ROMULO V. RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO M. LAT AND ANGELES M. LAT, RESPONDENTS.

From the decision of the Public Service Commission in PSC Cases
Nos. 103908 and 104384, allowing Pedro Lat and Angeles Lat to install,
operate and maintain, in addition to their original 2-ton ice plant, a
5-ton unit in Digos, Davao, and dismissing the application of Romulo V.
Ramos for a certificate of public convenience for the same purpose, the
latter appealed to this Court by way of the instant petitions for
certiorari in the two cases, questioning the findings of the Commission
that the spouses Pedro and Angeles Lat, who were holders of a
certificate of public convenience for the same purpose, the latter
appealed to this Court by way of the instant petitions for certiorari
in the two cases, questioning the findings of the Commission that the
spouses Pedro and Angeles Lat, who were holders of a certificate of
public convenience since 1949, had been rendering adequate and efficient
service, thus justifying the granting of their application for the
installation and operation of an additional 5-ton unit.

On February 7, 1957, Romulo V. Ramos filed an application with
the Public Service Commission (PBC Case No. 103908) for a certificate of
public convenience to install, operate and maintain in the municipality
of Digos, province of Davao, an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of 5 tons, and for the sale and distribution of ice not only in
Digos but also in the adjoining municipalities of Sta. Cruz, Dansalan,
Hagonoy, Padada and Malalag, all of the same province.

This application was opposed by Pedro M. Lat and Angeles O. Lat,
grantees of certificates of public convenience to operate ice plants not
only in Digos, but also in Davao City and Magugpo, in the province of
Davao, for the reasons that the ice plants owned by them were actually
producing ice more than sufficient to meet the demands of the public;
that oppositors had already filed, in Case No. 104384 (on February 19,
1957), an application to increase the daily capacity of their ice plant
in Digos from 2 tons to 7 tons, which application was already heard by
the Commission; and that to grant the application of Ramos would only
cause ruinous competition. At the request of applicant Ramos, the
Justice of the Peace of Digos, Davao, was commissioned to receive the
evidence for applicant and oppositors.

The records show that on February 18 of the same year, the
spouses Pedro and Angeles Lat sought authorization from the Public
Service Commission (in PSC Case No. 104384) to increase the daily
capacity of their ice plant in Digos, Davao, covered by a certificate of
public convenience granted in 1949, from 2 tons to 7 tons, and to sell
and distribute ice not only in the municipalities of Digos, Sta. Cruz,
Limonso and Padada, but also in the municipality of Malalag (Davao). A
the hearing of the aforesaid application, Romulo Y. Ramos appeared and
opposed the same, on the ground that the purpose of the applicants Lat
apparently was to control or monopolize the distribution of ice in
Davao.

Considering the two applications and the oppositions thereto
jointly, the Public Service Commission rendered a decision, in part
reading as follows:

“The need for the additional production in Digos is not at issue
here. The evidence clearly establishes that there is a need for more ice
for use in Digos and the towns proposed by the applicants in view of
the development of the fishing industry in those towns and the
considerable increase in population. It appears that there is an overall
population of about 60,000 people in all the towns which will be served
by the ice plant in Digos. The evidence of both applicants also
establish those need, and the only question is which of the two
applicants should be allowed the additional production considering that
we believe that there is no need for allowing both applicants to put up a
plant of 5 tons each. Applicant Ramos had adduced evidence to show that
operators Pedro and Angeles Lat have been negligent in rendering their
service and that they have overlooked the increasing or growing needs of
the public for ice and that the Lats did not think of applying for
additional production until they know that applicant Ramos had filed his
application for a 5-ton plant. We do not find this contention correct
because the evidence shows that as early as October, 1956 applicants Lat
instructed their counsel in Manila to file an application for an
additional 5-ton unit to be installed in Digos and the corresponding
order for the equipment was placed with the Industrial Equipment
Company, and in the letter of that company to Pedro Lat dated September
29, 1956 the former quoted to the latter specifications for a 5-ton unit
pursuant to the request made by said Padro Lat. This evidence confirms
the claim of the applicants that they took steps even before the filing
of the Ramos application to put up an additional unit in Digos. There is
also the claim of the applicant Ramos that the Lats are no longer
interested in their Digos plant because they have sold the land where
the plant is installed to another party. There is such a deed of sale of
the land but this fact certainly does not prove that the Lats have
given up the operation of their ice plant because the land may be sold
but they may still retain the ownership of the plant, and that this is
so is shown by circumstance that they are willing to put up an
additional investment of about P80,000.00 to increase the production of
the plant. We also find satisfactory the evidence of applicants Lat that
they have been rendering ice delivery service in Digos and the other
towns whenever such service was needed by the public. In consonance with
the principle that, all things being equal, the pioneer operator is
entitled to preference in authorizing an additional service in his
territory when such service is shown to be needed by the public there
being no showing that the Lats have been negligent or careless in
attending to the needs of the public, we believe that in the present
cases the authority for the additional 5-ton production should, as it is
hereby, given to applicants Pedro and Angeles Lat for authority to
increase the capacity of their ice plant in Digos by 5 additional tons,
and dismissing the application of Romulo V. Ramos.”

Petitioner admits that the question raised herein is purely
factual, and, fully aware of the definite stand of this Court in appeals
of this nature,^[1] he claims
that the finding of the Public Service Commission is not supported by
evidence, thus justifying the removal of these cases from the sphere of
application of the general rule. As we have already held,^[2] where the appeal from a
decision of the Public Service Commission involves factual findings, the
only question that should be determined is whether the evidence on
record substantially supports said findings and conclusions, without
necessity of examining the proof de novo to find out whether such
findings or conclusions are supported by preponderant evidence.

In controverting the findings of the Commission in the cases at
bar, petitioner insists that it failed to take into account the facts
that there were occasions when, to replenish their stock in Digos,
respondents had to get the excess ice produced by their ice plant in
Davao City; that no ice deliveries were being made by the respondents;
and that although they were grantees of a certificate of public
convenience since 1949, respondents sought authority to increase the
capacity of their ice plant in Digos only in 1957, although the
population of the affected areas had allegedly been increasing since
1949. After considering these allegations, which were already made and
presented by petitioner during the hearing, the Public Service
Commission expressly found the services rendered by respondents
satisfactory. This conclusion is evidently based, on the one hand, on
the testimony of Pedro Lat and his witness, Eufronio Felix — tending to
establish the sufficiency and efficiency of the services of respondents
in the past, and the need for the increase of the same to meet the
growing demand of the public for the commodity — and, on the other, the
absence of evidence, other than petitioner’s own testimony, to prove the
alleged negligence and indifference of respondents to the needs of the
public. Under the circumstances, we perceive no reason to disturb the
finding of the Commission in these cases and substitute the same with
one of our own.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner in both instances.

So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., on leave, took no part.

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^[1] The Supreme Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Public Service Commission on
questions of fact and will interfere only when it is clear that there is
no evidence to sustain its decision. (Angat-Manila Transportation Co.
v. Vda de Taongco, L-5005, May 26, 1954; Surigaro Express Co. v.
Mortola, L-4816, March 25, 1954, Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. De la
Cryuz, L-6533, June 29, 1954; Javellana v. Bariela, L-4347, Jan. 31,
1953; Espiritu v. Los Baños, L-7121, July 30, 1955; Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co.. v. Danon, 58 Phil. 65; Padua v. Ocampo, L-7579, Sept. 17,
1955; Raymundo Trans. Co. v. Carda, L-7880, May 16, 1956; Guico v.
Bachrach Motor Co., L-9570, July 29, 1957; Halili v. Aldea, L-15433,
Dec. 29, 1959.

^[2] Bachrach Motor Co. v.
Guico, L-12619-12620, August 28, 1959.