its principal has not
been surrendered to the court, and despite several extensions of time
granted said company to produce him.
The reasons for the non-production of the accused in court were allegedly:
- That he had transferred his residence from Dinaig, Cotabato to Dansalan, Lanao, without notifying the bondsman;
- That
he had gone into hiding in Paualas, Ganasi, Lanao, a place allegedly
reputed to be a sanctuary for Moro criminals and bandits.
It is to be noted that all these reasons were based on information
received by the bonding company from the defense counsel. It is natural
that said counsel will try to protect the best interests of his client.
The bonding company has no first-hand knowledge of the whereabouts of
the accused. His production in court would not have been impossible had
the bonding company itself diligently performed its duty. Right at the
start, when the accused was not present in court during the first
hearing, the company should have adopted some course of action to
insure his appearance at the next hearing instead of merely relying on
information furnished by the defense counsel. Indeed, it should have
been more earnest and conscientious in the performance of its
obligation.
It is the bonding company’s responsibility to produce the accused
before the court whenever required. Failure to so produce is
indisputably a complete breach of the guaranty.
“When bail is given, the principal is regarded as
delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a
continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do
so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if
that cannot be done at once they may imprison him until it can be done.
They may exercise their rights in persons or by agent. They may pursue
him into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and if
necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose”. (Taylor vs. Taintor, 83 Su.S. 366, 371. See also U.S. vs. Sunico, 40 Phil., 826, 832.)
In accordance with Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, if
the bonding company fails to produce the body of its principal, or to
give a satisfactory reason for his non-production, a judgment shall be
rendered against it on its bond.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed. It is
hereby ordered that the bond filed by appellee bonding company be
ordered confiscated to its full amount. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.