THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. IGNACIO VILLALBA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:


On November 16, 1956, Ignacio Villalba of Linnec, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija was feeding his chicks. When he went up to his house to get more
feed, a pig owned by Ignacio Cabanada ate some of his chicks. Angered
thereby, Villalba took a piece of wood and hit the pig with it, causing
it to become lame.

As a result, Cabanada reported the incident to Catalino Dacanay, the
barrio lieutenant. Dacanay sent for Villalba. And, with the disputants
before him, he investigated the matter. Villalba admitted having
injured Cabanada’s pig. Thereupon, the barrio lieutenant asked him to
pay for the damage. Cabanada wanted twenty pesos but Villalba stated it
should be ten pesos only since Cabanada could roast the pig. At any
rate, Villalba pleaded for ten days to look for the necessary amount.
Subsequently, Cabanada unceremoniously went away, even though the
barrio lieutenant tried to call him back.

From this point, the facts are disputed. According to the prosecution’s evidence, the following took place:

In the moonlit evening of November 17, 1956, some twenty men
including Pablo Bengson, Florentino Labrador, Juan Villalba, Alfredo
Cachuela, Ignacio Cabanada, Emilio Cabrillas, Francisco Carbon and
Guillermo Dacanay, played a game called “patalunton” on the national
road in barrio San Pedro (now Linnec), Guimba, Nueva Ecija. After the
game, at around eight o’clock in the evening, they proceeded to go
home. A group of them, composed of Pablo Bengson, Florentino Labrador,
Alfredo Cachuela, Juan Villalba and Ignacio Cabanada, walked together
along the road in the direction of Guimba. Reaching the place where the
pathway to their houses was located, said persons left the road and
went down the pathway. Suddenly, accused Villalba emerged from the tall
palay stalks along the path and went behind Cabanada. From an angle of
about thirty degrees to Cabanada’s left, Villalba raised a bolo with
both hands and struck Cabanada with it, bringing it down in a
right-to-left movement. Cabanada, hit on the right forehead, fell down.
As Cabanada dropped, Villalba boloed him again, hitting the left elbow.
Cabanada’s companions ran away.

According, however, to accused Villalba, he merely acted in self-defense, thus:

At about four o’clock in the afternoon of November 17, 1956, he went
to see his father, who was sick, in the latter’s house at barrio
Linnec, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Returning therefrom, at about eight
o’clock that evening, he passed in front of Pablo Bengson’s house.
There, Pablo Bengson, Ignacio Cabanada and Alfredo Cachuela approached
him. Bengson and Cabanada each held a bolo and Cachuela had a cane.
Ignacio Villalba tried to proceed on his way but the trio intercepted
him. Thereupon, he decided to turn back. The three men, however, chased
him. As accused Villalba was running and after covering a distance of
around three meters, he felt a bolo touch his right hip and saw that
bolo in front of him. Villalba then picked it up. Cabanada ran to grab
it from him. Seeing this, accused Villalba swung the bolo sidewise to
his back, not knowing whether or not he hit Cabanada thereby. Cabanada
then launched at him with a dagger. At this moment, Villalba hacked
Cabanada with the bolo, hitting the latter on the front. Villalba
thereafter ran to the house of the barrio lieutenant, Catalino Dacanay,
and reported to said barrio lieutenant that the three persons
aforementioned waylaid him as he returned from his father’s house and
chased him as he ran away from them.

The record shows that the wounded Cabanada was brought to his house.
And, there, at nine o’clock that same evening, Fausto Eusebio,
auxiliary barrio lieutenant, took from him a statement declaring that
while he was on the road the accused Villalba suddenly boloed him (Exh.
A).

Afterwards, Cabanada was taken to Dr. Felipe Batangan’s house. Said
Guimba municipal health officer treated the patient, finding in him an
incise wound at the right side of the face beginning from the forehead
passing through under the ear to the lateral side of the neck, right
side; and another wound that almost amputated the left arm at the left
elbow.

Subsequently, Cabanada was put in an ambulance and taken to the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital, arriving there at 1:00 A.M. of
November 18. Dr. Nicolas V. De Guzman, Jr. treated him there for
lesions stated in his medical certificate (Exh. B) as follows:

As a result of said injuries, particularly to severe shock,
hemorrhage and cerebral concussion, Cabanada died on November 18, 1956
at 3:00 P.M. (Exh. B and Exh. C, death certificate).

On November 19, 1956 Villalba was accused of murder, for Cabanada’s
death, in a criminal complaint filed in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Subsequently, on December 17, 1956, an
information charging said offense was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. Arraigned on February 12, 1957, Villalba
pleaded not guilty. On November 12, 1958, however, the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, with the consent of the accused, moved to dismiss
the case provisionally, stating that evidence adduced in a
reinvestigation showed that Villalba acted in self-defense. On November
13, 1958, said motion was granted and the case was provisionally
dismissed with the conformity of the accused.

On February 18, 1959, an information for the same offense was filed
in the same Court of First Instance against the accused Ignacio
Villalba by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Arraigned hereunder
on August 3, 1959, Villalba pleaded not guilty.

After trial, on July 18, 1960, the Court of First Instance rendered
its decision, finding the accused guilty of murder, qualified by
treachery, without any mitigating or generic aggravating circumstance,
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P6,000 and to pay the costs.

On July 19, 1960, Ignacio Villalba took the present appeal to this Court.

The prosecution’s version of the fatal incident that evening of
November 17, 1956, was testified to not only by the prosecution witness
Pablo Bengson, but also by defense witnesses Florentino Labrador and Alfredo Cachuela. Thus, Florentino Labrador, testifying for the defense, stated:

“Q In walking southward enroute home will you pass first your house or the house of Cabanada?

“A Our house, sir.

“Q Were you able to reach your house that evening?

“A No, sir.

“Q Why not?

“A
Yes, sir, because as we were going home along the road when we went off
the road stepping on the shoulder of the road to the left side about a
meter I saw that Ignacio Villalba hacked him.

“Court:

“Q Hacked who?

“A Ignacio Cabanada, your Honor.

xx xx xx xx

“Q As you left the road Mr. Labrador with Juan Villalba and the deceased will you please tell the court your relative position?

“A All of us were walking side by side, sir.

“Q
In the same position that you were in between Villalba and Cabanada
while you were still walking on the road, that is you were on the
middle, Juan Villalba was on your left and the deceased was on your
right, is that correct?

“A Yes, sir.

“Q Immediately before he was hacked did you see Ignacio Villalba?

“A Yes, sir.

“Q Where did you see him?

“A He emerged from the ricefield and immediately thereafter he hacked him.” (Tsn., pp. 26-27, Garcia)

As to who of the witnesses were telling the truth, Pablo Bengson,
Florentino Labrador and Alfredo Cachuela on one hand, and the accused
Ignacio Villalba on the other, it perforce depends upon the credibility
of said witnesses, as revealed during their testimony. The finding of
the trial court in this regard is that the testimony of Ignacio
Villalba cannot be believed; and that there is no reason to disbelieve
Pablo Bengson, much less Florentino Labrador and Alfredo Cachuela, two
witnesses for the defense.

The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to full respect and will not be disturbed by
Us on appeal, in the absence of a showing that some fact of substance
and value has been overlooked or misconstrued, which, if considered or
rightly understood, will affect the result of the case (People v.
Curiano, L-15256-57, October 31, 1963; People v. Evaristo, L-14520,
February 26, 1965). And in this case We find none.

Appellant would urge that he had no motive to kill the deceased,
that he had no previous altercation with the deceased, no previous ill
will whatsoever. The doctrine frequently restated by this Court is that
motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no
doubt as to the identity of the culprit (People v. Solaña, L-13967,
Sept. 29, 1962; People v. Tagaro, L-18518, Jan. 31, 1963; People v.
Raquel, L-17401, Nov. 28, 1964). And besides, it is not correct to say
that the accused had no previous altercation or ill will with the
deceased. As testified to by him, the deceased asked for P20 in payment
for the pig appellant had beaten, and appellant offered to pay only P10
and pleaded for time to pay, but the deceased unceremoniously walked
out. Appellant must have resented said actuation of the deceased, for
after all, the incident developed because the pig of the deceased
strayed into appellant’s place and ate his chicks. The following
observation on a similar argument of lack of motive in another murder
case, People v. Reyno, L-19071, April 30, 1965, is hereto pertinent:

“Appellant’s counsel projects an argument that there
was no reason for the accused to kill the deceased. It must be stated,
however, that lack of motive does not preclude the commission of an
offense. Moreover, in this particular case, the accused Reyno must have
resented the interference of the deceased, when he (accused) and three
(3) other persons tinkered with the water pipe, in front of the
Wesleyan Colleges. While ordinarily the incident would not have
provoked the accused, or anyone for that matter, to commit an offense,
it is of judicial knowledge that others have been killed or assaulted
for lesser or no reason at all.”

Appellant stresses that Pablo Bengson is a brother-in-law of
Cabanada and that Alfredo Cachuela is the deceased’s cousin.
Relationship to the victim, alone, does not impair the positive and
clear testimony of a witness (People v. Valera, L-15662, August 30,
1962; People v. Asmawil, L-18761, March 31, 1965). And for this matter,
the record shows that appellant’s wife is the second cousin of the
deceased (Tsn., p. 5, Garcia), so that appellant himself is a relative
of said deceased.

It is also contended that the precise location of Cabanada’s wounds
points in favor of appellant’s version and against that of the
prosecution. The pretense is untenable. The group of Cabanada saw the
accused suddenly emerging from the palay stalks and going behind
Cabanada at about thirty degrees to the latter’s left. From that
position he immediately raised a bolo in both hands and brought it down
in a right-to-left motion. As he did so, Cabanada must have turned
towards the left to face him, hence, the blow fell upon his right
forehead up to his neck’s right side, in a right-to-left slanting
manner corresponding to appellant’s afore-stated motion. Cabanada’s
other wound is said to have almost amputated the left arm at the elbow,
except for the skin at the dorsal (back) side. Said blow, therefore,
could have been inflicted from the left side of the victim, although
Dr. Batangan opined it was delivered frontally. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that appellant suddenly emerged from concealment and
immediately hacked the deceased. Such sudden and unexpected attack
constitutes treachery (People v. Nable, 77 Phil. 93).

Appellant’s guilt being sufficiently proven by the eyewitness
accounts of Pablo Bengson, Florentino Labrador and Alfredo Cachuela,
there is no need for Us to resolve whether the statement taken from
Cabanada by Fausto Eusebio (Exh. A) may properly be considered as a
dying declaration.

And, finally, appellant would advance as proof of his innocence some
letters of the deceased’s wife, dated October 8, 1958, or about two
years after the incident. Said letters were relied upon by and annexed
to the motion of November 12, 1958 to provisionally dismiss the first
information presented by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal with the
signed conformity of the accused. They stated in part:

“I have written you in connection with our case
which I am requesting you that you give us something for the
subsistence of my children. I am sure Brother it was all the fault of
my husband because that night he went down with his bolo and I asked
him where was he going and he told me that he and Pabling, Andong and
Parin would go somewhere else and that was then the time when he was
wounded and I know that you have nothing to answer as your fault.”

Assuming that said letters can be considered, although they are
hearsay, because the said deceased’s wife did not testify, the same
cannot prevail over the positive and clear testimony of three
eyewitnesses to the incident, one for the prosecution and two for the
defense. Although said letters prompted the abovementioned provisional
dismissal of the first information, the fact is that another Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, after the requisite preliminary investigation,
subsequently filed a second information for the same offense, upon
which this case proceeded to trial and the judgment of conviction
appealed herein. For all these reasons, we can not sustain the alleged
probative value of the letters.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave.