G.R. No. L-31785. September 25, 1979
“ANTIPOLO HIGHWAY LINES EMPLOYEES UNION”, MANUEL ALVARAN, IRENEO REYES, BONIFACIO BUHAY, ALBERTO BELEN AND RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, AS P…
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari places in issue the jurisdiction
of respondent Judge, then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, in 1) taking cognizance of Civil Case
No. 12384 for Damages with Preliminary Injunction filed by private respondent;
2) issuing a Restraining Order on October 16, 1969 and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on December 8, 1969; and 3) in promulgating a Decision making said
injunctive Orders permanent, and sentencing petitioners to pay damages and
attorney’s fees.
The main thrust of petitioners’ submission is that jurisdiction
properly belonged to the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground that
private respondent’s suit (Civil Case No. 12384) for Damages with Preliminary
Injunction is “interrelated, interwoven, or connected with acts of unfair
labor practice” and partakes of a labor dispute.[1]
The records bare the following antecedents: Private respondent Francisco DE JESUS is the
owner-operator of the “Antipolo Highway
Lines” (AHL, for short), a public service entity operating around 40
buses. Sometime in September, 1969, some
employees and workers of said transportation company organized themselves into
a union known as the Antipolo Highway Lines
Employees’ Union, petitioner herein, and affiliated itself with the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (hereinafter referred
to as AHLEU-KILUSAN). Petitioner Union
was duly registered with the Department of Labor and was issued Registration
Permit No. 6283-IB on September 8, 1969. The individual petitioners are officers of
petitioner Union.
In a letter dated September
15, 1969, AHLEU-KILUSAN informed the AHL through private respondent
DE JESUS of its organization and due registration and requested for an
immediate conference between the company and the union representatives.[2]
Attached to the letter was a list of proposals for a Collective Bargaining
Agreement among which were union recognition, union security job security,
grievance machinery and others.[3]
Apparently, no action was taken by AHL on the aforesaid letter,
as on September 29, 1969, AHLEU-KILUSAN filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a Notice of Strike against the AHL for acts constituting unfair labor
practice under Republic Act No. 875, such as refusal to bargain, coercion,
discrimination against Union members in trip assignments, and violation of other
labor laws, among others.[4]
On October 3, 1969, AHLEU-KILUSAN declared a strike
against the AHL and established a picket line.
However, the strike was lifted the next day since conciliation
negotiations were undertaken by petitioners and DE JESUS with the assistance
of the Mayor of Antipolo, according to
petitioners. The latter contend further
that in the conference of October 4,
1969, a “Return to Work Agreement” was arrived at in
principle. However, when the draft for
said Agreement was presented at a conference to be held on October 12, 1969, DE JESUS did not attend the
same. Instead, a representative of his
came and informed petitioners that AHL had already entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the Antipolo Highway Lines
Employees’ Association, affiliated with Philippine Transport and General
Workers Organization (AHLEA- PTGWO).[5]
AHLEU-KILUSAN then resumed its picketing on October 15, 1969.
On the following day, October
16, 1969, DE JESUS filed with the lower Court a Complaint for Damages
with Preliminary Injunction against AHLEU-KILUSAN and its officers. The Complaint alleged essentially that 1) AHL
had already entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the AHLEA-PTGWO
on September 10, 1969; 2) petitioners, who called an illegal strike against AHL
on October 15, 1969 and posted picket lines along its compound and around the
gasoline station owned by it, are not employees of the Company; 3) petitioners
prevented the employees of AHL from performing their work by means of threats,
violence and intimidation; 4) DE JESUS suffered material loss and damages in
the sum of P11,000 by reason of non-operation of his buses, and daily damages
in the amount of P4,000.00 due to illegal acts of petitioners in preventing and
blocking customers from AHL’s gasoline station. The Complaint then prayed that Preliminary
Injunction be issued ex parte enjoining
the petitioners from continuing their illegal acts; for payment of actual
damages in the amount of P15,000 plus moral damages in
the discretion of the Court; and attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,000.00.
On the same date of October 16, 1969, respondent Court issued an
ex-parte Restraining Order enjoining petitioners
“from continuing with their illegal acts and from posting their picket lines
along AHL premises and on such places as are within the Certificate of Public
Convenience issued to (AHL)”, and set the application for Preliminary
Injunction for hearing on October 29, 1969.[6]
The Restraining Order is first challenged herein.
On October 22, 1969,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Restraining Order and/or to Dismiss
Complaint, which was opposed by DE JESUS.
On November 22, 1969,
upon manifestation of both parties, respondent Court considered the application
for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction submitted for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings, without oral argument.[7]
On December 8, 1969,
respondent Court issued a Writ of Preliminary injunction, also questioned
herein by petitioners, upon DE JESUS’ filing of a bond of P5,000.00,
rationalizing as follows:
“The main question before the Court is whether defendants are
employees of plaintiff (De Jesus).
During the hearing on the writ of preliminary injunction, defendants did
not present any evidence to prove that they are employees of the plaintiff. On the other hand, plaintiff in his complaint
strongly denies the relationship of employer and employee between plaintiff
and defendants under oath. The mere
allegations in defendants’ opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction that defendants are employees of plaintiff, without
evidence in support of it cannot divest this Court of jurisdiction over a case
of damages as set out in plaintiff’s complaint.
Until and unless it is established by convincing evidence that the relationship
between plaintiff and defendants is one of employee and employer and the
incident from which the present case arose is one of a labor dispute a bare
claim in defendants’ opposition to the writ asserting such relationship and
such dispute cannot divest this Court of jurisdiction.”[8]
In a letter dated December
21, 1969, AHLEU-KILUSAN formally offered to return to work under
the same terms and conditions as prior to the strike, effective December 26, 1969 at 6:00 p.m.
Attached to said letter was a list of thirty-seven striking employees
returning to work.[9]
However, DE JESUS refused to accept said offer to return to work on the ground
that the employees listed in said letter were not legitimate employees of his
company. DE JESUS also called attention
to the pending case between him and the petitioners.[10]
AHLEU-KILUSAN then filed Charge No. 3294, dated January 1, 1970, against AHL and DE
JESUS with the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations
for Unfair Labor Practice.[11]
The Charge essentially averred that private respondent refused to reinstate all
the striking employees to their former positions “without justifiable
reasons but to harass, discriminate, and coerce said striking employees because
of their union activites and affiliations”.[12]
On January 10, 1970,
respondent Court declared petitioners in default upon motion of DE JESUS.[13]
And on January 16, 1970,
respondent Court allowed DE JESUS to present his evidence ex parte.[14]
On January 23, 1970,
respondent Court rendered the Decision in question in DE JESUS’ favor, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P12,850.00 as actual damages for loss of income; ordering the
defendants to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and the costs of
this suit.
“The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued in this
case is hereby declared permanent.”[15]
On February 6, 1970,
petitioners filed a Petition to Set Aside Decision of January 23, 1970 and the Order of Default of January 10, 1970. Petitioners
contended that they were not afforded their day in Court as they were not given
a chance to file their Answer since their Motion to Dismiss was never resolved
by the Court.[16]
Said Petition was denied by respondent Court for lack of merit on February 14, 1970.[17]
Hence, the present recourse which was given due
course.[18]
Petitioners contend:
I. THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS RESTRAINING ORDERS OF OCTOBER 16 AND DECEMBER 8,1969,
REFERRED TO IN ANNEXES “E” AND “I” – PETITION.
II. THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
IN ENTERTAINING AND TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION WITH
DAMAGES LIKEWISE DATED OCTOBER 16,
1969, REFERRED TO IN ANNEX “D”-PETITION.
III. THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN ULTIMATELY PROMULGATING A DECISION DATED JANUARY 23, 1970 REFERRED TO IN ANNEX
“J”-PETITION.
For the resolution of the jurisdictional issue posed, we refer to
the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), which was the governing
statute at the time of the controversy.
Section 5 (a) of that Act explicitly provides:
SEC. 5.
Unfair Labor Practice Cases. – (a) The Court (of Industrial Relations)
shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is
empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall be exclusive and
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by an agreement, code, law
or otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
As to what is constitutive of “unfair labor practice”,
Section 4 of the same Act states:
“SEC. 4. Unfair Labor Practice.
–
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
x x x x x
x
(6)
To refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees subject to the provisions of sections
thirteen and fourteen.”
The seed of the controversy herein germinated from an alleged
unfair labor practice, particularly, the refusal of AHL to take action on
petitioner AHLEU-KILUSAN’s proposals for a Collective
Bargaining Agreement. By reason thereof,
that Union declared a strike, which was called off the
next day due to conciliation negotiations.
Subsequently, however, DE JESUS refused to sit in conference with
AHLEU-KILUSAN on the ground that AHL had already entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement with another labor union, the AHLEA-PTGWO. That precipitated the picketing by petitioner
AHLEU-KILUSAN, which DE JESUS sought to enjoin in Civil Case No. 12384 filed
before respondent Court, and which the latter should not have taken cognizance
of.
We restate what Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court in
the case of Leoquinco, et al. vs.
Canada Dry Bottling Co. of the Philippines,
Inc., Employees Association, et al.,[19]
aptly said:
“The authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to take
cognizance of cases connected with the carrying out of a strike is well recognized
in this jurisdiction. In a long line of
decided cases this Court has held that where the acts complained of in the
petition for injunction are found to arise out of or to be connected with any
case exclusively belonging to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations, the case shall be heard by the said court. In those instances, the court of first
instance shall be without jurisdiction to issue any injunctive writ, whether
temporary or permanent, to restrain the conducting by strikers of activities
related to, or connected with, the labor dispute, and where the injunction is
indeed proper, recourse may be had to the Industrial
Court where the main action belongs.”
Neither does a Court of First Instance have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Industrial Relations over labor disputes arising
out of unfair labor practices.
“Labor disputes arising out of unfair labor practices committed
by any of the parties do not present a question of concurrent jurisdiction
between the Court of First Instance and the Court of Industrial Relations, but
that jurisdiction over such matters is vested exclusively in the Court of
Industrial Relations. The fact that a
civil case was filed ahead in the Court of First Instance than the filing of
the unfair labor practices charge in the Industrial
Court does not deprive the Court of Industrial
Relations of its jurisdiction”[20]
Although it was artfully made to appear that the suit was one for
Damages, that did not divest the Court of Industrial
Relations of its jurisdiction. The
Complaint itself, in paragraph 5, adverted to an “illegal strike” and
“picket lines”, which are but mere incidents or consequences of the
unfair labor practice complained against by petitioner Union. In other words, it is clear that the cause of
action for damages “arose out of or was necessarily intertwined with”
an alleged unfair labor practice committed by DE JESUS in refusing to sit at
the bargaining table. It is still the
labor Court, therefore, that has jurisdiction, particularly under the principle
that split jurisdiction is not to be countenanced for being “obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice.”
In the Leoquinco case, supra., it was also maintained that the action was not
against the strike or the strikers but was a simple demand for payment of
damages. The Court, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, held:
“This is not the first time that the argument was presented
before and ruled on by this Court. In
the case of Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. vs.
Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association (104
Phil 17), involving practically the same set of facts, the resort to the court
of first instance by the company to restrain the strikers’ allegedly unlawful
act of preventing the entrance into the company premises of the non-striking
employees and from molesting and harassing the company officials and agents,
was declared improper, the recourse being to institute appropriate action in
the Court of Industrial Relations and there to secure the necessary
restraining order under Section 9 (d) of the Industrial Peace Act. Then, overruling the contention that the
petition was for damages cognizable by the court of first instance, this Court
said:
‘While there is merit in petitioner’s claim that the lower court
should not have dismissed its entire petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, because said petition also asks for the payment of damages
suffered by the company on account of the alleged acts of violence and coercion
committed by the respondent Union in the course of its picketing of
petitioner’s premises, whether or not such damages are recoverable, and to
what extent, would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor
practice case between the parties pending in the Court of Industrial Relations,
and its final outcome.’
In other cases where the same question of
court jurisdiction was put in issue, because of the allegation of damages
against the strikers, this Court sustained the authority of the Court of
Industrial Relations, thus:
‘Neither would the claim for damages suffice to keep the case
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court of first instance. That claim
is interwoven with unfair labor practice.
The legality or illegality of the strike must necessarily be litigated
in the unfair labor practice case. And
the right to damages would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair
labor practice case — in the CIR. To allow Civil Case No. 60864 to prosper
would be to bring about split jurisdiction — which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.’ (Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez, L-25999,
February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 304)”
The same principles were reaffirmed by the Court in the cases of
Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers’ Federation
vs. Nolasco, et al. (24 SCRA 321 [1968]), per
Sanchez, J; Progressive Labor Association vs. Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation, et al. (33 SCRA 349 [1970]), per J.B.L. Reyes, J.;
Associated Labor Union, et al. vs. Cruz, et al. (41 SCRA 12 [1971]), per J.B.L.
Reyes, J.; Guevara vs. Hon. S. Gopengco, et al. (67
SCRA 236 [1975]), per Antonio, J.; Goodrich Employees Association vs. Flores,
et al, (73 SCRA 297 [1976]), per then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique R.
Fernando; and Federation of Free Farmers, et al. vs. Hon. V. Ericta, et al. (73 SCRA 601 [1976]), per then Justice, now
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando; Cyphil Employees
Association-NATU vs. Pharmaceutical Industries Inc., et al. (77 SCRA 135
[1972]), per then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando.
And CIR’s jurisdiction stays even if no
unfair labor practice case has been filed with the CIR. It is enough that unfair labor practice is
involved.[21]
Since respondent Court was without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 12384, neither did it have the authority to provide
for the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction.[22]
Furthermore, even if it could take cognizance of the dispute, respondent Court
did not follow the procedure laid down by law for the issuance of injunction.
“x x x in
order that an injunction may be properly issued the procedure laid down in
section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 should be followed and cannot be granted ex–parte as allowed by Rule 60, section 6 of the Rules
of Court. The reason is that the case,
involving as it does a labor dispute, comes under said section 9(d) of the
law. That procedure requires that there
should be a hearing at which the parties should be given an opportunity to
present witnesses in support of the complaint and of the opposition, if any,
with opportunity for cross-examination, and that the other conditions required
by said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief must be
established and stated in the order of the court. Unless this procedure is followed, the
proceedings would be invalid and of no effect.
The court would then be acting in excess of its jurisdiction”[23]
Inasmuch as exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
cases lies in the Court of Industrial Relations, the lack of employer-employee
relationship alleged by DE JESUS is a matter of defense which may be properly
raised in the Court of Industrial Relations.[24]
Another clear proviso of the Industrial Peace Act overlooked by
respondent Judge is section 9(d), which provides that a temporary restraining
order is effective for no longer than five days and becomes void at the
expiration of said five days. The records
reveal that the Restraining Order, issued on October 16, 1969, continued in full force and effect
until Injunction was issued on December
8, 1969.
All told, and as enunciated by Chief Justice Fernando in Cyphil Employees Association – NATU vs. Pharmaceutical
Industries, Inc. (supra.) “the impress of
deceptive plausibility that could be affixed through artful advocacy to a
complaint otherwise outside the jurisdiction of a regular court ought not to
have misled respondent Judge.”
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of January 23, 1970, and the Orders of October 16, 1969 and December 8, 1969, issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 12384, are hereby declared null and void for
want of jurisdiction, and accordingly set aside.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman),
Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
[1]
Annex “F”, Petition.
[2]
Annex “A”, Petition, p. 10, Rollo.
[3] P. 11, Rollo.
[4] P. 12, Rollo.
[5] Pp. 91-95, Rollo.
[6] P. 19, Rollo.
[7] P. 96, Rollo.
[8] Pp. 40-41, Rollo.
[9] Pp. 30-31, Rollo.
[10] P. 105, Rollo.
[11]
Annex “H”, Petition, p. 32, Rollo.
[12] Pp. 32-34, Rollo.
[13] P. 106, Rollo.
[14] P. 107, Rollo.
[15] P. 45, Rollo.
[16] Pp. 46-49, Rollo.
[17] P. 58, Rollo.
[18] Resolution of March 21, 1970, p. 60, Rollo.
[19] 37 SCRA 535 (1971).
[20]
Veterans Security Free Workers Union (FFW) vs.. Hon. Cloribel,
et al., 31 SCRA 297 (1970).
[21]
Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers’ Federation
vs. Hon. Nolasco, et al., supra.,
citing Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs.
Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association, supra.
[22] Leoquinco, et al vs. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, Inc., Employees Association, et al., supra.
[23] Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al, vs.
Tan, et al., 99 Phil 854, 867 (1956).
[24]
Veterans Security Free Workers Union vs. Hon. G. Cloribel
(31 SCRA 297 [1970]), citing Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez (19 SCRA
304 [1967]).