G.R. No. L-6698. August 30, 1955
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., AND FAR EASTERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE TEODORO, SR., JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND CAPITOL SUBDI…
CONCEPCION, J.:
petition:
“1. That upon the giving by petitioners of a nominal bond in such amount as
this Honorable Court may fix, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against
the respondents restraining them from continuing the hearing of civil case No.
1865 until further order from this Court;“2. That after due hearing judgment be rendered herein
“(a) Setting aside the order of the respondent judge dated March 21,
1953 (Annex F), whereby petitioners’ motion to transfer civil ease No. 1865 to
Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for joint trial
therein with civil case No. 597 was denied;“(b) Annulling the rulings made by the respondent judge which are
complained of in paragraph IX of this petition, whereby he refused to permit the
witness Mariano C. Reyes to testify and explain the inconsistency between the
contents of his letter Exhibit CC and his testimony before the trial court, and
whereby the said respondent judge also refused to permit the witnesses Emilio
Buenaventura, Jr. and Paterno M, Serrano to testify with reference to the
document Exhibit 4 (Annex I herein), intimating that said. document is worthless
as evidence for not being a consummated contract; and“(c) Directing the respondent judge to indorse civil case No. 1865
to Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for joint
trial therein with civil case No. 597 of the same Court, and further directing
the trial judge to admit the testimony of the witnesses Mariano C. Reyes, Emilio
Buenaventura, Jr., and Paterno M. Serrano as herein-above
specified.“Petitioners further pray for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem just and equitable and for costs of suit against the respondent Capitol
Subdivision, Inc.” (Petition pp. 46-47.)
Soon after the institution of the case, the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition was, after due hearing, issued, upon the filing of
the corresponding bond.
The issues before us are: (1) whether or not respondent judge, Hon. Jose
Teodoro, Sr., should be greeted to transfer civil case No. 1865 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, pending before the second branch thereof,
which is presided over by said respondent, to the third branch of the same
court; and (2) whether or not respondent Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction, or
committed a grave abuse of discretion, in sustaining the objections of counsel
for the Capitol Subdivision,. Inc., to certain questions, propounded by counsel
for petitioners herein, during the hearing of said case.
The facts pertinent to the first issue are: Petitioners herein, namely,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., and Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., are the
defendants in civil case No. 1865 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, instituted by respondent Capitol Subdivision, Inc., as plaintiff,
which case is pending before Branch II of said court, presided over by
respondent Judge. Claiming to be the owner of part of the land constituting
Airport No. 2 of the City of Bacolod, the Capitol Subdivision instituted said
case, on January 25, 1951, to recover compensation for the occupation of said
portion of land by petitioners herein, as operators of the air lines using said
airport. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, under whose authority the airport
is now being operated, intervened in said case No. 1865, for which reason it
has, also, been allowed to participate in the case at bar, as intervenor.
It appears that, several years prior to the commencement of case No. 1865, or
on August 9, 1946, an issue identical to the one involved in said case was
raised in civil case No. 444 of the same court of first instance, entitled
“Monico Puentevella, Jr., et al., vs. Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc.,
Philippine Air Lines, Incv and Commercial Air Line, Inc.,” namely: whether
Fuentebella and the other plaintiffs in said, case No. 444, as alleged owners of
other portions of land within the perimeter of said airport No. 2, had a cause
of action against the defendants therein (including herein petitioners) for the
use of said land as part of the airport aforementioned, and, in the affirmative
case, what is the reasonable compensation for said use? After due trial, before
Branch II of said court, respondent Judge, who presided it, rendered judgment on
September 27, 1950, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
“Wherefore, the Court renders judgment (I) declaring that each and all of the
plaintiffs are entitled to rental at the rate of P0.02 1/2 per square meter per
month for the use of the properties described in the above-mentioned titles of
the plaintiffs, for a total period of 32 1/2 months; (2) sentencing the
defendants herein to pay the plaintiffs or other judicial representatives, as
follows: The FEATI alone, to pay the sum of P30,355.33 covering only the period
from November 15, 1945 to July 16, 1946, to all the plaintiffs as per area
listed in the previous paragraph, to be paid to each plaintiff as :
follows,:
Arsenia R. Puentevella ………………………………………… Carmen Gonzaga
……………………………………………………..Teofilo Gonsoli
……………………………………………………….Luis
Harvias…………………………………………………………..Luis
Hervias…………………………………………………………….Antonio P. Ciocon & Ricardo Ciocon
…………………………………Rosario Consoli
………………………………………………………Margarita Tolo
………………………………………………………..Dolores Vda. de Tampingco ……………………………………… Mercedes
Estrologo……………………………………………………Mercedes Estrologo
………………………………………………….Tomas
Jamili…………………………………………………………“(3) Sentencing defendants FEATI and PAL to pay for the period front July 16,
1946 to May 12, 1947, the total sum of P37,28047 which they may prorate and
which they are to pay as follows to each plaintiff, or their judicial
representative:
Arsenia R. Puentevella ………………………………………… Carmen Gonzaga
……………………………………………………..Teofilo Gonsoli
……………………………………………………….Luis
Harvias…………………………………………………………..Luis
Hervias…………………………………………………………….Antonio P. Ciocon & Ricardo Ciocon
…………………………………Rosario Gonsoli
………………………………………………………Margarita Tolo
………………………………………………………..Dolores Vda. de Tampingco ……………………………………… Mercedes
Estrologo……………………………………………………Mercedes Estrologo
……………………………………………………“Sentencing defendant PAL alone, to pay to the hereinabove listed plaintiffs
from May 13, 1947 to July 31, 1948, the total sum of P55,793.86 or to each
plaintiff as follows:
Arsenia R. Puentevella ………………………………………… Carmen Gonzaga
……………………………………………………..Teofilo Gonsoli
……………………………………………………….Luis
Harvias…………………………………………………………..Luis
Hervias…………………………………………………………….Antonio P. Ciocon & Ricardo Ciocon
…………………………………Rosario Consoli
………………………………………………………Margarita Tolo
………………………………………………………..Dolores Vda. de Tampingco ……………………………………… Mercedes
Estrologo……………………………………………………Mercedes Estrologo
………………………………………………….Tomas
Jamili…………………………………………………………with legal interests from August 9, 1946, until the whole amount is fully
paid, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.” (Joint Memorandum for
Petitioners and Intervenor, pp. 7-9.)
This decision in case No. 444 was appealed to the Supreme Court (G. R. No.
L-4958), where the case was pending at the time pertinent to the issues raised
in the present case (No. 1865).
Prior to the rendition of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in said case No. 444, or, to be exact, on February 20, 1947,
one Andres Wenches began civil case No. ,597 of the same court, against
petitioners herein, the Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., and the Philippines Air
Lines, Inc., for the purpose of ejecting the latter from a portion of land
alleged to be owned by Menchaca, which land is said to be within the limits of
the airfield above referred to, and to recover the corresponding for the use of
said land from November 15, 1945. This case No. 597 was assigned to Branch III
of said court.
On March 21, 1953, petitioners herein, as defendants in civil case No. 1865,
filed a motion praying that an order issue transfering case No. 1865 from Branch
II to Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for joint
trial therein of said case and case No. 597, upon the ground that the two cases
involves the same questions , of fact and law; that the same are practically
identical to those decided by respondent Judge in civil case No. 444 (G. R. No.
L-4958), and that, inasmuch as the evidence sought to be presented, in said
cases Nos. 1865 and 597, by petitioner herein, are substantially the same as
these introduced by them in civil case No4. 444, and respondent Judge, who
decided that case, had already formed an opinion adverse to the contention of
petitioners herein, it would be very difficult to persuade said respondent to
reach a different conclusion in deciding case No. 1865. This motion was denied
and so was a petition for reconsideration of the order denying said motion. On
April 11, 1953, petitioners herein proposed that the hearing of case No. 1865 be
deferred until after the appeal in said case No. 444 shall have been disposed of
by this Court; but the proposal did not merit favorable action. Thereafter, or
on April 29, 1953, the trial of case No. 1865 began before respondent Judge.
After the presentation of the evidence for the Capitol Subdivision, consisting
of the’ testimony of ten witnesses and numerous exhibits, marked as Exhibits A
to CC inclusive, petitioners herein, as defendants in said civil case No. 1865,
proceeded with the introduction of their own evidence, namely, the testimony of
Mariano C. Reyes, Emilio Buenaventura, Jr. and Paterno M. Serrano.
As above stated, the first question for determination by this Court is
whether or not respondent Judge is under’ a ministerial duty to grant the motion
for transfer of civil case No. 1865 from Branch II to Branch III of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the Joint hearing of Cased Nos. 1865
and 597 before said Branch III.
No statute or decision has been cited in support of the affirmative view.
Rule 32, Section 1, of the Rules of Court upon which petitioners rely,
reads:
“When actions involving a common question of law of fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of ainy or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it .may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs, or delay.”
This provision does not hear put petitioners’ pretense. Admittedly it grants
discretion, which is incompatible with the clear legal duty the
existence of which is essential to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Moreover, said section 1 must be understood to refer to the consolidation of the
hearing of two or more cases which are before the same judge, not when the cases
are pending before different courts or different branches of the same court.
Indeed, in the latter contingency, none of the judges involved has control over
the case or cases pending before the other court or judge. Similarly, neither of
them may, in effect, impose, upon the other judge or court, the duty to hear and
decide the cas pending before the latter, jointly with the case originally
belonging to the former.
Again, petitioners did not seek relief from the order denying the transfer
joint hearing prayed for, upon the issuance of said order, dated March 21, 1953,
copy of which was received by petitioners herein on March 25, 1953. Thereafter,
the parties proceeded with the hearing on the merits of case No. 1865 and
introduced their respective evidence therein. This mandamus and certiorari
proceeding was not commenced until May 16,1953, after the taking of documentary
and testimonial evidence in case No. 1865, the transcript of which covers
hundred of pages. As a result, if case No. 1865 were now ordered transferred to
Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, taking
cognizance of civil case No. 597, for a joint hearing of the two cases, the
result would be that part of the evidence would have been taken before
respondent Judge and the rest would be introduced before another judge. In other
words, case No. 1865 would be decided by a judge who had no opportunity to
observe the behaviour of the witnesses for the plaintiff in case No. 1865.
Surely, such a situation should be avoided, instead of created by mandamus,
particularly considering that petitioners herein have contributed to its
existence. It is apparent, therefore, that he first issue must be decided in
favor of respondents herein.
The second question refers to the resolutions of respondent judge sustaining
the objections of counsel for respondent, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., tp some
questions propounded by counsel for the petitioners herein, as defendants in,
said case No, 1865. In this connection, it should be noted that, admittedly,
respondent Judge had, and still has, jurisdiction over civil case No. 1865. It
is not denied that His Honor has authority to receive evidence and to rule on
the objections thereto. The resolutions thereon, even if erroneous, are
reviewable, therefore, not by certiorari, ” but on appeal from such decision as
may be rendered in due time. In fact, said decision may make in unnecessary to
pass upon the wisdom of the resolutions complained of, for the party adversely
affected by the latter might be 1 favored by the former, or the decision may be
predicated upon such grounds as to render said resolutions immaterial to the
validity of the conclusions of fact and law that may have been reach by the
lower court in disposing of the case on its merit.
The cases of Orient Insurance Co. vs. Revilla (54 Phil., 919) and
People vs. Concepcion (55 PhiL, 485), cited by petitioners herein, are
not in point. The first refers to an action against an insurance company,
counsel for which was not allowed to read the second page of a latter after the
first page thereof had been read into the record by counsel for the plaintiff.
Obviously, the lower court was in duty bound to permit such examination, for,
otherwise, counsel for the insurance company could not properly exercise the
right of cross-examination, which is essential to due process. The second case
involved the refusal of a lower court to receive the testimony of a given
person, because he had been accused of perjury. Not having been, as yet,
convicted of perjury, by final judgment, said person was manifestly competent to
testify as a witness and, hence, the court had a legal obligation to admit his
testimony, regardless of the weight or credence due thereto. In other words, in
both cases, the lower court had failed, or refused, to perform a clear
ministerial duty, the enforcement of which by mandamus is, proper. No such duty
exists in the case under consideration.
Moreover, the records before this Court do not disclose sufficient facts to
enable us to determine, with reasonable certainty, the materiality or propriety
of the questions objected to, apart from the circumstance that an expression of
our ppinion thereon might be construed as a statement of our views on the merits
of case No. 1865, before the same had been passed upon by the lower court.
Accordingly, there is no way by which petitioners’ pretense, concerning the
second issue, may be sustained, and the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental must be allowed to resume the hearing of case No. 1865. However, at
the continuation of said hearing, respondent Judge, or whoever shall preside the
lower court, is expected to adhere to the policy enunciated in the case of Prats
& Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil., 807, 816-818), in which
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Street, said:
“In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice
of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any
intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of
the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle
over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fail into
error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarraased and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
without returning the case for a new trial—a step which this court is always
very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission, of proof in a court of
first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy
is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the
trial jijdge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then hat all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.” (Italics
supplied.)
The necessity of adopting a long-range view and a liberal attitude, upon
resumption of the hearing of case No. 1865, becomes more imperative, owing to
the fact that, acting upon the appeal from the decision of respondent Judge in
case No. 444 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (G. R. No.
L-4958), on March 30, 1954, this Court rendered judgment the dispositive part of
which reads:
“In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment’is hereby set
aside and the case ordered remanded to the court a quo, with the
instruction that the Bureau of Aeronautics be made a party defendant, and that
thereafter the. action proceed in accordance with the rules.”
Although we have not as yet expressed our opinion on the merits of the cause
of action involved in said case No. 444—which is substantially identical to that
set up in case No. 1865—it is obvious that our aforementioned decision of March
30, 1954—particularly insofar as it directs the inclusion of the Bureau of
Aeronautics as party defendant in said case No. 444—tends to broaden the
perspective in both cases and indicates certain possibilities which the lower
court should bear in mind in the reception of evidence in case No. 1865 and in
passing upon the issues raised in the course thereof.
Wherefore, the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is dissolved and
this case is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Case dismissed.