G.R. No. L-45168. September 25, 1979
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS, GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORP., INTERVENOR, ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RAMON D. BAGATSING, INTER…
GUERRERO, J.:
Two motions for leave of court to intervene in the above-entitled
case are before Us, the first by Greenfield Development Corporation,
claiming to be the registered owner of seven (7) parcels of land adjoining that
of private respondent, situated in the Barrio of Cupang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal (now portion of Metro Manila), with an aggregate
area of 783,367 square meters with TCT Nos. 366292, S-38660, S-38661, S-43229,
43230 and 93980 in the name of the movant, which land was originally registered
on September 20, 1913 in the registration book of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Vol. A-7, page 84, as Original Certificate of Title No. 684,
pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued on August 27, 1910 in the name of the
“Government of the Phil. Island” covering and embracing the land
otherwise known as the “Muntinlupa Estate”.
Movant alleges that upon comparison of the technical
descriptions set forth in TCT No. 42449 sought to be reconstituted by the
private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of two parcels
of land located in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal with an aggregate area
of 143 hectares, more or less, and designated as Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374,
with those described in the certificates of title of the movant, it appears
that the land supposedly covered by the certificate sought to be reconstituted
overlapped and included substantial portions of movant’s land, the location and
extent of the overlapping having been platted on the basis of the respective
technical descriptions referred to in the plan marked Annex 8 attached to the
motion; that movant therefore claims a substantial, material, proprietary and legal interest in the subject
matter of the instant petition which will directly and adversely affect the
petition for reconstitution of the respondent.
Movant also alleges that
among those overlapped by and adjacent to the land supposedly covered by the
title to be reconstituted aside from the movant are the residences within the
Alabang Hills Subdivision, Cielito Homes Subdivision, Tahanan Village, portion
of the South Super Highway, Meralco Substation, factories as well as roads and
infrastructures which respondent allegedly omitted to name and to give notice
of her petition for resconstitution.
It is further contended
that if reconstitution is granted, other title holders and possessors
overlapped by the land covered by the title sought to be reconstituted stand
to be deprived of their property rights and that greater injury shall be
inflicted to the Torrens system of registration for there will be two holders
of certificates of title overlapping each other thereby negating the very
purpose of the Torrens system and imperiling the indefeasibility and stability
of the same such that when this happens “the chaos that it will create
will be unimaginable.”
The second motion for
intervention filed by Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing
likewise prays for leave of court to intervene on substantially the same
grounds: I. That the Honorable Court a quo
has no jurisdiction to grant the petition for reconstitution; II. That granting arguendo, that the title
sought to be reconstituted is which it is not, the same cannot prevail over the
earlier title of herein intervenors or their predecessors-in-interest; and
III. That intervenors stand to be
divested of their property and thereby suffer special, immediate, direct and
irreparable injury in their proprietary rights, if reconstitution is granted.
These second movants
allege that they are the registered owners of parcels of land located at
Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila covered and evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Title issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
which were transfers from Original Certificate of Title No. 684 registered in
the name of “The Government of the Phil. Islands” originally
registered on Sept. 20, 1913, per survey in 1907 pursuant to Decree No. 4552
issued on August 27, 1910; that being registered owners and persons in actual
possession and as adjoining owners they were not personally notified of the
petition for reconstitution and that copies of the notices of hearing were not
posted on Lots 1 and 3 of the respondent before the hearing as required by the trial
court so that if reconstitution will be carried out, they stand to be divested
of their property by the overlapping of the area of the title sought to be
reconstituted on the land owned and actually in the possession of the movants
and their successors-in-interest, which overlapping are shown in the certified plans, Annexes 1
and 2 of the motion.
Movants further allege that a portion of the land in dispute was
covered by TCT No. 45397 (Lot 398-B) and 45398 (Lot 398-A) in the name of
movant Ramon D. Bagatsing and Toribio G. Reyes with an area of 815,317 sq.
meters and 201,591 sq. meters, respectively, the same being transfers from TCT
No. 14812 in the name of Toribio G. Reyes which in turn was a transfer from OCT
No. 684 in the name of “The Government of the Phil. Islands”
originally registered on Sept. 20, 1913 pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued on
August 27, 1910; that subsequent transfers by movant Ramon D. Bagatsing of
portions of the land were made to Meralco, to Alabang Development Corporation
which in turn sold to some 36 innocent purchasers for value in the Alabang
Hills Subdivision.
It is also averred that movant Alabang Development Corporation
obtained from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII an order dated
April 19,1969 for the issuance of certificates of title numbering 92 titles
over said parcels of land now surrounded by a high perimeter wall on its
boundaries which were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable
consideration who were not personally notified of the pendency of the
reconstitution case not only as adjoining owners but as actual possessors
thereof.
Private respondent separately opposed both motions, the first
motion on the ground that the supposed TCTs of the intervenor are of the 1972
vintage so that if same are true these titles are the ones that overlap that of
private respondent which was procured as early as November 13, 1942 and that of
her mother-predecessor issued on Sept. 29, 1942; that the motion to intervene
constitutes a mere annoyance tending merely to derail and delay the
proceedings; that petitioner is guilty of laches and that to grant the motion
after trial and judgment rendered comes out of time as an abuse of judicial
discretion and that whatever interest or right movants are supposed to have may
be fully protected by a separate proceeding.
Before resolving both motions for intervention, a brief recital
of the antecedent facts is necessary.
In an amended petition filed on November 12, 1970 before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda.
de Bernal sought the reconstitution of her Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
alleged to have been lost or destroyed during the last war, covering two
parcels of land described as follows:
(a) Lot 1 of plan II-4374 situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Parañaque (now Muntinlupa), Province of Rizal, with an
aggregate area of 717,523 sq. m., and (b) Lot 3 of plan II-4374 situated in the
Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Parañaque, Province of Rizal, with an aggregate area of 717,539 sq.m. Presented as the basic source of the title
sought to be reconstituted was the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-42449 issued in the name of herein private respondent.
Opposition to the
petition for reconstitution was filed by the Director of Lands, Pedro de la
Peña, Leodegario R. Alba, Jr., Angel Cruz, Aurora Favila, Democrito R. Favila
and Eufracia R. Favila, some of whom withdrew or never appeared or abandoned
their claims and after trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal on November
19, 1973 denied the petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-42449 for insufficiency of evidence. Private respondent moved for reconsideration
of the Order, or in the alternative, for the vacation thereof and for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The motion for new
trial was granted. After the hearing on
the newly discovered evidence, the court issued on September 18, 1974 an Order
again denying reconstitution of private respondent’s original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-42449, declaring that “(T)he Court still
entertains doubt as to the authenticity and genuineness of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C) which is
sought to be reconstituted.”
On appeal to the
respondent Court of Appeals[1] filed by private respondent, the same court
in its decision promulgated on October 1, 1976 reversed the appealed Orders.
On October 21, 1976, the
remaining oppositor, the Director of Lands, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed with the respondent court a Motion for New Period to File Motion
for Reconsideration alleging excusable negligence on his part for his failure
to file an extension of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration, to which herein private
respondent filed her Opposition. On
November 2, 1976, without waiting for the resolution of the above motion, the
Director of Lands filed a Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration attaching
thereto his Motion for Reconsideration dated October 1, 1976. Opposition thereto was likewise filed by
herein private respondent. On November
11, 1976, respondent Court issued its Resolution denying herein petitioner’s
motions on the ground that the decision sought to be reconsidered had become
final and executory.
Hence, the petition at
bar filed by the Director of Lands which was given due course by this Court in
the Resolution dated April 22, 1977.
On June 14, 1978, the case
was submitted for decision.
Thereafter, the herein two motions to intervene were separately filed
on December 7, 1978 and December
29, 1978.
Rule 12, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for intervention. According to Section 2 thereof, which reads:
“Sec. 2.
Intervention. – A person may,
before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof.”
It is quite clear and patent that the
motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings
where trial has already been concluded,
a judgment thereon had been promulgated in
favor of private respondent and on appeal by the losing party, the
Director of Lands, the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late,
beyond the period prescribed under the aforecoded Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of
which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to
secure to litigants. It is designed as
the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to
an end.[2]
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the
strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged
failure of, movants to act seasonably will
lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interest and
to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to
fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be proven
to be true. For it cannot be gainsaid
that if the petition for reconstitution
is finally granted, the chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the
certificates of title of the movants covering large areas of land
overlap or incroach on properties the title to which is being sought to be
reconstituted by private respondent, who herself indicates in her Opposition
that, according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping embraces some 87
hectares only, is certain and inevitable.
The aggregate area of the property claimed by respondent covering Lot 1
and Lot 2 is 1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly
residential sector of Metro Manila where growth and development are in rapid
progress to meet the demands of an urbanized, exploding population. Industries, factories, warehouses, plants,
and other commercial infrastructures are rising and spreading within the area
and the owners of these lands and the valuable improvements thereon will not
simply fold their hands but certainly will seek judicial protection of their
property rights or may even take the law into their own hands, resulting to
multiplicity of suits.
This Tribunal can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and legal controversies spawned by
overlapping and encroaching boundaries, each party relying on certificates of
titles issued under the TOrrens System or the Spanish registration laws or other
deeds and documents which prima facie show their lawful interests or
ownership therein. To the ordinary land
purchaser not fully acquainted with the intricacies of the law nor the validity
much less the authenticity of these instruments which in many instances are
found to be forged or simply reconstituted with areas that have been increased
in “cable surveys” with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials,
the courts by hastily stamping their approval on reconstituted titles have
wittingly and unwittingly aided and abetted these fraudulent transactions
resulting in the wiping out of the life-savings of many a poor, unlettered and
inexperienced lot buyer. The court must
guard against such haste and carefully take due precautions that the public interest
be protected.
In the case at bar, the sprawling area of the property in
question where various subdivisions, residential houses and homes and
infrastructures have mushroomed and the great number of people living or having
proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would certainly bring
about the swamping of the courts and the clogging of their dockets with cases
involving not only the original parties and the movants but also their
successors-in-interest. This litigation
will have no end, which this Court will not allow nor tolerate.
But over and above these considerations and circumstances which
We have pointed out, there is the basic and fundamental requirement under the
Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule
3, that “Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.” The
joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory under any and all conditions,
their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.[3]
The herein movants, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang
Development Corporation, Ramon D. Bagatsing, and all buyers from them, at least
those with ostensible proprietary interests as the MERALCO, Alabang Hills Subdivision,
Cielito Homes Subdivision, Tahanan Village, the Ministry of Highways insofar as
the South Super Highway is affected, are indispensable parties to these
proceedings as it has been shown affirmatively that they have such an interest
in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in their absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. The joinder must be ordered in order to
prevent multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter in dispute may be
determined once and for all in one litigation.[4]
The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable
and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not
only between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who
may be affected by the judgment.[5]
A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable
parties.[6]
We agree with the movants that the indefeasibility and stability
of the Torrens System will be imperiled should reconstitution be granted,
resulting into two holders of certificates of title to areas that overlap each
other. And where the overlapping area
embraces 87 hectares or 870,000 sq. meters as alleged, it becomes essential and
imperative to preserve the efficacy and integrity of our registration
system. This aspect of the case which
commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their
interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of
late intervention.
The crux of the matter, however, lies in ascertaining whether
there really is overlapping of boundaries of the properties of the movants for
intervention and that of the private respondent. As We scrutinize carefully the claim of each
party based on survey readings and plattings appearing on the plans submitted
as annexes, We find that the same have not passed the rigid test of accuracy
and authenticity as should be determined by precision instruments duly verified
by accredited surveyors. Indeed, each
claim may appear to be as good and self-serving as the other. And since
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, the veracity and correctness
of the alleged overlapping is better left to those scientifically qualified,
trained and experienced and whose integrity is beyond question and dispute.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in view of the higher and greater
interest of the public and in order to administer justice consistent with a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the
parties and their numerous successors-in-interest, the motions for
intervention are hereby granted.
The Court directs the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau
of Lands or his duly authorized representative with due notice to the parties
and in their presence or that of their duly authorized representatives to
conduct a relocation of the respective boundaries of the properties claimed by
the movants and the private respondent within 90 days after notice and his fees
shall be borne equally by the parties and thereafter to submit to this Court
the result of such relocation survey, indicating therein such overlapping as he
may have found and determined and the location of such industries, factories,
warehouses, plants and other commercial infrastructures, residential buildings
and other constructions, public or private roads, and other landmarks found
within the areas concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., on leave.
[1]
Pascual, J., ponente; Bautista, J. and Santiago Jr., J., concurring.
[2]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 525.
[3]
Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348.
[4]
Palarca vs. Baquisig, 38 Phil. 177, 178.
[5]
Puentebella vs. Feati, et al., 94 Phil. 644.
[6]
49 C.J.S. 67.