AURELIO ARCILIAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS AND VICENTE ARCILLAS, RESPONDENTS.

Arcilas versus Montejo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and preliminary injunction filed by Aurelio Arcilias against Judge Gregorio D. Montejo of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, together with the widow Modesta Alfaro and the heirs Geronimo Arcillas and Vicente Arcillas. The dispute concerns the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas, who died intestate, and specifically Lot Number 276, which forms a major part of that estate. The case matters because it settles two questions every bar candidate must know: whether the heirs of a decedent who left no will and no debts may still insist on administration proceedings, and whether a summary motion under the Land Registration Act may be used to cancel a certificate of title when the heirs are not in agreement.

Procedural History

Two separate petitions were filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The first, dated November 12, 1962, was filed by Geronimo Arcillas and sought the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in the name of the deceased and the issuance of a new title in the names of the heirs, invoking Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. The second, dated November 16, 1962, was docketed as Special Proceeding Number 632 and prayed for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Aurelio Arcilias. Aurelio opposed the first petition, and the respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 holding the November 12 petition in abeyance until the intestate proceedings were terminated. On March 8, 1963, however, the respondent court denied the petition for letters of administration and gave due course to the November 12 petition, reasoning that this would avoid useless expense and unnecessary delay, and relying on Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Unable to obtain reconsideration, Aurelio filed the present petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the cadastral motion.

Facts

Eustaquio Arcillas died intestate on March 8, 1958, in the City of Zamboanga. He left an estate of which Lot Number 276, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number RT-244, formed a major part. After his death, several transactions affecting the lot took place, among them the separate sales by four of his children of their respective shares in the lot in favor of their co-heir Vicente Arcillas.

On November 12, 1962, Geronimo Arcillas filed a petition invoking Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, asking that the proportion of each heir's participation in the lot be accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. Before any other material pleading could be filed, five other children of the deceased filed a second petition on November 16, 1962, docketed as Special Proceeding Number 632, praying for letters of administration in favor of Aurelio Arcilias. That petition alleged that the estate had a probable value of not less than six thousand pesos and that, as far as the petitioners knew, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid.

Geronimo, joined this time by Vicente and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration, arguing that since Lot Number 276 was the only property left and the deceased left no debts, administration was improper. Aurelio replied that there were still other properties of the estate besides Lot Number 276, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition, and that some heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation. The trial court nonetheless denied the petition for administration and gave due course to the cadastral motion.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upon the averments that the estate left no debts and that all the heirs entitled to share are of age.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining that the cadastral motion brought under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

This provision is the very basis of the respondents' claim that administration was unnecessary, and the Court construes its use of the word may as permissive rather than mandatory.

Section 112 of Act Number 496, the Land Registration Act, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased. This provision is the basis of the November 12 petition, and the Court holds that its summary relief is unavailable where the parties are not unanimous.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent Judge erred. Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts, if for good reasons they do not wish to resort to an ordinary action of partition. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Rodriguez versus Tan:

While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may.

Having chosen administration, the heirs may not be rebuffed merely because the expenses usual in administration may deplete the funds of the estate; the resulting delay and expense are consequences they voluntarily assumed. Besides, the truth of the claim that other properties exist besides the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings than in any other action.

On the second issue, the Court held that the hearing of the cadastral motion could not be sustained. While Section 112 of the Land Registration Act allows a person in interest to seek the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title, such relief can be granted only if there is unanimity among the parties, or if there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. Otherwise the case becomes controversial and must be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. Here the obvious lack of unanimity, shown by the express objection to the cancellation of the certificate of title, removed the petition from the scope of Section 112. Moreover, the proceedings under the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and therefore inadequate for litigating issues that properly pertain to the case where the incident belongs.

Doctrine

Section 1 of Rule 74 is permissive, not mandatory. The word may, used throughout the section, leaves the matter to the discretion of the heirs; had the framers intended otherwise they would have used the word shall. Heirs who for good reasons choose administration proceedings instead of extrajudicial settlement or an ordinary action of partition may not be rebuffed on the ground that administration expenses may deplete the estate, for the delay and expense are voluntarily assumed.

Relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is summary in nature and may be granted only where there is unanimity among the parties in interest, or no adverse claim or serious objection. Where any party in interest objects, the matter becomes controversial and must be litigated in an ordinary case or in the proceeding where the incident properly belongs.

Disposition

The Court set aside the appealed orders, directed the reinstatement of Special Proceeding Number 632, and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents except the respondent Judge.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: Section 1 of Rule 74 says may, not shall, so heirs with good reasons may always choose administration, and Section 112 of the Land Registration Act demands unanimity. Examiners use this case to test the permissive character of Rule 74 and the summary, non-contentious limits of a Section 112 petition.