IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, BERNARDO YAP, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (naturalization case 625),
granting the petition of Bernardo Yap for naturalization.

On January 30, 1961 Bernardo Yap, a Chinese citizen, filed a
petition for naturalization in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
petition alleges, among other things, that his place of residence is
Capitol Road, Cebu City, and his former residence was 247 Manalili
Street, Cebu City; that he is single; that he is an agent of the Wan
Tay Trading in Cebu City; that his average annual income is P2,400;
that he has resided continuously in the Philippines for at least 22
years immediately preceding the date of the petition; that he believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that he has
conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during the entire period
of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he lives;
that he has mingled socially with Filipinos; that he is possessed of a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals
of the Filipinos; that he has all the qualifications required under
section 2, and none of the disqualifications enumerated in section 4,
of Commonwealth Act 473.

The petitioner sought to establish at the hearing on the petition
that he was born in Cebu City on March 12, 1939, of Chinese parentage;
that he is single; that he holds an Alien Certificate of Registration
and an Immigration Certificate of Registration; that he has
continuously resided in the Philippines since birth, first in Cebu City
before the last World War, then in Bohol during the war when he was yet
a small child, and then again in Cebu City from 1945 to the present;
that he obtained his elementary education at the Chiang Kai Shek School
and his high school education at the University of Sto. Tomas; that at
the time of the hearing he was enrolled as a third year chemical
engineering student at the University of San Carlos; that in the said
institutions all of which are recognized by the Government of the
Philippines, Philippine history, government and civics form part of the
curriculum, and enrollment is not limited to any particular race or
nationality; that he is employed as a sales agent in the Wan Tay
Trading, Cebu City, a position he started to hold only on January 1,
1961, with a salary of P200 a month; that beginning January 1, 1962,
his salary was increased to P300 a month; that he is a person of good
moral character and standing in the community; that he has not been
accused or convicted of any crime, nor is there any derogatory record
against him; that he believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; that he has conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relations with the constituted government, as well
as with the community in which he lives; and that he has mingled
socially with Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos.

The two character witnesses, Geronimo Creer, Jr. and Juanita Cañedo,
affirmed the contents of their joint affidavit which is attached to the
petition. They further testified on the good moral character and
irreproachable conduct of the petitioner, and declared that the
petitioner has mingled socially with Filipinos and adopted and embraced
Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.

After considering the evidence on record, the lower court concluded
that the petitioner’s application for naturalization and his
qualifications therefor are amply supported by the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced, and that he possesses all the
qualifications enumerated in section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 535, and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473. The petition for
naturalization was then granted. From this decision, the Republic has
appealed.

Is the petitioner entitled to become a Filipino citizen?

The Republic contends that (1) the petitioner fatally omitted to
state his former residence in his petition; (2) there is insufficient
evidence to prove his good repute and irreproachable conduct; and (3)
there is no sufficient evidence to show that he has a lucrative
employment or occupation.

Anyone of these three assertions, if true, is a sufficient ground for the denial of the petition.

Anent the first point, the petitioner declared that his present
place of residence is Capitol Road, Cebu City. At the hearing, however,
he admitted that also resided in Bohol during the Japanese occupation,
which fact he did not state in his petition. His failure to state in
the petition all the places of his residence violates sec. 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act 473), and is a fatal
defect that warrants dismissal of the petition (Go v. Republic,
L-20558, March 31, 1965; Techip v. Republic, L-19637, February 26,
1965; Ong Ping Seng v. Republic, L-19575, February 26, 1965; Uy v.
Republic, L-20208, June 30, 1965; Tan Huy Ling v. Republic, L-21671,
Feb. 28, 1966; Kao Heng etc. v. Republic, L-21079, February 28, 1966;
Leoncio Dy v. Republic, L-20152, February 28, 1966). This requirement
of disclosure not only of the petitioner’s present place of residence
but also of previous ones, is “designed to facilitate the checking up
of the activities of said petitioner material to the proceeding and
affords the government fuller and more reliable basis for determining
his fitness or disqualification to become a Filipino citizen” (Cheng v.
Republic, L-20013, March 30, 1965; Ng v. Republic, L-19646, May 31,
1965). Non-compliance with this requirement is assumed to have impaired
the substantial effectivity of the investigation conducted for this
purpose. Furthermore, such omission amounts to “falsifying the truth,
indicating lack of good moral character which disqualifies him from
admission to Philippine citizenship” (Ong Tai v. Republic, L-19418,
December 23, 1964). Indeed, “this defect cannot be cured even if the
omitted place of residence is supplied during the trial” (Lo v.
Republic, L-15919, May 19, 1961; Qua v. Republic, L-19834, October 27,
1964; Kao Heng etc. v. Republic, supra). That the petitioner was only “3 to 5 years” old when he resided in Bohol does not constitute a valid excuse for the omission.

Similarly, his assertion that the citizenship laws should be
liberally interpreted in his favor finds no support in law or
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction. Admission to citizenship is one of
the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer
upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except
upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with
the law. “Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All
those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the
court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law”
(Chua Eng Hok v. Republic, L-20479, October 29, 1965).

It is next contended by the Republic that there is paucity of
evidence of record to prove the petitioner’s good repute and
irreproachable conduct. Geronimo Creer, Jr. and Juanita Cañedo vouched
for his good moral charater and irreproachable conduct. Besides
affirming the contents of his affidavit, Creer declared that he had
known Yap from 1946 or 1947 to about 1953, when they were neighbors in
Cebu City; that they used to see and contact each other and go together
to social affairs; that Yap used the Cebu-Visayan dialect in their
house; and that he has adopted Filipino customs and traditions. Juanita
Cañedo also affirmed the contents of her affidavit, and further
testified that she came to know the petitioner in 1948 as her neighbor
in Manalili St., Cebu City; that she continuously associated with him
up to the time of the trial; that he has mingled socially with
Filipinos during parties; and that he has learned and embraced Filipino
traditions and ideals. Both these witnesses admitted, however, that
during the time that the petitioner was studying in high school in the
University of Santo Tomas in Manila, their only contact with him was
during Christmastime and summer vacation in Cebu City. Consequently,
while they have personal knowledge of his behavior during his residence
in Cebu City, they are not competent to vouch for his good moral
character and behavior during the time that he was in Manila. And
because the law requires proof of proper and irreproachable conduct
during the entire period of the alien’s residence in the Philippines,
the evidence presented in this case falls short of the quantum
prescribed by law.

It will be further noted that the petitioner failed to ask for
amendment of his Alien Certificate of Registration in spite of his
change of address and the fact of his employment, which inaction on his
part amounts to a violation of section 5 of the Alien Registration Act
of 1950 (R.A. 562), indicating lack of proper and irreproachable
conduct on his part during his period of residence in the Philippines.

The Republic finally contends that there is insufficient evidence to
prove that the petitioner is engaged in a lucrative employment or
occupation. The petitioner’s bare averment that he has been employed
since January 1, 1961 (only thirty days before he filed his petition
for naturalization) without any supporting payroll, time card, or books
of accounts of his employer, and the uncorroborated testimony of his
supposed employer, Sy Pien Chong, regarding the alleged increase of his
salary to P300 a month effective on January 1, 1962, in spite of the
fact that at this time he was a chemical engineering student, whose
laboratory and school work demanded his attention for presumably the
greater part of every week day, far from lending verisimilitude to the
petitioner’s pretensions, compel us to the conclusion that his alleged
employment is pure fiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the petition is denied, at petitioner-appellee’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., in the result.
Regala, J., no part.