AURELIO ARCILIAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS AND VICENTE ARCILLAS, RESPONDENTS.

Filed before the Court
of First
Instance of Zamboanga
on November 12 and 16, 1962 respectively are two separate petitions having
direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. 
This lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-244 (2155(0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died
intestate on March 8, 1958
in the City of Zamboanga.

In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas,
one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased
and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the
heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition.  It was claimed that at various dates after the
death of the deceased,
several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among
which were the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in
Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of
co-heir Vicente Arcillas.  Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the
proportion of
each heir’s participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in
a new certificate of title.  But before
any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five
(5) other children of the deceased filed the November 16 petition
aforementioned.  This later petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner
preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased’s estate.  Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition,
insofar as pertinent to this case, read:

“3.     That the deceased
left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga
City with a probable value of not less than SIX THOUSAND PESOS (6,000.00), Philippine
Currency;

“4      That as far as
petitioners know, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid;”

In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his
opposition to the November 12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as Lot No.
276 – the subject matter thereof – was included in the estate of the deceased
for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was
awaiting resolution, that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held
in abeyance until after Special Proceeding No. 632 was closed and
terminated.  Recognizing then the merit
of petitioner’s ground, respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding in abeyance
resolution of the November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate
proceedings.

Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc.
No. 632) Geronimo Arcillas, this time joined by
Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta
Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein petitioner,
arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the deceased
and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was
improper.  However petitioner, in his
reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of
the estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with
respondents’ view that administration proceedings could be dispensed with
asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial
partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of
their participation in the estate.

On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition
for the issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave due course
to the November 12 petition.  Reasoned
the court: “x x x to
obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds
of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property
involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the Honorable
Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with
the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the
opinion that the herein petition (should) be denied and (holds that) the
cadastral motion of the oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the same property is the most expedient
and proper action.”

Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the
instant petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction.  On December 2, 1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required bond, we
issued a writ of preli­minary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from
proceeding with the hearing of the “cadastral motion” dated November
12, 1962.

The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted
properly (1) in dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority
of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate
left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all
of age and (2) in maintaining that the “cadastral motion” brought
under the provision of section 112 of the Land Registration Act was the more
proper proceeding under the circumstances.

Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in, an ordinary
action of partition.  And primarily
anchored on the proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain i.e. the decedent left no
will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that there is
no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of
an administrator for the settlement of the state for the reason that it is
superfluous and unnecessary.  In other
words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the
heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and
his heirs are all of age.

We cannot entirely agree with the respondents.  On a similar contention in the past, we had
occasion to explain in Rodriguez, et al v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273:

“xxx section 1 does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration pro­ceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition.  While
section 1 al­lows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves
as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them
to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.  Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may
be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may.  If the intention were otherwise the framer of
the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character. 
Note that the word may is used not only once but in the whole
section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.”

Having decided to institute
administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of
settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for
partition, heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion
granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground
that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the
funds of the estate.  The resultant delay
and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be
deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs them­selves so that they
may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.  Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioners
claim as to
the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in
question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings
rather than in any other action.

Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the “cadastral”
motion, supposedly brought under the authority of section 112 of Act 496,
cannot be sustained.  While this section
authorizes, among others, a person in interest to ask the court for any
erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title “upon the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, ex­pectant, or inchoate have terminated and ceased,” and ap­parently
the November 12 petition comes within its scope, such relief can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the
case where the incident properly belongs (see Puguid
v. Reyes, L-2131I, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein).  In the instant case the obvious lack of
unanimity among the parties in interest, manifestly demonstrated by
petitioners’ express objection to the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently
removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496.
Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are summary in
nature and hence inadequate for the litigation of issues which properly pertain
to the case where the incident belongs.

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered setting
aside the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge or whoever is
presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No. 632; the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining respondent Judge from
proceeding with the hearing of the “cadastral” motion dated November
12, 1962 is hereby made permanent.  Costs against respondents, except respondent Judge.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.