JOSE M. OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari, with mandamus, to review an order of the
Honorable Conrado V. Sanchez, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
favor of Vicente Uy, co-respondent. The facts of the case may be stated as
follows:

The petitioner, Jose M. Ocampo, is the owner of two parcels of land located
in Quiapo, Manila. On December 29, 1948, he leased said property to Vicente Uy,
under a contract whereby Uy was to pay a monthly rental of $2,000 United States
currency; Uy was to construct on the land, at his own expense, a permanent
semi-concrete building with a minimum costs of P100,000, said building to become
the property of Ocampo after the expiration of ten years; Ocampo was to pay the
real estate taxes on the land, while Uy was to pay the real estate taxes on the
building; Uy was to insure the building during the three months’ period of
construction at a certain amount and after the building had been finished, same
was to be insured by Uy at its full value. Uy was to pay the premiums, and
indorse the policies to Ocampo.

For the alleged failure of Uy to comply with his obligations under said
contract of lease, as amended or supplemented by written agreements of September
9, 1949, June 22, 1950, March 10 and July 27, 1951, Ocampo filed against Uy in
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch presided over by Judge Bienvenido
A. Tan), a complaint dated January 22, 1953, praying, among other things, that
the contract of lease be cancelled, terminated, or rescinded; that the building
constructed on the land by Uy be declared forfeited in favor of Ocampo,
declaring the latter absolute owner thereof; and that Uy be sentenced to pay to
Ocampo the various sums specified in the prayer of the complaint.

Ocampo and Uy submitted to the Court of First Instance of Manila a compromise
agreement dated April 23, 1953, asking the court to approve it and to render
judgment in accordance with it. Said compromise agreement reads as follows:

“Come now the plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective
counsels, having amicably settled the above-entitled case, to this Honorable
Court, respectfully submit the following compromise agreement:

1. Defendant agrees to pay plaintiff the amount of one thousand six hundred
   fifty pesos (P1,650) as monthly rental of the lot leased to him under contract
   dated December 29, 1948, payable within the first 10 days of every month
   beginning May 1, 1953, until the expiration of said contract of lease, on
   December 31, 1958;
2. Defendant agrees to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,540 not later than April 24,
   1953, which represents 60% of the back rentals collected by the defendant after
   October 31, 1952, when the administration of the Monte de Piedad was terminated;

3. Defendant will pay plaintiff the sum of P9,900, as back rentals for the lot
   leased to the defendant/ from November 1, 1952, to April 30, 1953, to be paid in
   two equal installments, the first installment to be paid on April 24, 1953, and
   the second installment to be paid on May 11, 1953;
4. Defendant will pay promptly all back taxes and all taxes due and to become
   due on the lot and on the building existing en said lot;
5. Defendant will pay all insurance premiums of said building for the amount of
   P60,000 a year till the expiration of said contract of lease, policies to be
   indorsed and delivered to the .plaintiff or to any party at the order of the
   plaintiff;
6. All payments herein stated shall be made at 910 Raon, Interior Manila,
   either to the plaintiff or his counsels;
7. That upon non-compliance with any condition hereof, or nonpayment of the
   monthly rentals and/or sums fixed herein at the times specified herein,
   plaintiff shall be entitled to an additional monthly rental of P500 and to a
   writ of execution on the lot and on the building, it f being understood that
   upon said non-compliance, the building shall become the property of the
   plaintiff without right of reimbursement on the part of the defendant, even
   before the expiration of said contract;
8. It is understood that the period of lease is 10 years without any extension
   whatsoever, thereby cancelling par, 6 of said contract dated December 29, 1948;
9. Defendant will pay a monthly sum of P20 payable within the first 10 days of
   each month until the unpaid balance of architect’s fees of said building is
   fully paid, said payment to start May 1, 1953;
10. All kinds of repairs of said building shall be at the sole expense of the
    defendant;
11. All provisions of the lease contract dated December 29, 1948, as aforesaid,
    inconsistent herewith are superseded and abrogated. Contracts Annex B, C, D, and
    E, attached to the plaintiff’s complaint are all hereby abrogated and cancelled
    in tcto.

Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that the above agreement be approved by
the Honorable Court in its entirety and judgment be rendered in accordance with
said agreement.”

The Court of First Instance of Manila entered judgment dated April 24, 1953,
approving the foregoing compromise agreement and making it a part of the
judgment.

On June 13, 1953, Ocampo filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
motion alleging that Uy had failed to pay in full on April 24, 1953, the first
installment of P4,950, representing one naif of the back rentals from November
1, 1952 to April 30, 1953, in violation of paragraph 3 of the compromise
agreement; that Uy failed to pay on May 11, 1953, the second installment of
P4,950, representing the last installment of the back rentals from November 1,
1952 to April 30, 1953, in violation of paragraph 3 of the compromise agreement;
that Uy failed to pay on May 10, 1953, the monthly rental of P1,650
corresponding to May, 1953 in violation of paragraph 1 of the compromise
agreement; that Uy failed to pay on June 10, 1958, the monthly rental of P1,650
corresponding to June, 1953, in violation of paragraph 1 of the compromise
agreement; that Uy failed to pay the amount of P20 due on May 10, 1953, and the
amount of P20 due on June 10, 1953, for, architect’s fees, in violation of
paragraph 9 of the compromise agreement; that Uy failed to pay the real estate
taxes on the building for the year 1952, in violation of paragraph 4 of the
compromise agreement; that Uy failed to insure the building in the full amount
of P60,000, and to endorse and deliver to him the corresponding policies, in
violation of paragraph 5 of the compromise agreement Ocampo prayed in said
motion that a writ of execution be issued against Uy on the lot and on the
building as described in the complaint; for the recovery of the amount of
P5,414.01, representing the balance of back rentals from November 1, 1952 to
April 30, 1953; for the recovery of P3,300 as rentals for May and June, 1953;
for the recovery of the monthly rental of Pl,650 from July 1, 1953, plus an
additional monthly rental of P500 from July 1, 1953, until Uy vacated the
premises; for the recovery of P40 as installment due as architect’s fees for May
and June, 1953, and for the recovery of P20 a month for architect’s fees from
July 1, 1953, until the balance of P870 is paid up.

On June 27, 1953, Uy filed an opposition to the motion for execution,
alleging that on May 4,1953, Ocampo agreed to allow Uy to pay the balance of the
account, under the compromise agreement, by installments at tile rate of P500.00
monthly beginning May, 1953, provided Uy would regularly pay the monthly rental
of P1,650 also beginning May, 1953; that pursuant to the subsequent agreement,
Uy paid to Ocampo religiously the monthly installment of P500 and the monthly
rental of P1,650 for the months of May and June, 1953; that out of the
outstanding obligation of P9,000 specified in paragraph 3 of the compromise
agreement, Uy had paid the total sum of 3,600.91, leaving a balance of P6,299.09
payable to Ocampo by monthly installments of P500; that by virtue of the
subsequent agreement Ocampo had allowed Uy to pay his obligations in a manner
other than that provided for in the compromise agreement; that the fact Ocampo
had accepted various payments from Uy out of time shows that Uy had really been
given time to pay his obligations; that if the taxes on the building for the
year 1952 were still unpaid it was because said taxes were being paid in
installments with their corresponding penalties, which has been his practice
since 1949; that the insurance policies on the building for the sum of P50,000
had already been renewed before the motion for execution was filed by Ocampo and
the remaining P10,000 was pending consideration and approved by any of the
insurance companies authorized to accept said additional insurance; that the
real reason for the filing of the motion for execution was that Ocampov wanted
to amend the compromise agreement so as to include therein a provision that
after December 31, 1958, all improvements existing on the land shall become his
property without any right of reimbursement on the part of Uy; that Ocampo was
being pressed for payment of his account in the amount of P141,515 by the Monte
de Piedad; and that Ocampo resented the refusal of Uy’s son on June 10, 1953, to
accept the receipt issued by Ocampo covering the payment of P1,650 as monthly
rental for June which Ocampo tried to apply to the payment of back account of
Uy.

On June 30, 1953, Ocampo filed a reply to the opposition of Uy alleging that
there was never a subsequent agreement allowing Uy to pay his obligations under
the compromise agreement by monthly installments of P500; that the attorney of
Ocampo issued two receipts covering payments of P500 each—none receipt covering
payment of P1,000 and the other covering payritent of P600 wherein the right of
Ocampo to the writ of execution was reserved—said payments having been made out
of time and in violation of the compromise agreement; that Uy admitted in his
opposition that the taxes on the building for 1952 remained unpaid in violation
of the compromise agreement; that Uy in his opposition further admitted that the
building was insured for P50,000 instead of P60,000 in violation of the
compromise agreement; that Uy had not paid the rentals for May and June, 1953,
at the rate of P1,650 monthly and the outstanding obligation of P9,000
representing back rentals from November 1, 1952 to April 30, 1953, a balance of
P5,414.01 still remaining unpaid.

On June 30, 1953, Judge Sanchez issued an order in open court giving one
week, until July 7, 1953, to respondent Uy to fulfill the obligations under the
compromise agreement and postponed the hearing of the motion for writ of
execution to July 7, 1953. This order given orally in open court has not been
reduced to writing. On July 7, 1953, Judge Sanchez issued an order which reads
as follows:

“Order (Civil Case No. 18642). After mutual explanation on the part of
counsel for the parties, the court orders defendant: (1) to pay within 5 days
from date hereof all the back taxes and all taxes due on the lot and building at
Echague Street, corner P. Gomez Street and R. Hidalgo Street, as set forth in
paragraph 4 of the compromise agreement, which is the basis of the decision
herein; and (2) forthwith to pay all the premiums due on the P50,000 policy
which according to defendant is the maximum amount for which he could insure the
building, and likewise forthwith fr endorse the policy and deliver the same to
plaintiff.

“The. clerk of this court is hereby authorized to deliver to plaintiff Jose
M, Ocampo the sums of P1,650 deposited with the clerk of this court on June 12,
1953 under Official Receipt No. 50166, and the sum of P7,104.01 deposited on
July 6, 1953 in accordance, with Official Receipt No. 50716.

“So ordered.

“Manila, Philippines, July 7, 1953.

(Sgd.) Gonrado V. Sanchez

Judge“

There is attached to the answer of Uy Hied in this court an affidavit which
is as follows:

AFFIDAVIT

“I, Vicente Uy, of age, married, and resident of Manila, after having been
duly sworn according to law, hereby depose and say:

“1. That I and Mr. “Jose Ocampo entered into a compromise agreement on April
24, 1953, which agreement was submitted to the presiding Judge of Branch VII of
the Manila Court of First Instance on the same date for approval;

“2. That pursuant to said compromise as approved by the Court, I am to pay
Mr. Ocampo the sum of P9,900 into two installments, the first being payable on
or before April 24, 1953 and the second being payable on or before May 11,
1953;

“3. That on April 24, 1953 I paid Mr. Ocampo the sum of P4,036.52 which was
duly accepted and receipted for by Atty. Silvestre Caniza, with the the consent
and in the presence of Mr. Ocampo, inspite of there remained a balance of
P2,000;

“4. That on May 4, 1953, I and Mr. Ocampo mutually agreed that I pay the
outstanding balance of my obligations in monthly installments of P500 provided
that I pay the regular monthly rental of P1,650;

“5. That in compliance to said mutual agreement, I have been paying Mr.
Ocampo various sums of money exceeding P500 as my finances could permit me;

“6. That on June 10, 1953 Mr. Ocampo became angry with us when my son Ernesto
Uy refused to accept the receipt he issued for the sum of Pl,650 which stated
that said sum was part payment of the accrued back rentals instead of stating
that said amount was payment for the monthly rental of June, 1953;

“7. That the real reason of Mr. Ocampo in asking for the execution of the
judgment in compromise dated April 24, 1953 was my refusal to sign the amended
compromise agreement which states that the building I have erected on his lot at
corner of Echague and R. Hidalgo Streets automatically become Mr. Ocampo’s
property after December 1953.

“In witness whereof I have set my hand this 12th day of September, 1953 in
the City of Manila, Philippines.

“Further affiant sayeth naught.

Sgd.) Vicente Vy

“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September, 1953, in tfie
City of Manila, affiant exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. A-0008924
issued at Manila on January 3, 1953 and ACR No. 40218 issued at Manila on July
17, 1950.

(Sgd.) Ceferino de los Santos
Notary Public Until
December 31, 1953.“

No cross-affidavit has been presented to counteract the above affidavit of
Uy.

In the case of “de la Costa versus Cleofas” (67 Phil, 686, 692), this Court
held that—

“Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of
execution of the final judgment obtained by him within fire years from its entry
(section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been repeatedly held, and it
is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been
rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask
the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice
and) the facts. (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil., 569; Behn, Meyer &
Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil., 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs.
Jaucian, 13 Phil., 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield arid Guash, 14 Phil., 588; Flor
Mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil., 809). * * *.”

Taking into consideration the oral order of the court of June 30, 1953, the
order of July 7, and the affidavit of Uy attached to his answer, it is
reasonable to conclude that the lower court acted in accordance with the
principle enunciated in the case of de la Costa vs. Cleofas cited
above. In view of the facts and circumstances which transpired after judgment,
the respondent Judge issued the above orders so as to harmonize the judgment
“with justice and the facts.” These circumstances consisted in the dealings and
agreements of the parlies subsequent to the judgment, curing the slight
deviations by respondent Uy from the literal terms of the original agreement
which would have led to the loss of his building. It should be noted that the
order of July 7, 1953 commences with the words “after mutual explanations of the
counsel for the parties etc.” It appears that the orders given by the respondent
Judge based on said circumstances are in accordance with the principles of the
de la Costa case and do not warrant the issuance of the writ of mandamus prayed
for. Said orders do not substantially affect or prejudice the rights of the
petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Petition denied.